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GOVERNING YOUTH: CONFIGURATIONS OF EU YOUTH POLICY  
 
Marinko Banjac  
University of Ljubljana 
 
Abstract 
The European Union has developed a range of measures to coordinate the actions 
of governments and other institutionalized actors in the field of youth as well as 
practical programs and actions directly addressing young individuals. Applying the 
Foucauldian analytics of government approach, this paper shows that EU Youth 
Policy is a particular field of government simultaneously regulating the actions of 
actors dealing with youth issues while also directing the ‘proper’ behavior and 
conduct of young individuals primarily as jobseekers. The Open Method of 
Coordination and the Structured Dialogue as modes of governance are used at the 
EU level to disperse political power across a range of institutions. Governing is 
accomplished through the notions of the involvement and equivalence of partners 
dealing with youth issues. Complementing this, by implementing the Youth in 
Action Program the EU is directly encouraging young Europeans to be self-
responsible and to act as active economically valuable (prospective) workers. 
 
Keywords: EU Youth policy, Structured Dialogue, government, governance 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Union is often promoted in an idealized way, as a space where much 
is done to create favorable conditions in which young people can seek 
opportunities, develop their skills and actively participate in European society. 
Indeed, the European Union (EU) represents itself as a unique community in which 
young people are, through diverse programs and actions, stimulated and 
encouraged to enter the labor market and learn how to become more employable.1 
On the other hand, the EU authorities, especially in the context of the economic 
crisis that hit the EU in 2008, are not entirely blind to the internal problems facing 
young people. In particular, unemployment is increasingly considered one of the 
most pressing issues. As the former Commissioner for Education, Culture, 
Multilingualism and Youth, Androulla Vassiliou, noted, “one in five young people in 
Europe cannot find a job”.2 Therefore, what we are encountering is a somewhat 
ambiguous notion of European space; it is at once presented and considered as an 
auspicious economic zone and as a space affected by unpleasant (if not critical) 
economic circumstances.   
 
                                                 
1  See European Commission, Focus On: Youth Employment. European Good Practice 
Projects (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012). 
2  European Commission, Focus On: Youth Employment. European Good Practice 
Projects (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012), 3. 
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While there are practically no objections or counter-arguments to the notion that 
the issues confronting European youth need to be resolved, the solutions are far 
from straightforward. The EU has been at the forefront of the search for remedies to 
the challenges young people face. In this context, the Renewed Framework for 
European Cooperation in the Youth Field (2010–2018), more commonly known as 
the EU Youth Strategy, was adopted by the European Commission in 2009. The 
Strategy is an overarching document for EU Youth Policy with two overall 
objectives: first, to provide more and equal opportunities for young people in 
education and in the labor market and, second, to encourage young people to be 
active citizens and participate in society.3 Because EU Youth Policy can only 
complement and support national youth policies, the Strategy is implemented on 
the European level through relatively new modes of governance, namely the Open 
Method of Coordination which is a non-binding, intergovernmental framework for 
cooperation and policy exchange, and through the Structured Dialogue which 
serves as a forum for continuous joint reflection between young people and 
policymakers across the EU in the youth field. In addition, yet equally importantly, 
the EU considers youth as part of the solution; every young person is spoken of as an 
agent of change and a critical resource in society upon which the EU’s future 
depends. Within EU Youth Policy, young individual’s concrete activities and actions 
were stimulated through the Youth in Action program which ran from 2007 to 2013 
and in 2014 was included in the new Erasmus+ program scheduled to last from 
2014–2020.4 
 
EU Youth Policy is obviously a field with diverse mechanisms and means available 
through which specific objectives are to be achieved. Within the policy field actions 
on two different, yet complementary levels are proposed and implemented: the 
intergovernmental level (which, besides the governments of member states, 
includes other more or less institutionalized actors/organizations), and that of 
young individuals. 
 
Not much research attention has been paid to the EU’s role in the field of youth 
policy, which is also curious because the EU considers young people as a driving 
force and one of the priorities of its political agenda. This article aims to fill this gap 
by critically analyzing the complex entanglement of processes and practices, the 
                                                 
3  European Commission, An EU Strategy for Youth – Investing and Empowering. A 
Renewed Open Method of Coordination to Address Youth Challenges and Opportunities. 
Com(2009) 200 Final (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2009). 
4  The Youth in Action program has certainly not been the only EU program or 
initiative to address young individuals. Currently, among others, young people are targeted 
by the Youth on the Move initiative, the Youth Opportunities initiative, the Your First EURES 
Job action, and the Youth@Work campaign. All these are clearly important but are 
implemented under the EU’s Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion Policy. Therefore, in 
this article, we focus on Youth in Action program that has been implemented within the EU 
Youth Policy field. 
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involvement of multiple collective actors as well as individuals within the youth 
policy, and how forms of governing the youth field are articulated through a variety 
of governmental practices and mediations between power and (collective) 
subjectivities. Applying the Foucauldian analytics of government approach5, we aim 
to show that EU Youth Policy is a complex field of government in which governing is 
undertaken not by a central institution/authority but by a multiplicity of authorities 
and agencies, employing a variety of techniques, practices, mechanisms, programs, 
and forms of knowledge. Through the relatively new modes of governance, that is, 
the Open Method of Coordination and the Structured Dialogue, the EU disperses 
power and involves various actors, formalized, institutionalized as well as more 
informal stakeholders. Beside these more formalized modes of governance, specific 
subjects – young individuals as part of the European population – are directly 
addressed through various initiatives, programs and actions to take specific 
measures, actions and types of behavior. 
 
Although quite a few studies from the critical Foucauldian perspective have been 
conducted on the Open Method of Coordination as a particular European 
governmental mechanism,6 we aim to show that within EU Youth Policy such modes 
of governance are only part of the comprehensive set-up of the governmental 
rationale and concrete practices through which governing in the youth field is 
achieved. Thus, in this paper we rethink the Open Method of Coordination and the 
Structured Dialogue also in relation to the EU’s Youth in Action Program through 
which a specific form of young personhood is constituted. While modes of 
governance such as the Open Method of Coordination and the Structured Dialogue 
are primarily a means of governing more institutionalized, formal and informal 
organizations such as national governments, civil society (youth) organizations, local 
governments, etc., the EU also carries out programs in the field of youth that aim to 
find solutions to problems (e.g. unemployment) residing in the capacity of young 
individuals as rational, autonomous, responsible, active, and entrepreneurial 
subjects. EU Youth Policy is therefore critically analyzed as a field in which 
government occurs through governmental mechanisms, strategies, programs, and 
                                                 
5  Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (Los Angeles: 
Sage, 2010), Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel 
Foucault, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991). 
6  Roger Dale, "Forms of Governance, Governmentality and the EU's Open Method of 
Coordination," in Governmentality: Governing International Spaces, ed. Wendy Larner and 
William Walters (London: Routledge, 2004), Jens Henrik Haahr, "Open Co-ordination as 
Advanced Liberal Government," Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 2 (2004), also see 
Caroline de la Porte, "Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising 
Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?," European Law Journal 8, no. 1 (2002). 
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actions and by which European youth are governed in a manner so that the desires, 
aspirations, and interests of young individuals are shaped. 
 
In the first part of the paper we briefly present the theoretical approach of ‘analytics 
of government’ and explain why it is useful for examining current modes of 
governing in Europe and specifically within the youth policy field. Second, we 
present the formation of EU Youth Policy and explain the role of the Open Method 
of Coordination and the Structured Dialogue within it. We show how these two 
modes of governance are employed by the EU to disperse power among a variety of 
stakeholders and to ‘govern at a distance’. We then move on to show how EU Youth 
Policy addresses young individuals through different programs and actions to 
develop particular comportments, behaviors and activities of individuals: a form of 
personhood we can describe as the entrepreneurial Self – an active, responsible and 
self-caring individual seeking to make an entrepreneur of herself or himself. 
 
2. ‘Analytics of government’ and the governmentalization of Europe 
 
As two of its most prominent proponents, Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose7, argue, the 
analytics of government approach is concerned with the analysis of the specificities 
of diverse contexts in which particular socio-political practices, apparatuses, 
institutions and structures emerge. What studies starting from this perspective are 
concerned with are programs, acts, practices, mechanisms, techniques, and 
knowledge that are aimed at conducting, managing, administering, and directing 
large-scale polities or organizations/institutions as well as the micro-scale, that is, at 
individuals as part of a specific population. The analytics of government focuses on 
the knowledge that is enmeshed in various governmental practices. The focus is on 
the “heterogeneity of authorities which seek to govern conduct, the heterogeneity 
of the strategies, devices and technologies used for governing […]”.8 Mitchell Dean9 
similarly explains that the analytics of government is concerned with modes of 
governing, acting, intervening, and directing that rely upon definite mechanisms 
and programs which, in the name of the public good and well-being of society, 
aspire to regulate, inform, arrange, and adapt social and economic policies, 
activities or practices. In this light, government is clearly not something which can 
be pinpointed but is the deliberate shaping of the way collectivities and individuals 
act; it aims at “not only the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic 
subjection but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, which 
                                                 
7  Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, "Political Thought and the Limits of Orthodoxy: A 
Response to Curtis," The British Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1995): 591. 
8  Herbert Gottweis, "Theoretical Strategies of Poststructuralist Policy Analysis: 
Towards an Analytics of Government," in Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding 
Governance in the Network Society, ed. Maarten A. Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar 
(Cambridge, UK; New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 255. 
9  Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. 
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were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in 
this sense, is to structure the possible field of actions of other”.10 
 
Such a perspective is particularly relevant and useful for examining new modes of 
government emerging at the European level. The EU is frequently characterized as a 
multi-level polity; a space which manifests itself through the recognition and 
acknowledgement of new actors and political processes.11 The latter are commonly 
identified as novel patterns of governance in which traditional centers of authority 
(states) are practically compelled to interact, network, and cooperate in 
policymaking processes with a myriad of other actors from local, national, regional, 
and global levels and coming from different sectors of society.12 Governance 
presupposes regular, iterative communication and exchanges among a more or less 
fixed set of interdependent actors that presumably have guaranteed access in the 
policy-making and decision-making cycle. In the EU, such political processes have 
been increasingly identified as “multi-level governance”13 whose key objective is, as 
the European Commission stressed in The White Paper on European Governance, to 
“open up the policy-making process to get more people and organisations involved 
in shaping and delivering EU policy. It promotes greater openness, accountability 
and responsibility for all those involved”.14 
 
One can argue from the analytics of government perspective that such a mode of 
governance15 is a re-arrangement of governing in which power is dispersed among 
associational networks of different actors from the private sector, civil society 
                                                 
10  Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 790. 
11  European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper. Com(2001) 428 
Final, vol. Commission of the European Communities (Brussels: Brussels, 2001), Patrick Le 
Galès, European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
12  Philippe C. Schmitter, "Participation in Governance Arrangements: Is There Any 
Reason to Expect It Will Achieve" Sustainable and Innovative Policies in a Multi-Level 
Context," in Participatory Governance. Political and Societal Implications, ed. Jürgen R. Grote 
and Bernard Gbikpi (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2002). 
13  See William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, 
Governmentality and European Integration (New York: Routledge, 2005), 2; also see Neill 
Nugent, The government and politics of the European Union: (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003); John McCormick and Jonathan Olsen, The European Union: politics and policies 
(Boulder, CO: Perseus Books Group, 2013). 
14  European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper. Com(2001) 428 
Final, 3. 
15  For more on the conceptual distinction between government, governmentality, and 
governance, see Mark Bevir, "Governance and Governmentality after Neoliberalism," Policy 
& Politics 39, no. 4 (2011). 
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organizations, and parts of the state apparatus.16 Political power is exercised on the 
basis of temporary as well as more long-term alliances between diverse authorities 
“in projects to govern a multitude of facets of economic activity, social life and 
individual conduct”.17 The restructuring of governing through polycentric 
ensembles in which the public-private distinction is blurred is deeply ingrained in a 
consolidating neoliberal rationale which, among others, combines “a desire to 
construct politically the market as the preferred social institution of resource 
mobilisation and allocation”.18 Moreover, as Thomas Lemke importantly upgrades 
Rose and Miller’s argument regarding the new modes for governing different 
collective agencies (e.g. state apparatuses, civil society organizations, private 
companies, etc.) as well as individuals: 
 
Neo-liberalism encourages individuals to give their lives a specific entrepreneurial 
form. It responds to stronger ‘demand’ for individual scope for self-determination 
and desired autonomy by ‘supplying’ individuals and collectives with the possibility of 
actively participating in the solution of specific matters and problems […]. This 
participation has a ‘price-tag’: the individuals themselves have to assume 
responsibility for these activities and the possible failure thereof. 19 
 
Within the EU modes of governance are certainly not limited to the inclusion of 
specific actors, agencies and organizations and their commitments, actions, and 
processes but are composed of specific practices, mechanisms, and technologies. 
Governing is accomplished through a varied mix of practical features of government 
that include a range of different policies and programs. This intricate and entangled 
amalgam of modes of governance and policies, programs and (practical) actions is 
what constitutes European government and can be described, using William 
Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr’s20 phrase, as the governmentalization of Europe. 
Walters and Haahr have effectively shown in their book entitled Governing Europe 
that a specific form of governmentalization can be observed at the European level. 
The governmentalization of Europe involves a series of diverse and complex policies 
and programs that serve to constitute Europe and, more particularly, the EU as a 
                                                 
16  Klaus Dingwerth, "Democratic Governance Beyond the State: Operationalising an 
Idea," in Global Governance Working Paper No 14 (Amsterdam, Berlin, Oldenburg, Potsdam: 
The Global Governance Project, 2004), Mark Bevir, "Governance and Governmentality after 
Neoliberalism," Policy & Politics 39, no. 4 (2011). 
17  Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, "Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of 
Government," The British Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (1992): 272. 
18  Erik Swyngedouw, "Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of 
Governance-Beyond-the-State," Urban Studies 42, no. 11 (2005): 1998. 
19  "'The Birth of Bio-Politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the Collège De France on 
Neo-Liberal Governmentality," Economy and Society 30, no. 2 (2001): 202. 
20  Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European 
Integration. 
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space in which governmental apparatus is deeply involved in the processes of 
enhancing different aspects of socio-political life. 
 
Having reflected on and explained the main aspects and elements of the analytics 
of government approach and also clarified its analytical value and potency in 
examining modes of governing within the EU, it seems reasonable to point out the 
analytical capacity of this approach for investigating EU youth policy. From the 
analytics of government perspective, the policy field can be observed as an 
amalgamated framework where specific political rationalities, strategies, and 
programs are constructed and ingrained into the political technologies and specific 
practices through and in which numerous collective actors of various types as well as 
individuals are involved and molded in the exercise of power. Analytics of 
government is valuable for explaining policies at the EU level as specific socio-
political artefacts or fields emanating from particular historical conditions and as an 
answer to specific needs and demands while at the same time always being flexible, 
changeable, and versatile. Moreover, youth policy should not be seen from an 
analytics of government perspective as a framework in which one political power or 
authority regulates the behavior and conduct of other actors. On the contrary, a 
specific policy field can be observed as a terrain of government where the 
capacities of different actors are used as a political strategy to secure particular 
ends. 
 
3. Modes of governance within EU Youth Policy: Historical contexts and current 
developments 
 
Although the development of a more or less coherent EU Youth Policy is quite a 
recent phenomenon, ideas and official references to youth on the European level 
have been present since the 1950s. Entering into force in 1958, the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community already explicitly refers to the 
young European population. Article 50 thereof states that member states shall, as 
part of a common program, encourage the exchange of young workers. The focus is 
thus not on the entire young population but exclusively on working youth. Although 
references to youth obviously did exist, it must be stressed that these were relatively 
scattered and more or less incoherent. This situation gradually changed and in the 
second half of the 1980s the first tangible initiatives were set up.  
 
Claire Wallace and Rene Bendit argue that one of the formative events for initiating 
the European Youth Policy was consultations with youth ministers in 1988 and the 
European Commission’s subsequent publication of a Memorandum which examined 
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the feasibility of a common European Youth Policy. 21 But with the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) it became clear that moves towards a common EU Youth Policy were limited 
since the competence to deal with the subject was restrained to encouraging 
cooperation between member states and, if necessary, by supporting and 
supplementing their actions.22 This principle of subsidiarity remained unchanged 
during the revisions of Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2000), and Lisbon (2009). 
 
Another important political development in the youth field was implementation of 
the Youth for Europe action program adopted by the Council in 1988. The program 
was designed to promote youth exchanges in the Community by implementing 
exchange and youth initiatives outside of formal education. Moreover, the program 
enabled member states to develop and share information in the field of youth.23 In 
the 1990s, especially in the second half, the question of employment became a 
common issue for more or less all member states and, as such, a kind of trigger for 
deeper European integration within the social dimension.24 One result was the 
adoption of a new strategy in 1997, known as the European Employment Strategy, 
which represents an important political milieu in which youth policy was further 
developed. In 1999, the Council and the Ministers of Youth meeting with the 
Council adopted a resolution on youth participation.  
 
This was one of the first explicit documents to clearly call for the cooperation of 
young people within the European space to participate in (political) processes that 
affect their lives.25 Further, in the same year the European Commission, Parliament 
and Council declared the need for a global, transparent and coherent EU Youth 
Policy reinforced by Social Agenda 2000, emphasizing the central role of the 
promotion of knowledge, education and vocational training. The result was the 
Youth program, superseding the Youth for Europe program.26 Nevertheless, a still 
present and recurring problem was how to address the issues and needs of youth at 
                                                 
21  "Youth Policies in Europe: Towards a Classification of Different Tendencies in Youth 
Policies in the European Union," Perspectives on European Politics and Society 10, no. 3 
(2009). 
22  Pekka Kettunen and Corinna Wolff, "Europeanisation through the Back Door: EU 
Social Policy and the Member States," Politička misao 47, no. 5 (2011). 
23  Council of the European Communities, "Council Decision of 16 June 1988 Adopting 
an Action Programme for the Promotion of Youth Exchanges in the Community - "Youth for 
Europe" Programme," Official Journal of the European Communities L 158, no. 25 June 
(1988). 
24  See Janine Goetschy, "The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and 
Development," European Journal of Industrial Relations 5, no. 2 (1999). 
25  Council of Ministers of Youth "Resolution of the Council and the Ministers of Youth 
Meeting within the Council of 8 February 1999 on Youth Participation," Official Journal of the 
European Union C 042, no. 17 February (1999). 
26  Wallace and Bendit, "Youth Policies in Europe: Towards a Classification of Different 
Tendencies in Youth Policies in the European Union," 453. 
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the European level but without interfering with the competencies of the member 
states. 
 
The response came in 2001 in the form of a new document known as The White 
Paper on European Youth: A New Impetus for European Youth. Here the European 
Commission committed itself to a clear policy and actions compatible with it. The 
introduction and launching of this document, which aimed to lay down a detailed 
and well-argued framework for cooperation between member states and the 
Commission, has been part of a larger, relatively profound and more tangible move 
towards so-called European governance. This does not mean, of course, that certain 
models of governance were not already in work at that stage,27 but the Lisbon 
Strategy and The White Paper on the European Governance are just two of the 
markers signifying the new impetus for implementing new concrete and allegedly 
more democratic modes of policymaking on the European level. The White Paper 
on European Youth introduced the Open Method of Coordination as a specific form 
of governance through which issues within EU Youth Policy should be dealt with.  
 
The Open Method of Coordination as a potent governance practice was introduced 
at the Lisbon European Council in 2000:  
 
The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion […] Implementing this strategy will be achieved by improving the existing 
processes, introducing a new Open Method of Coordination at all levels….28 
 
Dermot Hodson and Imelda Maher29 state that the Open Method of Coordination 
was in fact not introduced in 2000 ex nihilo; on the contrary, it had already existed 
in different, yet similar versions. Nevertheless, it was introduced by the Council as a 
novel vehicle for a more open and democratic process towards common EU goals 
and objectives. According to the Council, it has four key elements: setting up 
different guidelines and objectives for the EU; establishing performance indicators 
and benchmarking movements towards a previously established objective; 
translating objectives into implementation goals not only at the European but also, 
                                                 
27  Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-Level Governance and European 
Integration (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
28  European Council, Presidency Conclusions (2000 [cited 2 June 2012); available 
from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm. 
29  "The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic 
Policy Co-ordination," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 4 (2001). 
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or primarily, on the national, regional and local levels; systematic monitoring of the 
implementation with an emphasis on the process of mutual learning.30 
 
Within EU Youth Policy, the Open Method of Coordination has been adopted and 
applied basically according to the principles defined in the White Paper on 
European Governance. More concretely, the Commission has proposed that several 
subjects are suited to the Open Method of Coordination, including “participation, 
voluntary service, information, improving the public authorities’ awareness of young 
people’s concerns, and, more generally, any other subject which might contribute to 
the development and recognition of activities on the youth front (e.g. youth work, 
youth clubs, street work, projects to foster a sense of citizenship, integration, 
solidarity among young people, etc.) for the part which is not covered by other 
political processes such as employment, social integration and education”.31 These 
subjects correspond very strongly to the kind of activities and resources normally 
associated with youth policies at the national level. Among the themes proposed for 
applying the Open Method of Coordination to, it is particularly participation which 
is set as a priority. In order to facilitate the participation of European Youth, the 
Commission proposed “strengthening a consultation structure for young people at 
European level” in which civil society organizations (and particularly the Youth 
Forum) representing youth are supposed to participate.  
 
This can be viewed as a particular form of neoliberal governance which Jacques 
Donzelot has termed “the mobilization of society”,32 since within it we can observe 
“a pluralisation of the centre, enabling the problems […] to rebound back on 
society, so that society is implicated in the task of resolving them, where previously 
the state was expected to hand down an answer for society’s needs”.33 It is a specific 
form of government where political power is understood to be dispersed across a 
range of formal and informal institutions or organizations without manipulating 
specific processes and without dominating. Bearing in mind that the Open Method 
of Cooperation is primarily a new mode of governance through which, as described 
by the Lisbon Strategy, the EU seeks to become “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”, it becomes clear that it 
serves a specific governmental purpose: that of mobilizing all available sources, 
                                                 
30  European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper. Com (2001) 428 
Final, European Council Presidency Conclusions ([cited). 
31  European Commission, White Paper - a New Impetus for Youth. Com(2001) 681 
Final (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2001), 16. 
32  "The Mobilization of Society," in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: 
With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin 
Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
33  Jacques Donzelot, "The Mobilization of Society," in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, ed. Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 178. 
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including, or in particular, youth for pursuing a neoliberal agenda of 
competitiveness, dynamism of business and for securing a climate conducive to 
investment, innovation, and entrepreneurship. 
 
Although the Commission and the Council have both expressly assessed the Open 
Method of Coordination and the framework for European cooperation as part of EU 
Youth Policy in general as a successful platform for the member states in addressing 
youth-related issues, the European Youth Pact was set up by the European Council 
in 2005 to further promote the participation of all young people in education, 
employment, and society in general. In the same year, the Council of Ministers 
adopted a resolution which invited both the Commission and the member states to 
develop and implement the Structured Dialogue with young people and their 
organizations, researchers in the youth field and policymakers. The need for such a 
governance mechanism was confirmed by a Council resolution in November 2006 
and by the Commission in 2007. The Structured Dialogue has also been integrated 
into the renewed framework for cooperation proposed in the new EU Youth 
Strategy that sets current objectives within EU Youth Policy for the period between 
2010 and 2018. 
 
Implementation of the Structured Dialogue as a mode of governance within EU 
Youth Policy starts from the presumption that “young people and their 
organizations should be consulted on and closely involved in the development, 
implementation and follow-up of policy actions affecting them”.34 As such, the 
Dialogue aims to address a wide range of youth organizations as well as those young 
individuals who have fewer opportunities or are not formally organized: “through 
the Structured Dialogue, the EU institutions want to make full participation of 
young people in society a reality and strengthen the partnership between the EU 
institutions and young people”.35 Particularly the European Youth Forum, a youth 
organization active on the European level, has been targeted by the Commission as 
the main partner of EU institutions because it speaks on behalf of a great number of 
young people.  
 
Quite a few different events of the Structured Dialogue take place in the member 
states and at the European level from which different opinions, views, and 
                                                 
34  Council of the European Union, "Resolution of the Council and of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting within the Council, on 
Addressing the Concerns of Young People in Europe — Implementing the European Pact for 
Youth and Promoting Active Citizenship," Official Journal of the European Union C 292, no. 
24 November (2005): 5. 
35  European Commission, The New Concept of the European Structured Dialogue 
with Young People. Eac/D1/Jk/D (2008) (Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-
General for Education and Culture, 2008), 1. 
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judgments are gained. The Commission is a key steering and coordinating partner in 
the dialogue but it relies heavily on the support of the member states and the 
National Youth Councils to organize local, regional, and national debates and to 
feed the results back from the national to the European level. 
 
From this short sketch of the Structured Dialogue it is possible to observe 
techniques, mainly in the form of organized participatory events, employed for the 
purpose of governing through the notions of involvement, equivalence of each 
partner involved in the dialogue, reciprocal expectations and inputs of the parties 
involved, negotiations and, in the last instance, mutual consent for possible future 
policies. As such, the Structured Dialogue is a governmental strategy that employs 
techniques of voice and representation by which the targeted actors are endowed 
with the possibility to participate in the policymaking process, but which are at the 
same time shaped and guided through and throughout this process. 
 
The Structured Dialogue has primarily been put into practice to “help achieve the 
Lisbon employment goals” and in the process it is young people who need to be 
fully integrated into society. In this context, the EU strives to support young people 
in their efforts to access the labor market and encourages them to develop 
creativity and entrepreneurial skills. Further, the EU emphasizes that the young 
should be equipped with knowledge, skills, and competencies through high-quality, 
relevant education, training, and mobility experiences. The first step towards such 
concrete actions and support mechanisms for youth is, it is argued, precisely the 
dialogue that must be as inclusive as possible and developed at the local, regional, 
national and EU levels and which serves “as a forum for continuous joint reflection 
on the priorities, implementation and follow-up of European cooperation in the 
youth field”.36 The Structured Dialogue as a specific mode of governance is a way to 
promote the economy by seeking to guide and mold the conduct of specific formal 
as well as informal institutional arrangements as targets of governmental apparatus 
of local, national and European institutions. As such, the Structured Dialogue as a 
means of governing a range of diverse actors in the field of youth works through the 
“flexible forms of strategic alliance […] that cut across traditional institutional, 
professional and sector boundaries”37 and therefore transforms the organizations 
and institutions involved in the dialogue into areas of calculable space molded as a 
collective body limiting their forms and possible actions. 
 
 
                                                 
36  Council of the European Union, "Council Resolution of 27 November 2009 on a 
Renewed Framework for European Cooperation in the Youth Field (2010-2018)," Official 
Journal of the European Union C 311, no. 19 December (2009): 4. 
37  Mark Duffield, "Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid," Disasters 
25, no. 4 (2001): 318. 
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4. Governing youth through the Youth in Action program: towards self-responsible 
young individuals 
 
As we have seen, the modes of governance that are invoked and actualized within 
EU Youth Policy, and the agencies which are endowed with possibilities to 
participate in the policymaking more frequently and thoroughly, are predominantly 
collectivities/organizations, whether formal or informal, rather than young 
individuals. But this does not mean that EU Youth Policy does not target individuals 
as part of the young European population. To this end, there is a specific program 
known as Youth in Action (now under the Erasmus+ program) through which young 
individuals are addressed. The Youth in Action program was established by the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in 2006 to be 
implemented between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 201338. It was a successor 
of the Youth Program (2000–2006) and recognized by the EU as a key instrument in 
providing young people with opportunities.39 Its stated aims are to create a sense of 
active European citizenship among young Europeans and to involve them in shaping 
the EU’s future. To this end, the program’s main objectives, summarized in five 
points were: (1) to promote young people's active citizenship in general and their 
European citizenship in particular; (2) to develop solidarity and promote tolerance 
among young people, in particular in order to reinforce social cohesion in the EU; 
(3) to foster mutual understanding between young people in different countries; (4) 
to contribute to developing the quality of support systems for youth activities and 
the capabilities of civil society organizations in the youth field; and (5) to promote 
European cooperation in the youth field. More specific objectives of the program 
included: giving young people and youth organizations the opportunity to take part 
in the development of society in general and the EU in particular; encouraging 
young people’s participation in the democratic life of Europe; encouraging 
initiative, enterprise, and creativity. To achieve both these general and specific 
objectives, the program has been divided into five action clusters known as Youth 
for Europe; European Voluntary Service, Youth in the World; Youth Support 
Systems, and Support for European Co-operation in the Youth Field. 
 
As already stressed, the key subjects addressed by Youth in Action are evidently 
young individuals as members of the young European population. Here, the 
objective of government is to bring up, cultivate, mold, and nourish forces and 
“capacities of living individuals as members of specific population, as resources to 
be fostered, to be used and to be optimized”.40 Youth is being valued, regarded, and 
                                                 
38  The Decision was amended by a Decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council in 2008.  
39  European Commission, Youth in Action Programme Guide (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2012). 
40  Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 29. 
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conducted as a specific component of society at large that need to act in such a way 
to successfully enter the ‘adult’ world of being useful to European society.  
 
The Youth in Action program as part of EU Youth Policy has from the outset been 
formulated as a flexible governmental mechanism which can adapt to emerging 
issues and include specific actions responding to those issues not identified when 
the program started to be implemented. To this end, annual priorities were selected 
with the aim of better defining the context of implementation of the Program and 
by anchoring the Program to the most pressing issues at the European level.  
 
From 2010 to 2012 one of the now already permanent annual priorities was the 
issue of youth (un)employment. This persisting problem has worsened especially 
since 2008 and was also highlighted as one of the most acute concerns facing 
European youth by the European Commission in its 2009 Youth Strategy.41 The 
document acknowledges that today’s globalized world is an opportunity for young 
people to find jobs, but at the same time a place where unemployment can easily 
become a reality for vulnerable workers such as young people.  
 
This detected problem of young Europeans has received a response within the 
Youth in Action Program. As already noted, the question of (un)employment has 
been an annual priority of the program since 2010. In 2012, priority was given to 
projects financed by the Program that aim to promote young people’s commitment 
to more inclusive growth, projects tackling the issue of youth unemployment, as 
well as projects seeking to stimulate unemployed young people’s mobility and 
active participation in society. Further, the Program especially called for specific 
actions to stimulate entrepreneurship and employability among young individuals. 
Such priorities are clearly in line with the European Youth Strategy’s 
recommendations to youth workers whose responsibility should be to “encourage 
partnerships between the worlds of education and enterprise in fostering the 
transition of young people into employment and in supporting the development of 
the competences and skills young people need to participate fully in employment 
and society”.42  
 
We can see how obligations and responsibilities are divided between different 
subjects. On one hand, youth workers and organizations are expected to support, 
encourage, and foster youth employability, while it is the responsibility of young 
individuals themselves to seize such opportunities for developing their knowledge, 
                                                 
41  European Commission, An EU Strategy for Youth – Investing and Empowering. A 
Renewed Open Method of Coordination to Address Youth Challenges and Opportunities. 
Com(2009) 200 Final. 
42  European Commission, European Research on Youth. Supporting Young People to 
Participate Fully in Society (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
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competencies and skills, with the latter predominantly being entrepreneurial. What 
was once a public area of responsibility is now a responsibility of individuals, groups, 
and communities that are encouraged freely and rationally to conduct themselves. 
However, these recommendations, incentives, and stimulations from the side of the 
EU do entail something that could be called contractual implication. Namely, 
individuals and youth workers must assume active responsibility for their actions and 
activities, “both for carrying them out and […] their outcomes”.43 In addition, 
government through the EU Youth Policy involves processes of responsibilization, 
inciting and encouraging individuals to act, behave and conduct themselves as 
enterprise, to conduct themselves in accordance with a normalized, appropriate 
and/or approved model of action. 
 
Instances of such ‘proper’ comportment, actions, and behavior of youth 
organizations, workers and young individuals are aggregated and presented 
through the identification of good practice projects within the Youth in Action 
Program, available to the wider public in the publication Focus on: Youth 
Employment published by the European Commission.44 As the former Commissioner 
for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth, Androulla Vassiliou, explains: 
“The projects […] demonstrate how Youth in Action empowers young people, giving 
them chance to transform themselves to take on a role in the job market, with its 
evolving demands for adaptability and resourcefulness”.45 Such a published 
compendium of good practices is precisely what the former commissioner was 
hinting at: good practice cases are part of the governmental technologies of 
performance that aim to demonstrate, make visible, benchmark and measure 
performance and conduct, and are allegedly a way to restore trust, stimulate, and 
make subjects accountable.46 
 
An example of what the European Commission assesses as a good practice was a 
project conducted within the Youth in Action Program in Estonia in 2010. The motto 
of the project was “Getting prepared for the world of work”. The project organizers 
prepared a training course that helped 16 Estonian jobseekers get ready for their 
position in the labor market and to improve their knowledge and possibilities of 
finding a job. The project sought to raise the participants’ awareness of youth 
                                                 
43  Graham Burchell, "Liberal Government and the Techniques of the Self," in Foucault 
and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government, ed. 
Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press and UCL Press, 1996), 29. 
44  European Commission, Focus On: Youth Employment. European Good Practice 
Projects. 
45  Ibid., 4. 
46  Hans Krause Hansen and Dorte Salskov-Iversen, "Remodeling the Transnational 
Political Realm: Partnerships, Best-Practice Schemes, and the Digitalization of Governance," 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 30, no. 2 (2005): 146. 
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employment, the labor market and to gain knowledge on how to look for a job and 
start a business. What was offered during the project was an opportunity for young 
individuals to acquire knowledge on the employment topic. It is therefore implicitly 
assumed that knowledge and competencies are a necessary condition to be 
employable and, in order for young people to gain knowledge and competencies, 
they must possess the ‘will to learn’. An unemployed person is not only someone who 
is in need of an income, but also a person who must first and foremost actively seek 
(additional) knowledge and competencies. Learning, whether formal or informal, is 
as such part of the regime of government in which one’s learning process through 
human capital is produced. Young individuals are compelled to acquire knowledge 
and must be able to use this knowledge in order to be both included and valuable to 
society.47 
 
Projects within the Youth in Action program do not only concentrate on knowledge 
transmission but also on offering young individuals an opportunity to make 
connections and direct links with employers. The idea is to create networks between 
jobseekers, employers and entrepreneurs not simply to obtain knowledge about 
employers’ activities, roles, and responsibilities, but to give them an immediate 
chance of finding a job by themselves. The creation of networks and ties is what 
living an entrepreneurial life is all about. This means that young individuals are 
being stimulated to be mobile; moving in different contexts and environments or 
networks and, through this, to become employed in the “continuous business of 
living”.48 In the process of creating networks and making oneself mobile, the 
incentive is to activate values of self-reliance, self-respect, self-esteem, self-
advancement, and self-responsibility. As one participant in the Estonian project 
mentioned above remarked, “[…] it is up to me to create the opportunities for 
myself to get a job”.49 The quest for young entrepreneurs is to make themselves 
economically valuable and to enhance their own economic capital as a capacity of 
their selves.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Although the EU does not hold legally-binding competencies in the youth field, this 
does not mean that no policies and governmental arrangements have been 
developed and implemented at the EU level. On the contrary, as we have shown, the 
                                                 
47  Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, 162, Richard Edwards, 
"Mobilizing Lifelong Learning: Governmentality in Educational Practices," Journal of 
Education Policy 17, no. 3 (2002). 
48  Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, ed. 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 44. 
49  European Commission Focus On: Youth Employment. European Good Practice 
Projects, 25. 
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EU has developed an intricate and complex policy framework within which issues 
relevant to youth are addressed and dealt with. In addressing and responding to 
these issues, among which the issue of unemployment has been a central one since 
2009, a range of formal and informal, institutionalized and less institutionalized 
actors has been mobilized. This is not by coincidence, of course, since the 
mobilization of diverse and heterogeneous stakeholders in policymaking at the 
European level is part of the relatively new European governance agenda that 
presupposes more open, inclusive and democratic political processes. We have 
shown that such governmental involvement of a range of actors from different 
levels and societal domains is particular to the governmentalization of Europe which 
entails the construction of political and administrative structures at the EU level, 
dissemination of norms and procedures, and production of specific practical 
arrangements, mechanisms, and programs.  
 
EU Youth Policy is one of the more or less coherent fields in which such 
governmentalization can be discerned. It is structured around two modes of 
governance through which cooperation between not just national authorities but 
also other agencies is stimulated, encouraged, and framed. The Open Method of 
Coordination and the Structured Dialogue are two practical modes of governance 
that are currently the formula for planning and solving issues related to the field of 
youth and seem to be fabricating space where substantial and comprehensive 
improvements in the field of youth can be achieved with the contribution of all 
partners involved. However, as the Open Method of Coordination and the 
Structured Dialogue stimulate and enable agency, participation, and deliberation, 
they also structure the possibility of action of these collective actors, their values, 
norms, and attitudes that are harmonious yet never fully analogous or identical with 
the institutional arrangements and objectives outlined at the EU level. 
 
While the Open Method of Coordination and the Structured Dialogue are relatively 
coherent and systematized governmental arrangements directed at the inclusion of 
governments and institutionalized organizations, the Youth in Action Program as an 
important part of EU Youth Policy more directly addresses young individuals as part 
of the European youth population. While the program is well-organized and clearly 
structured, with unambiguous aims and objectives, it is also flexible and allows the 
most persistent or relevant issues to be included in its framework. In this light, the 
issue of youth employment has also received growing attention within the Youth in 
Action program. In addressing this issue, young Europeans are represented not as a 
problem but as a solution. The Youth in Action program is declared to be one of the 
European mechanisms that opens up possibilities for young individuals, yet it is 
young EU citizens themselves who must seize the opportunities given. The Youth in 
Action program is a vehicle through which responsibility for tackling the 
employment issue is transposed to ‘responsible’ and ‘rational’ individuals upon 
whom subjectivities such as active jobseeker and effective entrepreneur are 
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bestowed. Young individuals included in the projects within the Youth in Action 
program are encouraged to give their lives a specific entrepreneurial form. They 
must empower themselves by gaining knowledge and skills so that they can become 
economically valuable to European society. The governing of youth (employability) 
is therefore increasingly being accomplished by allocating accountability to the 
younger European generations. The logic behind this, it seems, is quite harsh: if 
European youth is Europe’s (economic) future, why not make them fulfil our 
expectation themselves. 
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ESTONIAN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: PREDICATED ON A COLLECTIVE MEMORY 
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Abstract 
In 1991, post-Soviet Estonia was confronted with the need to deal with the 
burdened legacies of its past. The independent regime began to implement 
transitional justice. This process was predicated on a particular collective memory of 
the recent past that has since been produced and reproduced through the works of 
a memory institute, the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes Against Humanity, operating as a mechanism of transitional justice. It is 
found that this institute regards the Soviet period of occupation as criminal, 
illegitimate, and immoral, and has selectively remembered Estonian history, 
dismissing counter-narratives of the past, reflecting the goals of the present regime. 
As a result, some of the universal and normative goals of transitional justice have 
been compromised.  
 
Keywords:  transitional justice, memory, crimes against humanity, Estonia 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A society emerging from an authoritarian, totalitarian, and criminal past is 
confronted with the need to redress and acknowledge the burdened legacies of the 
past. In its transitional context, transitional justice is a process often implemented 
by the new regime seeking to deal with this burdened past and the crimes 
committed. Referencing Christine Bell, the “common project” of transitional justice 
is “dealing with the past” to establish reconciliation and stability for the new 
regime.1 Moreover, Juan E. Mendez argues that redressing the wrongs is “an urgent 
task of democratization because it highlights the fundamental character of the new 
order to be established, an order based on the rule of law and on respect for the 
dignity and worth of each human person.”2 Therefore, pursuing justice both during 
the period of transition and post-transition is critical for the new regime attempting 
to establish itself as stable, accountable, and legitimate, thus distinct from its 
predecessor. It must be initially noted that transition, for the purposes of this 
discussion, is conceptualized as “the shift from a non-democratic regime type to a 
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democratic one.”3 In Estonia, the transition began to take place in the late l980’s 
and culminated September 17th, 1991 with the international recognition of its 
independence and membership to the United Nations. 
 
As part of the third wave of democratization,4 Estonia’s approach to transitional 
justice has been largely defined by the added normative dimension that is 
concerned with values of democracy on an international scale.5 This article takes the 
normative assumption that democracy and the associated values of accountability 
and stability are strived for, representing the widely accepted broad and universal 
goals of transitional justice.6 Moreover, the post-Cold War wave of democratic 
transitions introduced a form of transitional justice closely tied to nation building,7 
where a collective memory and a dominant narrative of the past became essential 
to regime consolidation. Therefore, a balance must be achieved between 
international norms and the local conditions and constraints.8 There are three 
predominant factors that limit and structure a given regime’s approach to 
transitional justice: the type of transition,9 the dominant beliefs and attitudes of the 
transitional society and elites,10 and the nature of predecessor’s regime.11 
                                                 
3  Alexandra Barahona de Brito, “Introduction by Editors,”in The Politics of Memory 
Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, ed. C.G. Enriquez, A.B. de Brito, and P. 
Aguilar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 5. 
4  The third wave of democratization refers to the surge of democracy that began in 
the 1970’s and includes the democratic transitions of South-West Europe, Central and South 
America, countries of Pacific Asia, and the Eastern European countries after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).  
5  Tuomas Forsberg, “The Philosophy and Practice of Dealing with the Past: Some 
Conceptual and Normative Issues,” in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice After 
Civil Conflict, ed. N. Biggar (Washington: Georgetown University, 2003): 65; Ruti G. Teitel, 
“Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 70-71.   
6  Mendez, “In Defense of Transitional Justice,” 5; Forsberg, “The Philosophy and 
Practice of Dealing with the Past,” 65; Teitel, “Transitional Justice Geneaology,” 87. 
7  Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 71.  
8  Diane Orentlicher, “’Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with 
Local Agency,”The International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2007): 18; Juan E. Mendez, 
“National Reconciliation, Transitional Justice, and the International Criminal Court,”Ethics 
and International Affairs 15 (2001): 29; Jose Zalaquett, “Confronting Human Rights Violations 
Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints,”in 
Transitional Justice Volume I: General Considerations, ed. N.J. Kritz (Washington: US Institute 
of Peace, 1995): 17-19; Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,”76; Mendez, “In Defense of 
Transitional Justice,”3-5. 
9  de Brito, “Introduction by Editors,”12-13, 35. 
10  Jon Elster, “Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in a Historical Perspective,” 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 213, 216-217. 
11  De Brito, “Introduction by Editors,” 19. 
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In Estonia, the crimes under the Soviet Union were often clandestine. Repression, 
secret police activities, and arbitrary arrests,12 left the Estonian population with a 
black hole of knowledge about its’ past. With the advent of transition, Estonians 
actively sought to uncover these crimes and reclaim ownership of their past 
subjugation.13 Therefore, and theoretically, to establish a record of the past, 
mechanisms involving investigation and truth revelation would be more effective 
than criminal trials or reparatory efforts.14 Shaped by such constraints, Estonia’s 
experience with transitional justice has largely been predicated upon the 
construction of a collective memory, based on a decided account of the past.   
 
Through the establishment of collective memory,15 there is also possibility for the 
new regime to influence what is remembered and how the process of memory 
construction is to unfold through the various approaches and mechanisms of 
transitional justice.16 Therefore, in the process of achieving transitional justice, the 
Estonian past has been remembered in a particular way, reinforced through the 
mechanisms of transitional justice the new regime adopted. The ways in which the 
various mechanisms of transitional justice function, their positive and negative 
outcomes, has been well studied.17 Although employed by Estonia, Slovakia, and 
Latvia, there has thus far been little to no research analyzing memory institutes as a 
                                                 
12  Lavinia Stan, “Introduction: Post-Communist Transition, Justice, and Transitional 
Justice,” in Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Reckoning 
with the Communist Past (London: Routledge, 2009): 6. 
13  Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky, “Estonia,” in Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice 
Volume 2, ed. Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 16; Marek Tamm, “In Search of Lost Time: Memory Politics in Estonia 1991-
2011,”Nationalities Papers 41 (2013): 654; Mart Laar, “The Restoration of Independence in 
Estonia,” in Estonia: Identity and Independence, ed. J.J. Subrenat (Amsterdam: Rodopoi, 
2004): 226-227.  
14  De Brito, “Introduction by Editors,” 21. 
15  Maurice Halbwachs notion of collective memory is used, whereby individual 
memory is to be understood in terms of the collective memory as collective memory is a 
cohesive notion based on the overall and dominant representation of the past that is to 
inform the present. See Maurice Halbwachs La Mémoire Collective (Pars: Les Presses 
universitaires de France, 1950; Richard Ned Lebow, “The Memory of Politics in Postwar 
Europe,” in The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe, eds. N. Lebow, W. Kansteiner, C. Fogu 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006) 8-9; Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, 
“Collective Memory and Cultural Identity, New German Critique 65 (1995): 125-133.  
16  Forsberg, “The Philosophy and Practice of Dealing with the Past: Some Conceptual 
and Normative Issues,” 69; De Brito, “Introduction by Editors,” 24. 
17  De Brito, “Introduction by Editors,” 1-14; Elster, Closing the Books; Forsberg, “The 
Philosophy and Practice of Dealing with the Past: Some Conceptual and Normative Issues”; 
Mendez, “In Defense of Transitional Justice”; Juan E. Mendez, “Accountability for Past 
Abuses,”Human Rights Quarterly 19 (1997): 255-282; Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy; 
Wouters, Transitional Justice and Memory in Europe. 
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mechanism of transitional justice seeking to establish a collective memory of the 
past.  
 
A memory institute is distinct yet similar to truth commissions. Similar in terms of 
the need to establish a record of the past, yet different because they do not 
necessarily assume the close collaboration with all those involved in the given 
historical events to be investigated. In particular, memory institutes do not require 
direct juxtaposition of perpetrators’ and victims’ narratives on discrete events. They 
are not necessarily required to produce an end result of their works nor are they 
restricted temporally in any sense. Memory institutes will be understood as a 
mechanism seeking to reclaim the past and in order to "reclaim the past" memory 
institutes aim to establish a narrative of the given historical event or time period, 
that is widely accepted and perceived as legitimate through some form of 
investigation and research. A collective memory is constructed which often has the 
effect of distinguishing the new regime from the previous, defined by its oppression 
and criminality.18 However, in oppositional reference to truth commissions19 
memory institutes are less restricted in terms of what historical events are to be 
examined, as well as how, when, and what the final outcome of the findings is to be. 
 
This article seeks to evaluate institutes of memory as a mechanism of transitional 
justice in terms of their success meeting the broadly stated normative goals of 
transitional justice. One institute, the Estonian International Commission for the 
Investigation of Crimes against Humanity (hereafter: the Commission) will be 
analyzed to understand the Estonian collective memory that has been produced, 
and how successful the mechanism has been in meeting both the broader universal 
and context specific goals. 
 
2. Method 
 
Given the Commission as the subject of analysis, an empirically driven approach will 
be utilized in order to effectively understand the ways in which collective memory 
has been established in post-communist Estonia. An evaluation of whether the 
established collective memory and the process of historical selectivity has been 
justified and remained neutral will be conducted. Additionally, an analysis of the 
                                                 
18  James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in 
Central-Eastern Europe (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) 27-28.  
19  Using Priscilla Hayner’s definition, truth commissions directly engage with those 
involved, the perpetrators, victims and witnesses, are focused on a series of events that took 
place in a specific timeframe, are officially authorized by the state, have a temporal limit and 
are meant to produce a formalized report of the findings. See Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable 
Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 
2011).  
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works and achievements of the memory institute will be evaluated by relating them 
to the universal normative goals of transitional justice. Further analysis will be based 
on a close reading of the reports published by the Commission supported by 
statements made by Toomas Hiio and Meelis Maripuu, directors of the Estonian 
Institute of Historical Memory,20 in an interview conducted at the institute in Tallinn 
May 2014. This approach allows for a thorough evaluation as the conclusions drawn 
are supported and derived from a variety of primary and secondary sources.   
 
Juan Mendez has proposed four responsibilities for the state to move forward to a 
less adversarial future and achieve the normative universal goals of transitional 
justice while considering the context specific needs.21 Each of these obligations are 
not goals in and of themselves, they are processes to be incorporated in the 
selected mechanisms of transitional justice in the hopes of meeting the normative 
goals. Mendez’ four proposals will be directly applied as the theoretical basis for the 
evaluation of Estonia’s success in meeting the broadly stated, universally accepted, 
and legitimate normative goals of transitional justice, specifically with regards to 
the institute of memory under study.  
 
The obligations proposed by Mendez are as follows, (1) there is an obligation for 
justice in that abuses and crimes committed in the past need to be punished, (2) the 
victims have a right to know the truth which allows the state to investigate and 
establish a record of the past, (3) the victims should also be granted some form of 
reparation for the harms done, and (4) those who committed the crimes should be 
removed from public office positions.22 
 
In order to properly contextualize the critical analysis of the Estonian memory 
institute a brief overview of Estonia’s recent history, starting with the inter-war years 
of independence of the 1920’s and ending with proclaimed independence in 
199123, and experience with transitional justice thus far is necessary. Li Bennich-
Björkman argues that Estonia's historical legacy, particularly the period of 
independence between World War I and World War II, was formative in the 
country's transitional process.24  
                                                 
20  The Estonian Institute of Historical Memory replaced the Estonian International 
Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity in 2008 once the Commission 
had completed its investigation based on the Rome Statute. More details regarding the 
Estonian Institute of Historical Memory can be found at: http://www.mnemosyne.ee/lang/en-
us.  
21  Mendez, “In Defense of Transitional Justice,” 12. 
22  Ibid. 
23  For a comprehensive overview of Estonian history see: Toivu Raun’s Estonia and the 
Estonians (Stanford: Hoover Institutions Press, 2001). 
24  Li Bennich-Björkman, “The Cultural Roots of Estonia’s Successful Transition: How 
Historical Legacies Shaped the 1990s,” East European Politics and Societies 21 (2007): 317-
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On August 23rd, 1939 the Republic of Estonia was signed into the “secret protocols” 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, becoming part of the Soviet “sphere of influence,” 
and by late August 1940, the Soviet Union occupied Estonia and Sovietization 
began.25 Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June of 1941 and the Soviet 
forces retreated. There was a general sense of welcoming and help from Estonian 
partisans towards the Nazi’s who took control of Tallinn August 28th of 1941.26 
However, the German occupiers turned to outright mobilization, undermined the 
Estonian state structure and inflicted suffering upon Estonia and Estonians.27 In 
September of 1944, the Soviet forces ‘liberated’ Tallinn, crushing an attempt to 
restore an independent Estonian government.28 The German forces retreated in 
1944 and nearly 100,000 Estonian citizens fled fearing the second Soviet occupation 
based on memories of the deportations and repression that took placed from 1940 
to 1941. The immediate post-war years were characterized by Stalin’s rule and 
Sovietization, dramatically altering Estonian demographics, politics and 
economics.29 After Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet policies and system altered, 
becoming more moderate.30 Although for the next near 40 years of Soviet 
occupation, many of the soft cultural and national annihilation Stalinist projects 
continued,31 threatening the Estonian language, culture, and identity. Yet a 
collective memory of the inter-war years of independence was able to withstand the 
occupations and the crimes, namely the mass deportations and the assault on 
culture and history.32 By the mid-l980’s it was becoming increasingly clear that the 
                                                                                                                 
319; Rein Ruutsoo “The Perception of Historical Identity and the Restoration of Estonian 
National Independence,” Nationalities Papers  32 (1995): 172-173. 
25  Toivo Raun, Estonia and the Estonians  (Stanford: Hoover Institutions Press, 2001): 
139-144; Karsten Brüggemann and Andres Kasekamp, “Identity Politics and Contested 
Histories in Divided Societies: The Case of Estonian War Monuments,” in Identity and Foreign 
Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration, Eds. E. Berg and P. Ehin (Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009): 54. 
26  Brüggemann and Kasekamp, “The Politics of History and the ‘War of Monuments’ 
in Estonia,” Nationalities Papers 36 (2008): 427; Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, 142; Tonu 
Parming, From the Republic of Estonia to the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic: The Transfer 
of Rule and Sovereignty (Helsinki: Otava, 1997): 47-48, 89. 
27  Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, 158. 
28  Ibid.  
29  Ibid.,171-172, 182; Brüggemann and Kasekamp, “The Politics of History and the 
‘War of Monuments’ in Estonia,” 428-429.; Romauld J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera. The 
Baltic States, Years of Dependence: 1940-1980 (Oakland: University of California Press, 1983) 
74. 
30  Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, 185-189. 
31  Ibid, 212-218; Toivo Miljan, Historical Dictionary of Estonia (Oxford: Scarecrow 
Press Inc., 2004) 424; Rein Ruutsoo “The Perception of Historical Identity and the Restoration 
of Estonian National Independence,” 168. 
32  Toivo Raun, “Estonia After 1991: Identity and Integration.” East European Politics 
and Societies 23 (2009): 529; Laar, “The Restoration of Independence in Estonia,” 226-227; 
CEU Political Science Journal 9(3-4) 
165 
Soviet communist system was coming to an end on a global scale. The 
permissiveness of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika provided the opportunity 
for Estonians to exploit the changes in the regime but also to challenge the Soviet 
version of history.33 The following years saw extensive national activism and efforts 
to reclaim independence based on the collective idea of legal continuity, the 
illegality of the Soviet Union and its illegal political actions in the country.34 The 
Estonian collective memory of the past provided a basis for Estonian independence 
which was internationally recognized on September 17th 1991, and contributed to 
the moral grounding of the new regime through its inversion to the oppressive 
Soviet occupiers. 
 
3. Estonia and Transitional Justice 
 
As briefly mentioned, the crimes committed in the Soviet Union were of a particular 
nature that influenced the measures of transitional justice adopted. Due to the high 
degree of secrecy and repression in Estonia, there was a collective demand for an 
understanding of the crimes that were committed, and an established record of the 
past was arguably one of the first transitional steps.35 Accordingly, Estonia’s 
experience with transitional justice has largely been predicated upon the 
construction of a collective memory that has had the effect of distinguishing the 
new regime from its three periods of occupation. Since independence in 1991 
Estonia has adopted six identifiable mechanisms of transitional justice based on the 
view that the Soviet period was illegal, criminal, and thus, the independent country 
has been dealing with repressive acts committed by a foreign power rather than by 
Estonia itself.36 Therefore in Estonia’s transitional context, establishing a collective 
memory of the previous regime has been crucial for the new regime’s attempt with 
transitional justice.37 
 
Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky identify Estonia's six mechanisms as: victim 
rehabilitation, property restitution, the written oath of conscience, revealing the 
names of former security agents, prosecuting crimes against humanity, and symbolic 
                                                                                                                 
Bennich-Björkman, “The Cultural Roots of Estonia’s Successful Transition: How Historical 
Legacies Shaped the 1990’s,” 316-347. 
33  Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, 222; Brüggemann and Kasekamp, “The Politics of 
History and the ‘War of Monuments’ in Estonia,” 428. 
34  Tamm, “In Search of Lost Time: Memory Politics in Estonia 1991-2011,” 654; Vello 
Pettai, “The Construction of State Identity and its Legacies: Legal Restorationism in Estonia,” 
Ab Imperio 3 (2007): 5-7. 
35  Laar, “The Restoration of Independence in Estonia,” 226-227; Stan and Nedelsky, 
“Estonia,” 161. 
36  Stan and Nedelsky, “Estonia,” 161. 
37  Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 87; De Brito “Introduction by Editors,” 10; 
Wouters, Transitional Justice and Memory in Europe (1945-2013), 14. 
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justice.38 As mentioned, the majority of the crimes and repression, including the 
forced evacuations, deportations, and murders, were committed under Stalin and 
ceased after his death in 1953.39 Since transition began roughly 40 years after the 
end of Stalin’s regime, the pursuit of criminal justice was limited;40 many of those 
involved had already died or were too ill for criminal proceedings.41 However, some 
individuals have been tried by the Estonian state, as well as by the European Court 
of Human Rights.42 Lustration was also very limited, consisting solely of the written 
oath of conscience.43 Estonia's experience with property restitution has been 
controversial. The legal owners of Estonian property in 1940 were able to reclaim 
ownership in June of 1991, evicting tenants, and possibly leaving many homeless.44 
 
Furthermore, the process of confronting the past was arguably delayed.45 Eva Onken 
points to the fact that “many Balts shied away from engaging too actively in a policy 
of confronting the recent past,” fearing that it would “endanger social stability in 
the young democracies.”46 However, as Estonia was increasingly cooperating and 
seeking membership with the European Union and NATO, the pressure to deal with 
the criminal past was mounting.47 Specifically, Estonia needed to come to terms 
with the possibility of Estonian involvement and collaboration particularly with 
reference to the Holocaust. Passive leverage of membership into the European 
Union and NATO likely motivated Estonia to deal with its burdened historical 
                                                 
38  Stan and Nedelsky, “Estonia,” 162-167. 
39  Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, 189. 
40  “Kaitesepolitsaiemet: Judicial Decisions,”Kaitesepolitsaiemet, accessed May 19 
2014, www.kapo.ee/eng/judicial-decisions. 
41  Ibid. 
42   Ibid. 
43  Stan and Nedelsky, “Estonia,” 161; Marek M. Kaminski and Monika Nalepa, 
“Judging Transitional Justice: A New Criterion for Evaluating Truth and Revelation 
Procedures,”Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2006): 399; “Act on Procedure for Taking an 
Oath,” (Riigikogu, 1992): 1. 
44  Merje Feldman, “Justice in Space? The Restitution of Property Rights in Tallinn, 
Estonia,”Cultural Geographies 6 (1999): 167-169; Stan and Nedelsky, “Estonia,” 163. 
45  Eva-Clarita Onken, “The Politics of Finding Historical Truth: Reviewing Baltic 
History Commissions and their Work,”Journal of Baltic Studies 38 (2007): 110; Pettai A. Vello, 
“Estonia: Old Maps and New Roads,”Journal for Democracy 4 (1993): 117-125. 
46  Onken, “The Politics of Finding Historical Truth: Reviewing Baltic History 
Commissions and their Work,” 110. 
47   Ibid; Matthew Kott, “Estonia 1940-1945: Reports of the Estonian International 
Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity (review)”Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 21 (2007): 321. 
CEU Political Science Journal 9(3-4) 
167 
legacies.48 Perhaps the international environment and political context led to the 
culmination of former President Lennart Meri convening the Commission in 1998.49 
 
As mentioned, there are various constraints to the process of transitional justice. 
One problem is the tension between history, memory, and justice.50 This dilemma is 
particularly salient amongst post-communist transitional societies,51 including 
Estonia, that have attempted to uncover much of the hidden activities and crimes 
that took place under the communist regime.52 
 
Based on its findings, the particular notion of the Estonian past propagated by the 
Commission will be assessed in the proceeding chapter. As a mechanism of 
transitional justice meant to establish an understanding of the past, thereby 
contributing to the construction and dissemination of a collective memory, the 
Commission’s work is important for an evaluation of Estonia's success with 
transitional justice. A critical analysis will show, despite the claim of objectivity, this 
memory institute is largely focused on the task of criminalizing the previous regime 
bringing into question concerns of selectivity, objectivity, and the possibility of 
manipulation in the process of establishing an understanding of the past. 
 
4. The Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against 
Humanity 
 
4.1. Establishment, Goals, and Mandate 
 
The Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against 
Humanity was established by a presidential decision on October 2nd 1998 by the 
President of the Republic of Estonia, Lennart Meri.53 Through Presidential 
designations, seven non-Estonian academics, policy analysts, and politicians from 
the United States, Finland, Denmark, Russia, and Germany formed the Commission. 
According to Anton Weiss-Wendt, the members were nominated on the basis of 
                                                 
48  Brüggemann and Kasekamp, “The Politics of History and the ‘War of Monuments’ 
in Estonia,”437. 
49  Onken, “The Politics of Finding Historical Truth: Reviewing Baltic History 
Commission and their Work,” 110; Kott, “Estonia 1940-1945: Reports of the Estonian 
International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity (review),” 321. 
50  Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 78; De Brito, “Introduction by Editors,” 25; 
Forsberg, “The Philosophy and Practice of Dealing with the Past: Some Conceptual and 
Normative Issues,” 72.  
51  Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 81.  
52  De Brito, “Introduction by Editors,” 5; Mark, “The Unfinished Revolution: Making 
Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe,” 27-28. 
53  “Introduction of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes Against Humanity” (2008): 1. 
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their “friendliness” towards Estonia.54 The “Introduction” produced by the 
Commission and published in 2008 serves as the mission statement of this body. It 
formally defines the goals and mandate of the Commission, derived from President 
Lennart Meri’s announcement convening the Commission.  
 
As laid out in the Introduction, the principal goal of the Commission was “the 
investigation of “crimes against humanity committed against Estonian citizens or on 
the territory of the Republic of Estonia during the occupation of the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany,” as well as to establish “the attendant circumstances of the 
crimes against humanity, and also the relevant historical background.”55 According 
to the Introduction, the Commission is to proceed from Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court of Rome, and to compile “a record 
sufficiently well-documented and complete that no one will be able to deny what 
happened or to avoid facing up to the facts,” because “double standards in the 
assessment of particular events,” are to be eliminated.56 However it is emphasized 
that the Commission is a non-judicial body, thus its powers are limited, and the 
established record of the facts is not to launch any sort of judicial action. In order to 
compile an account of the crimes against humanity committed in Estonia and 
towards Estonians, the Commission was instructed to work on the basis of consensus 
where research papers by Estonian history scholars were to be analyzed and 
discussed by the Commission’s members to eventually produce a report, even 
though producing a report is not mandated by the Introduction or the Presidential 
speech.57 
 
In order to perform such research, the hired historians were given access to all of 
the available Estonian and international archives.58 The internal working rules are 
otherwise not detailed in the Introduction, nor were they outlined in President 
Lennart Meri’s speech regarding the decision to convene this Commission. 
Therefore, despite being funded by the Estonian state, the Commission has had a 
significant degree of freedom in terms of the method of its work and its relationship 
to other state bodies.59 In contrast to truth commissions, there was no formal call for 
                                                 
54  Anton Weiss-Wendt, “Why the Holocaust Does Not Matter to Estonians,”Journal 
of Baltic Studies 39 (2008): 479. 
55  “Introduction of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes Against Humanity,” 1. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Ibid.; Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against 
Humanity, “Statement by the International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes 
Against Humanity” (1999). 
58  “Introduction of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes Against Humanity,”2. 
59  Interview with ToomasHiio and MeelisMaripuu. Estonian Institute of Historical 
Memory, Tallinn, 19 May 2014. 
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victims as witnesses, nor was there cooperation from all those involved in the 
historical period under study, and there was not a clearly defined timeframe or 
requirement to produce a report at the outset. Therefore, despite its many 
similarities, this body cannot be accepted as a truth commission. As a mechanism of 
transitional justice, the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes Against Humanity is a memory institute meant to “reflect our hope in Estonia 
that shining the bright light of truth on some of the tragedies of the past will not 
only contribute to reconciliation within our society and its further reintegration into 
the international community of nations but also help to prevent the repetition of 
such tragedies elsewhere.”60 
 
Following its establishment, the Commission decided to investigate the crimes 
against humanity committed in Estonia in three distinct historical periods, “(1) the 
occupation of Estonia by Soviet forces in 1940-1941, (2) the occupation of Estonia 
by German forces in 1941-1944, (3) the second Soviet occupation beginning in 
1944.”61However, there is no clearly defined set of events or limit as to what is to be 
investigated regarding the Soviet occupation beginning in 1944. It is clear that it 
ends with the proclamation of Estonian independence, yet the actual set of 
historical events is not explicitly stated, whereas a truth commission would 
temporally and spatially define the historical events under study.  
 
Although the Commission was established as a non-judicial body, the basis of its 
evaluation of the past includes Crimes of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes of 
Aggression, and Crimes Against Humanity as laid out in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court of Rome.62 From 2001 to 2008, the Commission 
published three reports, one per period of occupation, detailing the historical 
background of each occupation and the criminal events that took place under the 
occupying regimes. The following section will provide a descriptive overview of 
these three reports. This overview will be followed by an analysis of the 
Commission’s work, relating the findings to the specifically stated goals as well as 
the universal and normative goals of transitional justice.  
 
4.2 The Soviet Occupation of Estonia: 1940-1941 
 
At the outset, the Report of the Estonian International Commission for Investigation 
of Crimes Against Humanity regarding the Soviet Occupation of 1940 to 1941 states 
that the annexation of Estonia in 1940 was illegal. Furthermore, the Commission 
                                                 
60  “Introduction of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes Against Humanity,” 1.  
61  Ibid., 2. 
62  Ibid., 1-2; Statement by the International Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes Against Humanity”. 
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attributes responsibility to “those citizens of the Republic of Estonia who together 
with the Soviet officials prepared for and carried out the take-over of power,” 
identifying six particular criminal events that fall under Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome 
Statute, “Crimes Against Humanity,” and “War Crimes.”63 Each of these noted 
criminal events are detailed in terms of what exactly had happened, who and how 
many were harmed, and if any, what sort of justification was used in the 
commitment of the given crime. Based on Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, these six crimes are considered crimes against 
humanity because they were part of “a widespread or systemic attack directed 
against [a] civilian population,” and some are “considered war crimes according to 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.”64 The report 
concludes that responsibility for these crimes lies with the Soviet leadership, “whose 
objective was the rapid incorporation of Estonia into the USSR and the elimination 
of social groups and individuals that did not conform to the ideology of the USSR.”65 
In conclusion,  
 
the position of the Commission is that no ideology can justify the imprisonment, 
maiming and execution of thousands of people. The activity of citizens of the 
Republic of Estonia in the service of their country and people, in accordance with 
existing laws of Estonia before the Soviet occupation, could not under any 
circumstance be grounds for their subsequent conviction according to the laws of the 
Soviet Union,” of whose occupation of Estonia was illegitimate.66 
 
Accordingly, a multitude of crimes were committed in Estonia and the events that 
took place were not in the interest of Estonia and its people, but were in the 
interest of the Soviet Union and its expansionist goals.67 The Commission 
emphasizes the criminality of the Soviets, furthermore it is able to explicitly name 
those responsible while also identifying the involvement of broader Soviet-led 
institutions, demonstrating the oppression Estonia suffered from 1940 to 1941 
under its illegal annexation by the Soviet Union.   
 
4.3 The German Occupation of Estonia: 1941-1944 
 
According to the Commission’s publication regarding the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union and the occupation of Estonia, five crimes took place that are deemed 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
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In relation to the Holocaust, the report identifies a sub-set of three criminal events, 
“the Killing of Estonian Jews,”“the Killing of Foreign Jews on the Territory of 
Estonia,” and “the Participation of Estonian Military Units and Police Battalions in 
Towns and Transit Camps Outside Estonia, and at Labour and Concentration Camps 
in Estonia, while Acts of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Took Place Involving 
the Killing or Deportation of Jews and Other Civilians, in which the Units Played a 
Variety of Roles.” According to the Report, about 75% of Estonia's Jewish 
community fled the country in fear of the Germans, although roughly 950-1,000 
were killed. An unknown number of foreign Jews were killed in various camps 
established throughout Estonian territory and records from the Soviet trials found a 
number of Estonian battalions involved in the murdering of Jewish citizens in 
Estonia, Belarus, and Poland.68 The report’s details regarding the remaining four 
established crimes are sparse. The attitude and findings of the Commission 
regarding this particular period of German occupation raises many questions, which 
will be returned to in the analytical section.  
 
The Commission’s report identifies the Estonian people’s “confusion of the first two 
months [of the German occupation],” as follows: “the German invasion initially 
appeared to many as a form of liberation,” particularly after “the year-long Soviet 
occupation...[which] caused immense damage to Estonia’s institutions and to her 
citizens, in particular, the mass deportations of June 1941.”69 The report considers 
the crimes committed under German occupation within the context of the former 
Soviet occupation, and emphasizes the continued anti-communism and dominant 
anti-Soviet feelings of Estonian society.70 
 
Although the report acknowledges evidence regarding the involvement of Estonians 
in the arrests and killings of Estonian Jews, as well as in the interrogations of 
suspects deemed to be opponents of Nazi Germany, in particular Estonians that 
were members of the Omakaitse who had killed communists, and the 36th Police 
Battalion that participated in the shooting of Jews in Nowogródel, Belarus,71 it 
concludes that “it is not reasonable to assign responsibility by virtue of their 
positions,” and “neither the dates mentioned nor the testimony given, directly 
implicates Estonian units in these actions.”72 There were no trials or prosecutions of 
individuals who had been named in this report. The concluding portion of the report 
refers back to the difficulty of Estonians to “take a side” as there “was very little 
middle ground,” because “resistance to the Germans would inevitably be construed 
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as support for Communism and the Soviet Union.”73 In the end, “it is unjust that an 
entire nation should be criminalized because of the actions of some of its citizens; 
but it is equally unjust that its criminals should be able to shelter behind a cloak of 
victimhood.”74 Therefore, the report regarding the German occupation of Estonia 
from 1941-1944 accepts the criminality of the regime, the involvement of Estonians, 
and in the end returns to the present importance of the rule of law in 
acknowledging and condemning these crimes.  
 
4.4 The Soviet Occupation of Estonia: From 1944 
 
This part of the report notes the continuation of the Soviet regime’s repression after 
194475 justified by the Soviet regime’s claim that the Estonian governments after the 
War of Independence were illegitimate, despite its signing of the Tartu Peace 
Treaty.76 Based on this rationale, former Estonian leaders were convicted for anti-
communist activities and many were sent to Gulag labor camps. The Commission 
identifies the first crime as "the Continuation of the Prosecution and Conviction of 
Previous Estonian Leaders." In 1944 the Soviets had continued with the punishment 
and arrests of Estonians who had not been convicted under the first occupation. 
Toivo Raun, Estonian historian, refers to these activities as the purge of the 
“bourgeois nationalists,”77 which had the greatest impact on the Estonian 
government and leadership structure. As part of this criminal event, the Commission 
refers back to the falsified elections of July 1940 as well as the illegitimate nature of 
the occupation itself, re-emphasizing the illegality of the Soviet occupation and its 
criminal activities in 1940-1941 and that the occupation of 1944 was simply a 
continuation of this criminal period. Eight more crimes are listed in direct relation to 
the Stalinist years. The Report describes these crimes in detail, where they occurred, 
who took part, and who the victims were. The tenth and final crime listed is "the 
Post-1953 Repression – the Commuting of Sentences, but the Continuation for 
some Estonians of Enforced Residence in Exile" – entailing the release of prisoners 
and deportees from the Gulag camps after Stalin’s death in 1953. The report notes 
the slow and complex process of return, which often took years, and once returned, 
the limited freedoms of former prisoners.78 In the assessment of responsibility, the 
report attributes responsibility to the Soviet institutions that subordinated local 
bodies and carried out crimes against humanity, but it also names individuals at the 
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head of these organizations. Again, as a non-judicial body, it is out of scope for the 
Commission to carry out judicial activities against these individuals.  
 
As part of the conclusion the report notes that after Stalin’s death in 1953, the 
crimes committed under the Soviet regime in Estonia were deemed to be less 
atrocious and physically violent. Thus, the Rome Statute’s definition of “crimes 
against humanity,” no longer applied even though repression continued after 1953 
until independence was restored.79 Therefore, Stalin’s death informally marks the 
end of the work of the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes Against Humanity because it was based on the Rome Statute, specifically 
Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and Crimes of Genocide, and these 
standards of international law were no longer applicable.  
 
5. Analysis and Evaluation of the Commission’s Report 
 
5.1 Approach 
 
All together, the works of the Commission regarding the Soviet occupation of 1940-
1941, the German occupation of 1941-1944, and the Soviet occupation from 1944, 
consist of describing the selected crimes and naming wrongdoers. These reports 
serve to establish a record of what happened, providing Estonians with knowledge 
of the criminal past. Regarding Mendez’ proposed responsibilities of the state to 
meet the normative and universal goals of transitional justice, the works of the 
Commission will be considered in terms of its role in fulfilling these four obligations 
in conjunction with its stated goals. This allows for the most effective analysis of the 
Commission's success as a mechanism of transitional justice. Consequently, both the 
international normative discourse and the context-specific historical and 
transitional constraints are considered in the analysis and evaluation. The purpose of 
considering the universal normative features of transitional justice is that they allow 
for a criteria judging right from wrong use of collective memory. 
 
5.2 Granting Victims the Right to Know 
 
The Commission has arguably met the second responsibility proposed by Mendez, 
which is to “grant victims the right to know the truth.”80 According to this criterion, 
the independent Estonian state is duty-bound to investigate and establish a record 
of the past regarding the injustices committed towards Estonian individuals and 
society, as well as those on Estonian territory.81 Ultimately, the Commission’s focus 
on uncovering the crimes against humanity has had the effect of criminalizing the 
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previous regimes, distinguishing the new regime as one based on the rule of law, 
equal worth and respect of all people. The Commission has worked on the basis of 
consensus to construct a dominant narrative of the past based on both the collected 
historical knowledge and gathered memories of the difficult past. This process has 
made the knowledge of what happened accessible to victims, their descendants, 
and the whole society, thus delegitimizing the discourse of the institutionalized lie 
that had ruled in the previous period. In doing so, it has also contributed towards 
the collective memory of the harm, suffering, and injustice in Estonia at the hands of 
the oppressive occupying powers, which arguably serves to emphasize both the 
moral and democratic-political change brought about by independence.  
 
5.3 Redressing Injustice 
 
Regarding Mendez’ first obligation, the need for justice, and the fourth obligation, 
to remove perpetrators from positions in public office,82 the Commission has been 
less successful. As mentioned, the Introduction explicitly states that the Commission 
is a non-judicial body that is “not trying to compile a set of facts to launch judicial 
actions against anyone or any institution.”83 Yet, in each report the Commission 
attributes responsibility to individuals involved in the criminal events deemed to be 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide. After compiling the report, it 
then became up to the Estonian Internal Security Service, a government agency, to 
investigate offences and bring suspected individuals to trial if that should be the 
case.84 Certainly, the findings of the Commission may be used for investigation and 
prosecution, however, it is not part of the stated responsibilities of the Commission 
to initiate criminal proceedings, nor is it up to the Commission to compile a set of 
facts for such judicial action.85 Clearly, without judicial power, the Commission does 
not meet Mendez’ proposed obligations for the state to remove perpetrators from 
positions of public office or to persecute and punish those responsible for the 
crimes.  
 
However it must be noted that some, among the individuals named in the three 
reports, have been prosecuted for crimes against humanity. For instance, Vassili Riis 
was prosecuted for the arrest and deportation of 1,062 citizens in Estonia in 1941, 
although he died before the proceedings were finalized and IdelJakobson also died 
but was accused for the repression of at least 1,800 people from 1940-1941.86 
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Similarly, individuals singled out for crimes against humanity under the Soviet 
occupation of Estonia from 1944 have also been tried.87 
 
The Commission and the report regarding the Soviet occupation from 1944 have 
been cited and referenced in criminal proceedings carried out against some of the 
named perpetrators, including the European Court of Human Rights vs. Kolk and 
Kislyiy,88 and the European Court of Human Rights vs. Penart.89  Additionally, a few 
of the named individuals were investigated by the Estonian Internal Security 
Service.90 Estonian and international bodies have utilized the knowledge presented 
by the Commission because it explicitly attributes responsibility for the crimes 
against humanity committed towards Estonians, and in Estonia, based on the Rome 
Statute, despite President Lennart Meri’s claim that the Commission’s role is not 
judicial or prosecutorial.   
 
Due to the nature of the content of the reports and the explicit attribution of 
responsibility, the Commission does well to criminalize both periods of Soviet 
occupation, which has the effect of distinguishing the new regime through moral 
inversion.91 This perception is largely in agreement with the argument that the 
collective memory of post-communist Estonia has been based on the dominant and 
agreed upon understanding that Estonia suffered under the criminal Soviet rule.92 
 
As discussed, no trials or proceedings resulted from the report published regarding 
the German Occupation of Estonia in 1941-1944. Establishing a thorough account is 
a primary goal of memory institutes seeking to achieve the broad goals of 
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transitional justice. However, controversy surrounding the 36th Police Battalion, the 
involvement of Estonians in the deportation and killing of Jews and opponents to 
the Nazi regime, as well as the fact that this report was published in 2001, hints at 
the possibility for future action. ToomasHiio and MeelisMaripuu are also of this 
belief, and as time passes, more and more evidence is collected, allowing for more 
extensive research and the potential for new understanding of the criminal past.93 
The controversial elements of this period of German occupation will be discussed 
further. 
 
Certainly processes of retroactive justice are complex and difficult due to the 
temporal distance between the present and time of occupation. It is therefore out 
of scope and near impossible to effectively indict and remove those responsible 
from public office for crimes that occurred in 1940 and 1941, particularly as many 
have died or were too ill for proceedings.94 
 
Additionally, retroactive justice is contestable in and of itself due to the debated 
legitimacy of the new democratic regime to implement justice regarding the 
previous regimes inability to follow the rule of law.95Toomas Hiio and Meelis 
Maripuu emphasize that the end of the Commission’s operations were due to the 
inapplicability of the original framework, based on Crimes Against Humanity. 
Despite the works of the Commission being based on international legal grounds – 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity – which arguably facilitates 
and legitimizes retroactive justice,96Hiio and Maripuu emphasize the complexity of 
this sort of evaluative historical research and the importance of leaving present 
political motives out of the research itself. This is particularly relevant considering 
the roles the report and the Commission has recently played in international and 
domestic court proceedings regarding the findings.  
 
Arguably, the non-judicial nature of the Commission has been somewhat confused, 
making its efforts and aims to objectively establish an account of the past more 
ambiguous and multifarious. By identifying individuals responsible on the basis of 
historical research, the Commission has taken a stance regarding the possible 
narratives put forth, thus providing a blueprint for establishing a dominant account 
of the past. A published record and attribution of responsibility for the crimes 
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against humanity has had the effect of dismissing counter-narratives, which meets a 
stated goal of the Commission97 and simultaneously constructs a collective memory.   
 
5.4 Reparations 
 
The third stated responsibility listed by Mendez is to grant the victims some form of 
reparation for the harms done, be it monetary, recognition, or an apology.98 
Certainly, research and publications cannot explicitly serve as a form of material 
reparation or compensation. With this in mind, the reports produced by the 
Commission can only allow for recognition and acknowledgement by detailing the 
criminal events, the historical background, the context, and the attribution of 
responsibility in the context of reparation. Through its works, the Commission has 
certainly done so. Additionally, Mendez' identifies reparation as a means of 
recognizing the worth and dignity of the victims as human beings.99 The language 
used throughout the Report consistently conveys this message. For example, Soviet 
arrests of Estonians for the "activity of citizens of the Republic of Estonia in the 
service of their country and people," implies the resilience of Estonians to fight for 
their country and dignity.100 In reference to the possibility of collaboration with Nazi 
Germany, "we believe that many of these men taking the only action they believed 
possible,"101 emphasizes the non-rationality of human nature. The language of the 
Report does well to acknowledge and recognize the suffering of Estonians, all the 
while emphasizing their efforts to restore Estonian independence arguably 
satisfying the need of victims to have their dignity and worth restored after the 
years of human rights violations. Therefore, the reports serve as a means of 
recognition and reconciliation for the victims, meeting at a normative and symbolic 
level Mendez’ third obligation for a state.  
 
5.5 Possibility of Denial 
 
Thus far, it is clear that the Commission has decisively contributed to producing a 
particular memory of the country’s recent past, mostly focused on the criminality of 
the Soviet periods of occupation, as evidenced through the listed crimes 
committed. Entrenching this narrative, the Commission was able to emphasize the 
legal, political, and moral contrast between the old regimes and the new one, which 
is to be based on the rule of law, democracy, respect for equal rights, and the 
international democratic ethos. However, with regards to the period of German 
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occupation, there are points of contention in the works of the Commission and 
within the report itself. 
 
As mentioned, the involvement of Estonians in criminal events is acknowledged 
throughout the Report, although the actions of the 36th Police Battalion have been 
increasingly controversial.102 Additionally, there were no trials or prosecutions of 
individuals named in this report. However, the Estonian Security Police initiated an 
investigation into an Estonian, Harry Männil, after Efraim Zuroff, a prominent 
historian and the director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, claimed Männil killed 
hundreds of Jewish individuals in 1941 and 1942.103 After a five-year investigation 
process the Estonian Security Police as well as the Commission concluded that there 
was no concrete evidence regarding Männil’s participation in war crimes.104 
Ultimately, the findings detailed in the report, and the attribution of responsibility 
for the crimes committed under the German occupation, have remained 
controversial.  
 
Additionally, the crimes committed during the German occupation are considered 
in the context of the former Soviet occupation and there is a repeated emphasis on 
the anti-Soviet and anti-communist attitudes throughout. The extensive references 
about repression of Estonians by the Soviets that occurred prior to the Nazi 
occupation contextualizes the period of German occupation in Estonia, and further 
stresses the criminality of the Soviets while minimizing the period of German 
occupation and criminal activity that took place. Moreover, the lack of detail 
regarding the crimes committed relative to those of the Soviet occupation of 1940-
1941 is curious, although the Commission refers to the limited accessible 
material.105 Attributing sparse details of one period of occupation to a lack of 
evidence hints towards Stanley Cohen’s concept of historical denial, “a matter of 
memory, forgetting and repression,” it is about “remembering only what we want to 
remember.”106 Historical denial is not necessarily planned, but may result from 
gradual ignorance or the avoidance of past atrocities, leading to a black hole of 
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historical knowledge.107 Arguably, the criminal events took place roughly 65 years 
ago, the majority of the Estonian Jewish population left prior to the German 
occupation,108 allowing for a natural black hole of knowledge.109 Thus, it may be 
difficult to properly research with such a temporal gap.110 Therefore, historical 
denial is plausible. Still, when considering the collective memory that has so far 
been produced through the memory institute and its report – to criminalize the 
Soviet regime and emphasize the moral high ground of post-communist Estonia – 
the limited details regarding the German occupation, and the near dismissal of 
Estonian involvement contributes to cultural denial.  
 
Cultural denial has been perpetuated in the sense that Estonian society has chosen 
to maintain some degree of silence regarding this period in order maintain the 
dominant narrative of the past, characterized by Soviet evil.111 Although cultural 
and historical denial do not necessarily imply deliberative manipulation of facts and 
memory, they tend to misinterpret or ignore past and present realities.112 The 
potential political and social ramifications of denial in terms of meeting the goals 
of transitional justice are quite possibly far-reaching. Denial may have the effect of 
denying victims their right to know the truth of what happened, for victims to 
receive reparations, and to bring the perpetrators to justice, thus jeopardizing the 
realization of the broad and universally agreed upon goals of transitional justice 
that are based in the rule of law, equal worth and respect for all individuals.  
 
The portion of the report regarding the German occupation of Estonia from 1941 
to 1944 has been somewhat controversial and must be reconsidered to ensure that 
cultural or historical denial is not taking place in order to further Estonia’s 
transitional justice process.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
After a close reading and evaluation of the Commissions three reports, regarding 
the Soviet period of occupation of 1940-1941, the German occupation of 1941-
1944, and the Soviet occupation from 1944, it is evident that there is an effort to 
criminalize the previous regimes. References to the illegality of the Soviet 
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occupation are frequent, the criminal events are well documented and detailed, and 
attribution of responsibility to the Soviet Union, its institutions, and leaders is clear 
regarding both periods of occupation. This narrative has the effect of emphasizing 
and portraying the independent, democratic, and moral Estonia based on the rule of 
law. 
 
Regarding the occupation of Estonia by Nazi-Germany, the details regarding the 
criminal events are relatively sparse, the German occupation is framed within the 
context of the Soviet occupations, and there is repeated emphasis on the confusion 
Estonians experienced in the first few months of German occupation. Moreover, 
evidence of Estonian collaboration is largely dismissed and the Commission points 
to the lack of information and evidence regarding this period, as discussed, perhaps 
implying some form of denial. 
 
Broadly speaking, the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes Against Humanity has established a particular understanding of Estonia's 
past that operates within the framework of the independent nation understood 
through its moral inversion to the Soviet predecessor. However, the Estonian 
International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity 
completed its work in 2008 and has been succeeded by the Estonian Institute of 
Historical Memory, which is still in operation. The Institute is focused on 
establishing to what extent human rights had been violated under the second Soviet 
occupation in Estonia. It is therefore likely that the Estonian collective memory that 
has so far been based on the criminality of the Soviet Union will continue to be 
produced. Particularly since this collective memory has had the effect of further 
establishing Estonia as part of the international democratic ethos based on the rule 
of law with equal respect and worth for all individuals, a broad and normative goal 
of transitional justice that serves the contemporary Estonian political circumstance 
and context.  
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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to address the impact of political indicators on the 
minimum wage adjustment policies in 23 OECD countries. Adopting a multi-theory 
approach, we aim to answer the question if “minimum wage setting mechanism, 
institutionalized schedule of minimum wage adjustment, unionization rate, party 
ideology of the governments, and social welfare expenditures have impact on the 
minimum wages adjustment policies”? The findings show that indicators such as 
institutionalized schedule of minimum wage adjustment, unionization rate and 
social welfare expenditures have significant impact on the ‘real minimum wage 
adjustment’ in the selected cases.  
Keywords: minimum wage, unionization, social welfare, party ideology, scheduled 
minimum wage adjustment 
1. Introduction 
The minimum wage law is a labor market institution used in the majority of 
countries around the world.1 According to the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) Global Wage Report 2008/09, minimum wage is a nearly universal policy 
applied in some form or another in more than 90 percent of countries.2 Along with 
being a really critical labor market institution for the most of the world, minimum 
wage is a political issue on several levels. On one level it is political by highlighting 
the limitations of the market place and recognizing the necessity of the involvement 
of the governments, labor unions, and other social partners. On another level 
minimum wage adjustment is a major instrument of political competition that can 
be manipulated in order to achieve diverse objectives. 3 
Then, what exactly is a minimum wage?  It is easy to define the minimum wage as 
‘the wage floor applying to all wage earners and ensuring that they receive a 
minimum level of pay protection’. However   the reality is much more complicated 
and there are variety of legislative texts set for the minimum wage laws. The reasons 
                                                 
1  François Eyraud and Catherine Saget, The Fundamentals of Minimum Wage Fixing. 
Geneva: International Labor Office, 2005. 
2  (ILO) Global Wage Report 2008/09, 34 
3  Eyraud and Saget, The Fundamentals of Minimum Wage Fixing, 2005. 
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for such a complex array of systems can be traced to the very foundation of the 
minimum wage system, minimum wage adjustment procedures and criteria and the 
political, social and economic actors involved in the process.   
While there is a large body of theoretical and empirical research on the effects of 
minimum wages on employment, wage distribution, and inflation, much less 
attention has been devoted to the factors affecting the determination of the 
minimum wage increases. The academic literature has surprisingly little to say about 
the determinants of the minimum wage adjustment.   
National or statutory minimum wages exist in many OECD countries, but there are 
substantial differences in the way they are set and operated. The main objective of 
this study is to fill the gap in the minimum wage literature by conducting an 
longitudinal empirical analysis for 23 Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)4 states that have national (statutory) minimum wage laws.  In 
order to explain the determinants of the minimum wage we should know: What are 
the institutional dimensions of the national minimum wages? What are the 
mechanisms of minimum wage adjustment? Who sets the minimum wage?  How is it 
determined?  Do left parties and coalition parties favor minimum wage increases 
more than right-wing parties? Given the questions above, the research question of 
the study has been formulated as the following: What are the impacts of  minimum 
wage setting mechanisms (i), scheduled minimum wage adjustment (ii), unionization 
rate (iii), party ideology of the government (iv), social welfare expenditures (v), on 
the `real minimum wages’? 
In order to answer these questions, this study adopts a multi-theory approach by 
taking institutional theory5, interest groups6, and political parties and party ideology 
as the reference points for its theoretical framework7. 
2. Literature Review 
 Definition of the Minimum Wage 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines the minimum wage as the salary 
which constitutes the floor of the wage structure; its objective is to protect workers 
                                                 
4  Australia, Belgium, Canada,  Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
5  Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism” in Approaches and Methodologies in the 
Social Sciences. in eds. Della Porta and M. Keating, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008; March, James and Olsen, Johan. “Elaborating the New Institutionalism” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Institutions, eds. Rhodes et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
6  Frank R. Baumgartner and Jones, Bryan D., Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
7  Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge, 1983. 
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who occupy the lowest position in wage distribution.8 The minimum wage is 
generally related to a survival standard which is considered basic in a given society, 
and has the purpose of safeguarding the income and living conditions of workers 
who are considered to be the most vulnerable in the labor market and that of their 
families.9 Minimum wage policy supported by a strong social policy is an efficient 
mechanism against poverty and income erosion of the poorest households.10  By 
some groups the minimum wage is only seen as a wage floor. What is not 
appreciated is the extent to which a simple floor represents. According to 
Steinberg, minimum wage standards alter the employee-employer relationship in 
three important ways: It introduces limits on employer autonomy by establishing a 
standard that must be adhered to (1); it institutes some procedure for government 
to determine the extent to which employers comply with regulation (2); and it 
creates a situation in which employees see themselves as having a government-
backed right to demand certain minimum terms from their employers (3).11 
Minimum wage along with other labor market policies – particularly those that 
empower labor- would represent a powerful step in the direction of a higher wage 
economy.12 Therefore, the primary goal of any minimum wage policy is to increase 
the incomes of those at the very bottom of the wage scale13. Besides, the economic 
and social impacts of the minimum wage are considerably large because national 
minimum wage has a spillover effect and it has the potential to affect wages around 
it.14 Therefore, setting a higher minimum wage will have a compressing effect on 
wages. When viewed in these terms, a decline in the real minimum wage may be 
seen as a contributing factor to the wage squeeze and the growing income 
inequality, or vice versa. The minimum wage, in other words, as Levin-Waldman 
highlights, affects the nation`s overall wage structure, and is not just restricted to a 
few unfortunate members of a rather narrow segment of the labor market.15 
 
                                                 
8 ILO 2008, 34 
9  Barbosa de Melo, Frederico L., Figueiredo, Ademir, Mineiro, Adhemar S., Arbulu 
Mendonça, Sérgio E.  “Rescuing the Minimum Wage as a Tool for Development in Brazil”, 
International Journal of Labour Research, 4: 1 (2012)27-46. 
10  Herr, Hansjörg and Kazandziska, Milka, “Principles of Minimum Wage Policy : 
Economics, Institutions and Recommendations”, Global Labour University Working Papers 11 
(2011): 1-22.  
11  Steinberg (1982: as cited in Levin-Waldman 2001) 
12  Oren M. Levin-Waldman, The Case of Minimum Wage: Competing Policy Models, 
New York: State University of New York Press, 2001. 
13  Jerold Waltman, Minimum Wage Policy in Great Britain and the United States. 
New York: Algora Publishing, 2008. 
14  Ibid.  
15  Levin-Waldman, 2001. 
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Minimum Wage as a Mixed Policy 
In which policy domain does minimum wage lie?  The answer to this fundamental 
question is hugely important for the minimum wage and its importance in politics. It 
is really crucial to understand the realms of the minimum wage before presenting 
the adjustment determinants of it.  
Theodore Lowi has distinguished among three types of politics: regulation, 
distribution, and redistribution. Regulation essentially involves restricting the 
activities of some for the benefit of others.16 In terms of costs it is clear that one 
group will bear some costs so that others can derive benefits. Redistribution 
essentially involves taking from one group in society – usually in the form of 
taxation- and giving to others, such as social welfare policies. For these kinds of 
policies who benefits and who bears the costs is usually clear. Distribution policies, 
on the other hand, allow the political system to offer benefits to whatever group 
makes a request. Some groups bear the costs, but they are not identifiable. 
Therefore, the critical question about the minimum wage for the Lowi`s policy 
typology is the following: Were the minimum wage to be increased, who would be 
the prime beneficiaries and who would bear the costs? 
The minimum wage would appear to be a redistributive policy in Lowi’s terms 
because minimum wage laws force employers to pay employees higher wages. 
Freeman also conceptualizes minimum wage as a redistributive policy; because it 
takes money from some – businessmen and consumers- and transfers it to the low-
wage workers. According to him the goal of the minimum wage is to redistribute 
earnings to low-paid workers.17 If the market factors that determine who pays for a 
given minimum are considered, there are two main potential groups of payers.18 
First are consumers who will pay a higher price for those goods or services, 
proportional to the minimum wage workers' share of the cost of production. 
Another group who may pay for a minimum wage is stakeholders in businesses that 
raise hourly rates to meet the minimum (or to keep rates above the minimum).  
However, Lowi`s and Freeman`s classification of minimum wage as a redistributive 
policy is not conclusive, because the minimum wage as a policy area does not 
exhibit single pattern of politics; and national minimum wage laws also regulate the 
actions of employers.19 According to Waltman minimum wage, as a purpose, is a 
                                                 
16  Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political 
Theory.” World Politics 16 (1964): 677–715. 
17  Richard B. Freeman, “The Minimum Wage as a Redistributive Tool.” The Economic 
Journal 106 (1996): 639–49. 
18  Ibid 
19  Michael T. Hayes,. “Policy Characteristics, Patterns of Politics, and the Minimum 
Wage: Toward a Typology of Redistributive Policies”,The Policy Studies Journal, 35: 3 (2007): 
465-480. 
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social welfare policy and its primary goal is to attack poverty. However, in design 
and operation it is a labor market regulation. Even when it is put high on the social 
welfare agenda, the minimum wage`s status as labor market regulation policy will 
shape the political struggle.20  
Spitzer tried to solve this dilemma by introducing the idea of mixed categories. 
Spitzer revised Lowi`s typologies and recognized that many policies do not fit neatly 
within one of Lowi`s policy categories. Thus, he makes a distinction between `pure` 
and `mixed` cases. According to Spitzer’s typology, the minimum wage as a mixed 
case would combine aspects of both regulative and redistributive policies.21 
Following Spitzer`s and Waltman`s typologies, this study conceptualizes ‘minimum 
wage` as a mixed policy case generally following both the redistributive patterns (as 
a social welfare policy) and regulatory patterns (as a labor market policy). 
Conventional Discussions on Minimum Wage 
In this study, minimum wage is viewed mainly as a political issue and thus seeks to 
understand it through the lens of political theories because the minimum wage by 
its very nature and design is political more than being economic. However, to say 
that minimum wage is political is not to diminish either its economic bases or 
implications.  
For the most part, the minimum wage has been studied through the lens of 
economics.22 For economists, it is specifically an economic issue with consequences 
that are clearly predictable such as unemployment and inflation.23 They claim that 
minimum wage affects workers` and their employers` ability to freely negotiate 
labor contracts and leads to market inefficiencies. As the price of labor rises, 
employers seek to find other alternatives, such as layoffs, which inevitably lead to 
unemployment.24 
Opponents of the minimum wage often contend that the real way to lift people out 
of poverty can only be achieved through economic growth and increased 
productivity. According to this argument that favor business interests, market by 
itself can create more jobs and higher wages, and those at the bottom of the 
economic ladder will then benefit along with everyone else.25 
                                                 
20  Waltman, Minimum Wage Policy in Great Britain and the United States. 2008. 
21  Michael T. Hayes, “Policy Characteristics, Patterns of Politics, and the Minimum Wage: 
Toward a Typology of Redistributive Policies”,The Policy Studies Journal, 35: 3 (2007): 465-
480. 
22  Levin-Waldman, The Case of Minimum Wage: Competing Policy Models, 2001. 
23  Ibid 
24  Ibid 
25  Waltman, Minimum Wage Policy in Great Britain and the United States. 2008. 
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However, not all of the economic arguments oppose minimum wage.  The most 
provocative challenge to the conventional view has been the “new economics of the 
minimum wage”.26 The new economics approach mostly discussed the positive 
effects of the minimum wages such as how minimum wage increases purchasing 
power and productivity27; and a growing body of empirical work has begun to show 
that the employment consequences of minimum wage really were not that serious.28  
3. Methodological Framework 
Units of Analysis 
All countries in OECD have at least some form of the minimum wage (Table 1). The 
national systems, however, differ widely regarding levels, scope and political and 
institutional setting of minimum wages.  Basically, there are two main characteristics 
which can help to differentiate the minimum wage systems among all OECD 
countries. First one is having a single national minimum wage that is set either by 
law or by a national inter-sectorial agreement; and the other one is to set the 
minimum wages only at sectorial or occupational level through collective 
bargaining agreements.29 The units of analysis of this research consist of 23 OECD 
countries that have national (statutory) minimum wage laws30. 
Dependent Variable 
There are two main methods on how to compare the levels of minimum wages 
among OECD countries. The first is to match the current value of the minimum wage 
calculated in a common currency, for example the euro or US dollar. The problem 
with this way of comparison is that it always includes statistically distorting effects as 
a result of exchange rate developments. In addition, the current value of a minimum 
wage contains only little information on its real meaning for the workers in a certain 
national socio-economic framework. A second  way on how to compare minimum 
wages is, therefore, to calculate them in Purchasing Power Standards (or Purchasing 
Power Parity, PPP), which reflects the different price levels and costs of living in the 
various countries. This study uses ‘real minimum wages’ that is calculated in 
Purchasing Power Parity. The ‘real minimum wages’ are conceptualized according to 
                                                 
26  Eric A. Whitaker, Herian, Mitchel N., Larimer, Christopher W. and Lang, Michael. 
“The Determinants of Policy Introduction and Bill Adoption: Examining Minimum Wage 
Increases in the American States, 1997–2006”, The Policy Studies Journal 40: 4 (2012): 626-
649 
27  Ibid 
28  Salas Neumark, Wascher 2013, Neumark and Wascher 2008; Card and Krueger 
1995 
29  Schulten 2012; Barbosa de Melo et al. 2012; Herr and Kazandziska 2011; Waltman 
2008; Funk and Lesch 2006; Eyraud and Saget 2005. 
30  Chile and Israel have been eliminated from this research due to lack of data in 
OECD Statistics database for the analyzed years. 
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the OECD statistics, in which  the real hourly and annual minimum wages are 
calculated first by deflating the series using the consumer price index taking 2011 
as the base year. These series are then converted into the common currency unit of 
USD by using Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) for private consumption 
expenditures in 2011. 
 
Table 1: Minimum Wage Structure of OECD Countries31 
OECD Countries 
National Minimum Wage 
Sectoral/Occupational Minimum 
Wage 
United States, United Kingdom, Japan, 
Ireland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Chile, 
Canada, Australia, Belgium, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Turkey 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, 
Cyprus 
Source: International Labor Organization 
Independent Variables 
Mechanisms of Minimum Wage Setting 
In most countries the government is the only actor in the decision making process 
and in some countries final decision about the minimum wage rates is given either 
by a tripartite committee or by the collective bargaining negotiations. Based on this, 
five categories have been identified for the OECD countries by Eyraud and Saget: 
(1) the government decides alone; (2) the government consults directly and 
separately each of the social partners; (3) the government ‘must’ seek the opinion of 
                                                 
31  In all other countries belonging to second group minimum wages are exclusively 
determined by collective agreements at sectoral and company level. Cyprus is rather an 
exception, as it is the only country where there is a national minimum wage but it applies only 
to a group of nine different occupations including security guards, caretakers, cleaners, etc. 
(Soumeli, 2011: as cited in Schulten 2012).  
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specialized committee; (4) the tripartite committee sets minimum wage rates; (5) 
minimum wages are set through collective bargaining, with no state intervention.32 
Table 2: Mechanisms of Minimum Wage Setting 
AUTONOMOUS 
SEMI-
AUTONOMOUS 
COOPERATIVE 
Single Decision-Making w/o 
Required Consultation 
Single Decision-
Making with 
Required 
Consultation 
Multiple Decision-Makers 
with Required Consultation 
Gov`ts Decide 
Alone 
Voluntary 
Consultation 
Required 
Consultation 
Tripartite 
System 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Systems  
United States Spain United Kingdom Australia Belgium 
Canada 
New 
Zealand France Korea Greece 
Chile 
Czech 
Republic Japan Mexico   
Luxembourg Estonia Hungary Poland   
  Israel Ireland Slovakia   
    Portugal Slovenia   
    Netherlands Turkey   
Source: International Labor Organization, Authors` own composition 
Based on these arguments, three different minimum wage adjustment mechanisms 
have been identified for the OECD countries that are examined in this study: 
autonomous, semi-autonomous, and cooperative (Table 2). Once a minimum wage 
law is enacted, subsequent minimum wage policy development can take one of 
three forms.33 The autonomous mechanism is to keep all aspects of minimum wage 
policy in the hands of the legislature, government being the single decision-maker. 
The semi-autonomous mechanism is to create an outside body, but only give it the 
power to make recommendations that can soon come to the legislature such as the 
                                                 
32  François Eyraud and Catherine Saget, The Fundamentals of Minimum Wage Fixing. 
Geneva: International Labor Office, 2005. 
33  Waltman, Minimum Wage Policy in Great Britain and the United States. 2008. 
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Low Pay Commission in UK. The cooperative mechanism is to establish a public body 
outside the legislature and endow it with the power to make changes in the law, 
especially the setting of the level of the wage34.  
 
In some countries national minimum wages are set by the government without 
formalized consultations with unions or employer’s associations and no formal 
consultation body exists.35 The United States uses the autonomous mode as 
Congress has repeatedly resisted creating a recommendatory body. Thus each 
alteration in the minimum wage must run the entire legislative gamut, as any other 
statue.36  Another popular minimum wage adjustment system is minimum wage 
determination by the government which in some states follows a period of 
‘voluntary’ consultation with minimum wage commissions and social partners. The 
role of the social partners or minimum wage commissions can vary among countries 
but when it comes to the final decision, it is the government that makes it 
autonomously although the importance of consultation is still recognized.37  
Some governments are required to assess the recommendations of specialized wage 
committees when they are adjusting the minimum wages. The UK also fits in the 
category of governments that has to consult with the Low Pay Commission (LPC) 
which was established in July 1997 and granted permanent status in October 2001. 
The LPC is made up of a chair, three members from the business community, three 
from the labor unions and two independent academics.38 The recommendations 
made by these specialized bodies are generally backed by a technical report. The 
Low Wage Commission in UK also writes an annual wage report; and through that 
report a lot of important information and research about wage dispersion and 
minimum wages is delivered to the public.39 It would be difficult for the government 
not to accept the proposal or to reject a unanimous decision. On the other hand, it 
has no such constraints when there is disagreement within the committee. 
In tripartite or collective bargaining systems, for a decision to be reached the 
authorities generally have to come to an agreement with the employers` and 
workers` representatives. The commissions within these systems do more than 
                                                 
34  Herr and  Kazandziska (2011), Waltman (2008), and Eyraud and Saget (2005) 
discussed minimum wage adjustments systems among states with national minimum wage 
laws. However, these authors did not operationalize these mechanisms. Hence, for the 
purpose of conceptual clarity, minimum wage adjustment mechanisms have been renamed by 
Yildirim-Babakiray and Tugdar as autonomous, semi-autonomous, and cooperative according 
the decision-making actors involved within the process.  
35  Herr and Kazandziska, “Principles of Minimum Wage Policy, 2011 
36  Waltman, Minimum Wage Policy in Great Britain and the United States. 2008. 
37  Herr and  Kazandziska 2011; Eyraud and Saget 2005 
38  Lothar Funk and Hagen Lesch, “Minimum Wage Regulations in Selected European 
Countries”, Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy 3 (2006): 78-92  
39  Herr and Kazandziska, “Principles of Minimum Wage Policy”, 2011  
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merely making recommendations; they set the minimum wage rates. In most cases 
the government validates the decision but this is merely a formality.40 Tripartite 
system is considered as a favorable minimum wage fixing mechanism because it 
involves the three main actors - market forces, public authorities, and organized 
labor- to come into play, thus avoiding both excessive state control and excessive 
liberalism. Both tripartite and collective bargaining systems ensure that issues 
related to minimum wage are solved with a degree of coordination, solidarity and 
social integration that cannot be achieved by decentralized labor relations.  
In the collective bargaining systems, from a purely legal point of view, minimum 
wage setting is left completely to the social partners.41  A national multi-sectorial 
agreement sets a single minimum wage rate for the whole country. Very few 
countries have a single national rate set through collective bargaining. Of all the 
countries studied only two – Belgium and Greece – belong to this category.  In 
Belgium national minimum wage is determined in inter-sectorial collective 
agreement negotiated within the National Labour Council; and in Greece it is 
determined by National General Collective Labour Agreement (NGCLA) which is 
agreed by the social partners and then voted into law (LPC 2011). However, that 
fact that public bodies are not legally designated participants in the collective 
bargaining process does not necessarily mean that they are not involved in wage 
fixing. Governments may make recommendations concerning wage increases that 
can have an effect on negotiations.  
Hypothesis #1: OECD countries that use semi-autonomous and cooperative 
decision-making to determine the national minimum wages will be more likely to 
have higher ‘real minimum wages’ and OECD countries that use autonomous 
decision-making will be more likely to have lower ‘real minimum wages’.42 
Institutionalized Schedule of Adjustment 
National minimum wages are adjusted regularly by governments.43 However the 
duration of the adjustments may be longer than a year period when there is no 
institutionalized schedule of adjustment (Table 3).  
 
 
                                                 
40  Eyraud and Saget, The Fundamentals of Minimum Wage Fixing, 2005. 
41  Ibid 
42  Mechanisms of minimum wage setting are operationalized as a time-invariant 
dummy variable: semi-autonomous and cooperative mechanisms being 1, and autonomous 
decision making being 0.  
43  Lothar Funk and Hagen Lesch. “Minimum Wage Regulations in Selected European 
Countries”, Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy 3 (2006): 78-92.  
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Table 3: Institutionalized Schedule of Adjustment  
Institutionalized Schedule of Adjustment 
Country Yes/No How often? 
Australia Yes Annual 
Belgium Yes Two-years 
Canada No  - 
Czech Republic No  - 
Estonia No  - 
France Yes Annual 
Greece Yes Annual 
Hungary Yes Annual 
Ireland No  - 
Japan No  - 
Korea Yes Annual 
Luxembourg Yes Bi-Annual 
Mexico Yes Annual 
Netherlands Yes Bi-Annual 
New Zealand Yes Annual 
Poland Yes Bi-Annual 
Portugal Yes Annual 
Slovak Republic Yes Annual 
Slovenia Yes Annual 
Spain Yes Bi-Annual 
Turkey Yes Two-years 
United Kingdom No  - 
United States No  - 
Source: International Labor Organization,  Authors` own composition 
 
In countries without a fixed rhythm of adjustment, as for example in United States, 
minimum wages increase in an arbitrary way according to specific economic, social 
Yildirim-Babakiray and Tugdar: Political determinants of minimum wage adjustment policies 
 
196 
and political conditions in the country.44  In an inflationary situation adjustments in 
only two or even more years will lead to a situation in which the real minimum wage 
drops substantially and/or the nominal minimum wage loses its contact with the 
nominal average or median wage.45 Finally, annual adjustments of national 
minimum wages can add to the mobilization of union members to lobby and fight 
for sufficient adjustments of minimum wages.46 
Hypothesis #2: OECD countries with institutionalized schedule of minimum wage 
adjustments are more likely to have higher `real minimum wages’, and OECD 
countries without institutionalized schedule of minimum wage adjustments are 
more likely to have lower `real minimum wages’.47 
Social Welfare Expenditure 
Waltman and Marsh find that OECD countries with high levels of expenditure on 
traditional social welfare policies are decidedly less likely to have any type of 
minimum wage policy than lower spending nations.48 If we look across the OECD 
countries, we can see very complex relationships between social welfare, wealth, 
and minimum wage policies. Sweden, for example, has relatively high social welfare 
expenditures, but no minimum wage, while Australia has historically had a relatively 
high minimum wage, but low social welfare expenditures.49 These observations lead 
us to another question regarding national minimum wages. In order to move beyond 
these observations this study aims to analyze the relationship between social 
welfare expenditure and the real minimum wage among the countries with national 
minimum wage laws. It is hypothesized that there is a correlation between the real 
minimum wages and the percentage of GDP spent on social welfare expenditure 
among countries. 50 
Hypothesis # 3: OECD countries that spent more GDP on social welfare are more 
likely to have higher `real minimum wages’, and OECD countries that spent less GDP 
on social welfare are more likely to have lower `real minimum wages’. 
                                                 
44  Herr and Kazandziska, “Principles of Minimum Wage Policy, 2011 
45  Ibid 
46  Ibid 
47   Institutionalized schedule of adjustment is operationalized as a time invariant 
dummy variable for this study. For the OECD countries that have scheduled their minimum 
wage adjustment are given the value 1; and the ones that have not institutionalized their 
minimum wage adjustment are given the value of 0 for this variable.  
48  Jerold Waltman and Christopher Marsh. “Minimum Wages and Social Welfare 
Expenditures: Substitutes or Complements?” Policy Studies 28: 2 (2007):163-174. 
49  Ibid. 
50  The main social policy areas determined by OECD for the social expenditure data 
are as follows: old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labor 
market programs, unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas. 
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Unionization Rate 
The configuration of organized interests on any given issue is critically important.51 
According to Baumgartner and Jones interest groups are one of the major actors in 
setting the policy agenda.52 Interest groups play an important role in formulating 
questions, affecting public opinion, and defining the terms of the public debate. 
This study conceptualizes labor unions as a key interest group affecting the national 
minimum wage adjustment within the OECD countries. A commonplace observation 
is that labor unions promote minimum wage legislation. However according to Cox 
and Oaxaca this observation calls for an explanation. After all, most unionized 
workers are in relatively high wage occupations and thus do not have an 
immediately obvious economic self-interest to increase the minimum wage.53  
Today unions are representing many low-paid workers.54 A rise in the minimum 
wage increases the demand for workers with greater skills because it reduces 
competition for low-skilled workers.55Thus, some employers will replace their 
lowest-skilled workers with somewhat higher-skilled workers in response to 
increases in the minimum wage.56 As a result, minimum wage increases may harm 
the least skilled workers because more-skilled workers would be replacing some 
less-skilled workers, which in turn would weaken labor union’s strength and their 
collective bargaining power.57 Considering their relatively strong organizational 
power, the unions from the Nordic States especially but also those from Austria and 
Italy do not want to give the State any influence on wage setting and therefore 
reject any ideas of a statutory minimum wage. Thus, this study expects the minimum 
wage increase rate to be negatively related to the rate of unionization.  
                                                 
51  Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. New York: Schocken Books, 1970; Schattschneider, Elmer E., The Semi-Sovereign 
People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
1960. 
52  Frank R. Baumgartner and Jones, Bryan D., Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
53  James C. Cox and Ronald L. Oaxaca, “The Political Economy of Minimum Wage 
Legislation”, Economic Inquiry  20: 4 (1982): 533–555. 
54  Waltman, Jerold. Minimum Wage Policy in Great Britain and the United States. 
New York: Algora Publishing, 2008. 
55  Richard V. Burkhauser  and, Joseph J. Sabia,  "Minimum Wages and Poverty: Will a 
$9.50 Federal Minimum Wage Really Help the Working Poor?," Southern Economic 
Journal  77: 3 (January 2010): 592-623. 
56  Gary Becker,. "On Raising the Federal Minimum Wage," November 26, 2006, Available 
at www.becker-posner-blog.com 
57  Daniel Aaronson and Erich French. "Output Prices and the Minimum Wage," 
Employment Policies Institute, June 2006.  
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Hypothesis #4: OECD countries that have higher unionization rate are less likely to 
have higher `real minimum wages’; and OECD countries that have lower 
unionization rate are more likely to have higher `real minimum wages’. 
Political Party Ideology 
In modern democratic theory political parties are seen as the primary means for 
mediating between society and government. Parties are supposed to play a 
comprehensive role before, during, and after elections and they structure the 
voter`s choice. Once in the office, parties are the major actors that form, operate, 
and control the policy making process. Korpi believe that the strength of unions and 
parties of the left drive expenditure on welfare state policies independent from the 
level of societal wealth. Rather than wealth being automatically translated into 
welfare state provision, only the political muscle of the left serves to secure policies 
designed to help the less fortunate.58  
Waltman's investigation of public opinion polls pertaining to the federal minimum 
wage in United States turned up evidence that self-described ideology and political 
party affiliation were the most important factors in predicting a person's support for 
federal minimum wage increases, with ideology especially important in as much as 
the minimum wage is seen by many of its proponents as a social welfare policy.59 
Hypothesis #5: OECD countries that have left-wing governments, or lefty-wing 
dominance of coalitions are more likely to have higher `real minimum wages’, and 
OECD countries that have right-wing governments, or right-wing dominance of 
coalitions are more likely to have lower `real minimum wages’.60 
Control Variables 
For a better regression analysis, we control two variables in 23 OECD states; 
‘inflation rate’ and ‘annual increase of relative value of minimum wages in 
comparison to national average wages’ for their general economic well-being and 
job market characteristics. 
The relative value of minimum wages in comparison to national average or median 
wages gives information on the real level of minimum wage protection and the 
status of minimum wage earners within the overall national wage hierarchy.61 Thus, 
                                                 
58  Walter Korpi. The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge, 1983. 
59  Jerold Waltman, and Pittman, Sarah. “The Determinants of State Minimum Wage 
Rates: A Public Policy Approach”, Journal of Labor Research 23:1 (2002): 51-56 
60  The party ideology of the governments in rule has been operationalized as a 
dummy variable: left-wing governments and coalitions being 1, and the right-wing 
governments and coalitions being 0.  
61  Thorsten Schulten. “European Minimum Wage Policy: A Concept for Wage-Led 
Growth and Fair Wages in Europe”, International Journal of Labour Research 4: 1 (2012): 85-
103  
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we use ‘relative value of minimum wages in comparison to national average or 
median wages’ as a crucial control variable for this analysis. As the inflation refers to 
a rise in the general level of prices of goods and services over a period of time, and 
impacts the purchasing power, we control the ‘inflation rate’ as a variable as well.  
Data Analysis Methodology 
Data analysis and statistical software program STATA (Version 12) has been used for 
the regression analysis of the data. The panel data (also known as longitudinal or 
cross-sectional time-series) for this study has been consolidated by utilizing the 
statistical databases of OECD and International Labor Organization (ILO). In our 
panel data selected OECD countries with minimum wage laws are observed for the 
years in between 2001 to 2011. 
The two dominant approaches for the multiple regression analysis of the panel data 
are the use of 'fixed effects' or 'random effects' models.62 The core difference 
between fixed and random effect models lies in the role of the dummy variables. In 
our study, independent variables such as 'minimum wage setting mechanism' or 
'institutionalization of scheduled minimum wage adjustment' are time invariant 
dummy variables; and our regression model hypothesizes that these variables have 
some influence on the dependent variable. As Green explains if there is a reason to 
believe that differences across entities have some influence on the dependent 
variable then you should use random effects.63 
As an advantage of the random effects model we are able to include time invariant 
variables in our model which allows for time-invariant variables to play a role as 
explanatory variables. In the fixed effects model these variables are absorbed by the 
intercept. Another reason behind using random effects model for this study is that, 
unlike the fixed effects model, the variation across entities is assumed to be random 
and uncorrelated with the independent variables included in the model. The 
random effects regression equation of our model (I) can be written as follows: 
RMWit= α + β1MWSMit+ β2ISAit + β3SWE + β4URit + β5PIit + β6CPIit + β7MWMEit + uit+ 
εit 
64 
                                                 
62  Tom Clark and Drew Linzer,  “Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?” Available at 
http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~tclark7/randomeffects.pdf, accessed on Aug 15, 2013; 
Park, Hun M., “Linear Regression Models for Panel Data Using SAS, Stata, LIMDEP, and 
SPSS”,Center for Statistical and Mathematical Computing Working Paper Series, 2009. 
Available at  http://www.indiana.edu/~statmath/stat/all/panel 
63  William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2008.  
64  RMW= real minimum wages calculated in Purchasing Power Parity; MWSM= 
minimum wage setting mechanisms; ISA=institutionalized schedule of minimum wage 
adjustment; SWE= social welfare expenditure in percentage of GDP; UR= unionization rate; 
PI=party ideology of the government; CPI=consumer price index; MWME=the ratio of 
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4. Findings and Discussion  
In this paper, random effects regression analysis is done in two steps (Table 4). Real 
minimum wages that have been calculated in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) as the 
dependent variable; Model I includes 5 independent variables (MWSM, ISA, SWE, 
UR, PI) and two control variables (CPI, MWME) whereas Model II includes 3 
independent variables (ISA, SWE, UR) and two control variables (CPI, MWME). In 
Model I, minimum wage setting mechanism and party ideology are statistically 
insignificant. The testing number of p for these variables are both greater than 0.05. 
Although, the Model I is significant (Prob > chi2 = 0.000), the insignificant variables 
have been omitted for an additional analysis in order to get a more reliable model, 
because with insignificant p  values we are not able to support our hypotheses about 
the minimum wage setting mechanisms and party ideology of governments. Unlike 
it has been hypothesized random effects regression analysis of Model I explicitly 
shows that semi-autonomous or cooperative decision making for minimum wage 
adjustment and lefty-party governments cannot be considered as political 
determinants of minimum wage adjustments for the OECD countries analyzed in 
this study.  
The variables that are regressed for Model II, including the control variables, are all 
statistically significant having p values less than 0.05. The coefficients of the 
variables also support the hypotheses. The regression analysis of the data 
demonstrates that OECD countries with institutionalized schedule of minimum 
wage adjustments are more likely to have higher `real minimum wages’, and OECD 
countries with minimum wage laws that spent more of their GDP on social welfare 
are more likely to have higher `real minimum wages’. A commonplace observation 
about labor unions` effect on minimum wages is that unions usually promote 
minimum wage legislation. However, this study does not take unions` positive effect 
on minimum wages for granted due to the facts that most unionized workers are in 
relatively high wage occupations and thus do not have an immediately obvious 
economic self-interest to increase the minimum wage; and supporting minimum 
wages would weaken labor union’s strength and their collective bargaining power. 
As it is hypothesized regression analysis results shows that the effect of unionization 
rate on real minimum wage is negative rather than being positive which means that  
OECD countries that have higher unionization rate are less likely to have higher `real 
minimum wages’, and OECD countries that have lower unionization rate are more 
likely to have higher `real minimum wages’. 
 
                                                                                                                 
minimum wages to median earnings of full-time employees; i=country;  t=time; uit=between-
country error; εit=within-country  error.  
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Table 4: Random Effects Regression Models 
Random Effects Regression 
Variables Model I   Model II 
  Coefficient   Coefficient 
    
Constant 4.619   4.467 
  (1.054)   (0.737) 
Minimum Wage Setting Mechanism -0.203   omitted 
MWSM (Time Invariant Dummy Variable) (1.321)     
    
Institutionalized Schedule of  Adjustment   0.632***   0.667*** 
ISA ( Time Invariant Dummy Variable) (0.151)   (0.137) 
    
Social Welfare Expenditure   0.127***   0.126*** 
SWE (0.023)   (0.022) 
    
Unionization Rate    -0.076***    -0.75*** 
UR (0.014)   (0.013) 
    
Political Party Ideology  -0.046   omitted 
PI  (Dummy Variable) (0.103)     
    
Consumer Price Index\Inflation  -0.015*    -0.016** 
CPI (0.006)   (0.005) 
    
The Ratio of Minimum Wages to Median 
Earnings  1.730**   1.735** 
MWME (0.632)   0.612 
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Number of observations (n) 253   253 
  
Prob > chi2 = 
0.000 
Prob > 
chi2 = 
0.000 
  R-sq=0.5723   
R-
sq=0.5714 
Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates p<0.05; ** indicates p<0.01, *** 
indicates p<0.001 
 
Figure 1: 2I Model for Minimum Wages 
 
Comparative analysis of policy processes clearly demonstrate that there is a great 
variety in the ways agenda setting and policy implementation are accomplished. 
How can a minimum wage as a public policy process be extensively theorized given 
the fact it possesses different components such as social welfare institutions, 
schedule of the minimum wage adjustment, and unions? This analysis presents that 
institutional arrangements play a significant role in minimum wage adjustment. The 
institutional framework in which minimum wage policies are designed, 
implemented, and enforced matters. However, in order to understand the dynamics 
of minimum wage policies adopting an institutional theory as an explanation is not 
enough.  The determination of national statutory minimum wage is often a topic in 
public and political debates, which gives labor unions as interest groups the 
opportunity to influence wage developments beyond the traditional channels of 
collective bargaining.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTEREST GROUPS INSTITUTIONS 
Institutionalized 
Schedule of 
Adjustment 
Social Welfare 
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Unionization Rate 
 
REAL MINIMUM WAGE 
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5. Conclusion 
Cross-country studies of the policy-making process demonstrate that there is no 
single process through which public policies are made. As Cairney mentions policy 
processes are likely to vary across countries, political systems, and policy areas.65 
Different institutional frameworks, procedures, and traditions result in significant 
variation in the style and mechanisms of policy making.66  However, this variance 
does not mean that these processes stand as 'apples' and 'oranges'; and it does not 
mean that we cannot compare those.  
The OECD states have at least some form of the minimum wage, although their 
national systems differ, which in turn brings different practices regarding the scope 
and the institutional setting of minimum wages.  OECD states mainly have two 
characteristics that differ for their minimum wage systems; either (1) by law or by a 
national inter-sectorial agreement; (2) by collective bargaining agreements.67 For a 
better analysis, we developed two random effect regression models of 23 OECD 
countries with national (statutory) minimum wage law. In Model I, real minimum 
wages based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) are taken as the dependent variable, 
on which the impact of minimum wage setting mechanism, institutionalized 
schedule of minimum wage adjustment, unionization rate, party ideology of the 
governments, and social welfare expenditures are tested with the control variables 
(CPI, MWME). The Model I appeared as significant, taking the variables 
institutionalized schedule of minimum wage adjustment, unionization rate, and 
social welfare expenditures into consideration. However, the statistically 
insignificance of minimum wage setting mechanism and party ideology encouraged 
us to transform it into the Model 2I with three independent variables.  
Comparison of our two models show that, in order to study these 
differences/similarities among 23 OECD states in terms of their minimum wage 
adjustment policies, we reach to the conclusion that we need casually driven 
frameworks just like the '2I Model' that has been developed for this study.  All 
variables tested in Model 2I are statistically significant, which supports our 
hypotheses about the impact of political indicators on minimum wage adjustment 
policies. Thus, our model 2I supports that OECD countries with institutionalized 
schedule of minimum wage adjustments are more likely to have higher `real 
minimum wages’. This analysis contributes to the literature stating that states 
                                                 
65  Paul Cairney, Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues. New York: Palgrave, 
2012. 
66  Jessica Adolino and Charles Blake, Comparative Public Policy, Washington: CQ Press, 
2010. 
67  Schulten 2012; Barbosa de Melo et al. 2012; Herr and Kazandziska 2011; Waltman 
2008; Funk and Lesch 2006; Eyraud and Saget 2005.  
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without institutionalized minimum wage adjustment either depends on specific 
economic, social and political conditions or inflationary situation adjustments.68 
Accordingly, annual adjustments of national minimum wages can add to the 
unionization, which in turn would bring lobbying for sufficient adjustments of 
minimum wages.69  The determination of minimum wage is often a topic in political 
debates, which gives labor unions the opportunity to influence wage developments 
through the channels of collective bargaining. Our findings support these 
assumptions in literature as well. As the unionized workers are in relatively high 
wage occupations and thus have lower interest to increase the minimum wage, 
labor union's collective bargaining power would be weaken if minimum wages 
supported. Thus, Model 2I indicate that the effect of unionization rate on real 
minimum wage is negative rather than being positive, which means that OECD 
countries with higher unionization rate are less likely to have higher `real minimum 
wages’. 
Social welfare spending is another significant indicator of our Model 2I. In 
literature, the relationship between social welfare spending and minimum wage 
adjustment appears as a complex mechanism with different experiences in various 
OECD states.70 Our findings contribute to the literature by showing that 23 OECD 
countries with minimum wage laws that spent more of their GDP on social welfare 
are more likely to have higher `real minimum wages’.  
Despite the significant contribution of our Model 2I to the literature on minimum 
wage adjustments, the findings could be  strengthened with other independent and 
control variables (i.e. public opinion, women organizations, living wage campaigns) 
that would have explanatory power on this issue. Using more variables would 
definitely increase the robustness of this analysis. However, the main reason for not 
including other variables in the current model is mostly the lack of sufficient data. 
Nevertheless, mentioning some of these variables briefly here would be helpful for 
further research on determinants of minimum wage adjustment. 
First of all, as a cross-country study design, our model lacks the international 
institutions as determinants on countries` minimum wage policies. The domestic 
institutions considered are relatively stable and solely cross sectional variation is not 
sufficient to catch the true effect of 'institutions'. An example of such as affect is the 
severe cuts in minimum wages both in Ireland and Greece in 2011 that have 
resulted by the pressure of international institutions (i.e. International Monetary 
                                                 
68  Herr and Kazandziska, “Principles of Minimum Wage Policy, 2011 
69  Ibid. 
70  Waltman and Marsh, “Minimum Wages and Social Welfare Expenditures: 
Substitutes or Complements?”, 2007. 
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Fund). 71 It would be very helpful to analyze if IMF, WB, EU or other bailout 
agreements influence the policy outcomes, or what would be the impact of (pre or 
post) electoral agreements and the magnitude of the coalitions, on the minimum 
wage options. Additionally other domestic variables could be added to the model as 
well such as the living wage campaign. Although living wage is fundamentally 
different from the minimum wage (the latter is any legally mandated wage that 
must be paid by an employer, whereas the former is a wage sufficient to provide a 
decent living for the affected worker) in many ways, it can be considered as a 
pushing factor for national minimum wage policies, as it serves as a constant 
reminder that the ultimate goal is to make the minimum wage a living wage.72  
Other interest groups, such as women organizations, could have explanatory power 
as indicators on the minimum wage adjustments. In many countries, the minimum 
wage has undoubtedly been important for raising income levels among female 
workers and facilitating a reduction in the gender wage gap.73 Minimum wage 
workforce contains a significantly disproportionate number of women; and 
especially in U.S. women organizations co-ordinate lobbying activities to increase 
public awareness about the minimum wage increases.74 Thus, inclusion of women 
organizations in the model can bring a gender-oriented political perspective to the 
analysis of minimum wage adjustment policies.  
Although, minimum wage adjustment is a widely-discussed issue in literature, the 
analysis is heavily focused on micro-economic perspectives. In this respect, this 
article is a significant contribution to the literature, as we propose two models 
testing the relationship between political indicators and minimum wage adjustment 
policies in OECD countries. Thus, this study makes a significant contribution to the 
field by bringing a political perspective to the literature on minimum wage 
adjustment. Focusing on the real minimum wages calculated in Purchasing Power 
                                                 
71  In February 2012, the Greek government decided on a radical, 22 per cent cut of 
the national minimum. The decision was taken in the face of opposition from both the labor 
unions and the employers’ associations which had jointly appealed to keep the minimum 
wage level as determined in the national collective agreement (Paphitis and Corder 2012: as 
cited in Schulten 2012 ).  However, the Greek government was under strong pressure of the 
so-called Troika, composed of the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had insisted that a radical drop in the 
national minimum wage would be necessary in order to restore the competitiveness of the 
Greek economy (Schulten, 2012). At the beginning of 2011, it was Ireland which was the first 
country to cut its hourly minimum wage by 1 euro, which was equivalent to a reduction of 
11.5 per cent. Again, it was the EU-ECB-IMF Troika which had strongly pushed in favor of the 
wage cut (Schulten, 2012). 
72  Jerold Waltman, Minimum Wage Policy in Great Britain and the United States. 
New York: Algora Publishing, 2008. 
73  Funk and Lesch, “Minimum Wage Regulations in Selected European Countries”, 2006. 
74  Ibid 
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Parity, our model shows that political indicators such as institutionalized schedule of 
minimum wage adjustment, social welfare expenditure in percentage of GDP, and 
unionization rate in 23 OECD states have significant impact on the minimum wage 
adjustment.  
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EU COUNCIL PRESIDENCY AS AGENDA SHAPER: THE CASE OF THE CZECH EU 
PRESIDENCY 
 
Petr Kaniok 
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Abstract 
Based on an analysis of several EU Presidencies, Swedish political scientist Jonas 
Tallberg created a model that identifies ways in which EU Presidency countries 
shape the EU agenda. In this model, Tallberg conceptualises the process of agenda 
shaping in a broader way and particularly focuses on structuring issues that are 
already a part of the EU political agenda. Tallberg argues that there are three 
relevant dimensions – the socioeconomic, the regional and the constitutional – 
according to which the Presidency structures its political preferences. However, 
Tallberg did not work with consistent data (for example, presidency priorities on EU 
legislation) and his model is less than comprehensive. Additionally, Tallberg´s model 
was created in the context of the EU – 15. By analysing the Czech EU Presidency of 
2009 and its legislative priorities, this article addresses both shortcomings of the 
model and applies it to the EU – 27 context. As its main findings, the analysis 
confirms that Tallberg´s model is valid when applied to a single EU Presidency and a 
consistent dataset (legislative priorities) and offers an optimisation of the model. 
The analysis also confirms Tallberg´s model is valid for the new EU Member States.  
 
Keywords: EU presidency, agenda setting, Czech Republic, Council of the EU 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
Over the past two decades, the presidency of the EU has been a frequent topic of 
research into the European integration process. After years of relative neglect, it 
began to attract attention in the 1990s, as scholars began to investigate both 
qualitative and quantitative changes in the European integration process. Some of 
this research comprised a series of case studies focused on concrete presidencies;2 
                                                 
1  This article has been written as part of research project “Europe 2020: A Horizon of 
Change of Relevant Actors of the Czech Republic´s Political System” (Czech Science 
Foundation project GA13-24657S). 
2  See for example Simone Bunse, Small States and EU Governance Leadership 
through the Council Presidency (Houndmills, Basingstone and New York: 
Palgrave/Macmillan, 2009), Ben Crum, Can the EU Presidency make its mark on interstate 
bargains? The Italian and Irish Presidencies of the 2003–04 IGC, Journal of European Public 
Policy 14 (8, 2007): 1208-1226, Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, “Lithuania's EU Council Presidency: 
Negotiating Finances, Dealing with Geopolitics”, Journal of Common Market Studies 52 (s1, 
2014): 99-108. 
Kaniok: EU Council presidency as agenda shaper 
 
210 
some was more theoretically-oriented. The latter includes Jonas Tallberg’s abstract 
model of how the presidency works with the political agenda.  
 
Under Tallberg’s conceptualisation, the presidency may potentially shape the EU 
agenda in one of three ways: by agenda setting, by agenda exclusion, and, 
particularly, by structuring the issues already present within the political discourse 
— agenda structuring. He argues that, especially in terms of how they work with 
existing agenda matters, Presidencies follow particular socio-economic, 
constitutional, and regional determinants characteristic for the country. But 
Tallberg’s work suffers two shortcomings. First, he utilises ad hoc elements to model 
the presidency as a shaper of the agenda, illustrating the different parts of his 
model using various situations in which the presidency may find itself and the 
actions it may take. This set of situations is patchy in nature, though, and can hardly 
be said to be of uniform quality. Second, as illustrated in the literature review 
section, Tallberg’s model is not comprehensive — he does not, for example, 
explicitly anticipate the role inevitably played by determinants in working with the 
agenda. This paper addresses these problems by systematically analysing a single 
presidency and the way it deals with legislative action. Such an analysis can a) 
coherently and comprehensively evaluate Tallberg’s assumptions and b) optimise 
Tallberg’s model. 
 
The article has one additional goal. Tallberg’s pioneering research into the way 
presidencies work with the agenda was conducted when the European Union (EU) 
consisted of 15 Western European member countries. Despite several waves of 
enlargement and the differing lengths of individual country memberships this 
implied, these were still countries in which the majority shared common norms, 
common values, and a common economic model, and which function on the basis of 
a long-term shared model of representative parliamentary democracy.3 The so-
called eastern enlargement that took place in 2004 and again in 2007 brought 10 
new countries — in the main former communist regimes — into the EU. These new 
member countries have had access to the EU presidency since 2008, and by the end 
of 2013, five had governed the EU: Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Lithuania. Analysing one of these new Member State presidencies may answer 
the question as to whether these presidencies navigate the EU agenda using the 
same determinants as the original 15 EU countries. 
 
 Specifically, the analysis offered here works with the Czech EU Council Presidency. 
                                                 
3  It is correct to take into account two waves of Mediterranean enlargement in 80s 
which brought into the Community the post-authoritarian Southern European countries of 
Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (both in 1986). However, the legacy of nondemocratic 
regimes of these states can be hardly compared to the legacy of totalitarian communist 
regimes. 
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This presidency was chosen deliberately. It was, on the one hand, a new Member 
State presidency; on the other, it unfolded within the pre-Lisbon institutional setup, 
thus within the same framework in which Tallberg created his model. By contrast, 
the Polish and Hungarian EU presidencies took place after the Lisbon Treaty had 
brought some reforms to the EU Council Presidency, and might thereby introduce 
bias. 
 
The text is structured as follows: In the first section, the current state of the 
literature is reviewed. The issues that render the presidency’s power in agenda 
setting problematic are laid out and Tallberg’s model is given a detailed critical 
explanation. The second section analyses the position taken by the Czech 
government before assuming the EU Council Presidency and explains this position 
in the context of Tallberg’s model. The third section then focuses on an analysis of 
the Czech Presidency and its programme. It shows the Czech Presidency followed 
the expected patterns in working with the agenda (most actively in agenda 
structuring) and confirms the validity of Tallberg’s model as applied to the 
presidency’s priorities in EU legislation. The fourth section discusses the findings in 
the context of Tallberg’s model and offers a competing model. 
 
The article is designed as a case study4 that evaluates the validity of Tallberg‘s 
model. The analytical procedure itself is as follows: the characteristics of the 
presidency are analysed first with respect to socio-economic, regional, and 
constitutional preferences. The analysis is based on the statement of the 
government of the Czech Republic, on foreign policy documents, and on the 
ideological profiles of parties in the government. Analysing these documents and 
actors enables us to determine how the Czech government scores in terms of these 
preferences. In other words, the outcome of the analysis is a set of observable 
consequences5 of these political preferences. The preferences are then juxtaposed 
with those included in the programme of the Czech EU Presidency and its calendar. 
The materials analysed consist of the Presidency programme, the programs of 
formal ministerial meetings and press releases summarising the topics of informal 
ministerial meetings. 
 
This article contributes to the growing literature that focuses on both the 
                                                 
4  One case study was chosen deliberately. One might argue that a comparative study 
taking into account more or all recent CEE Presidencies would be more convincing, but such 
an approach would inevitably lead to substantially reduced explanatory power and would 
have to omit a lot of important details. As the article tries not only to evaluate Tallberg´s 
model, but also to optimize it, such a reduction in explanatory power would be inappropriate.    
5  Garry King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry. 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 28-
29. 
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presidency’s influence on agenda setting and on the presidencies of new Member 
States. With regard to agenda setting, studies currently available offer rival, 
competing explanations of the presidency’s influence. Some scholars, mostly rooted 
in a quantitative approach,6 claim the presidency can pursue its influence on 
legislative work. Others arrive at different conclusions.  Alexandrova and 
Timmermans7, for instance, in their analysis of the European Council agenda, show 
presidencies have no significant ability to push their domestic preferences. Crum8, 
in his analysis of the presidency and its role in the IGC 2003-2004, concurs that the 
presidency has only a limited impact on the agenda. 
 
The second stream of research is quite restricted in scope. Most work on the 
presidencies of new Member States focuses on particular countries and their 
performance as chair.9 A rare example of a theory-based work is the book by Drulak 
and Šabič10 comparing the Czech and Slovenian EU presidencies in terms of 
efficiency and socialisation. A second is Leconte's11 article on the relation between 
Euroscepticism and performance in the EU presidency. The intent with the present 
study is to make a further contribution to this research direction and to place the 
Czech Presidency in a more theoretical setting. 
 
2. Presidency as initiator: weakness or strength? 
 
Although it is one of its traditional tasks,12 the initiation function performed by the 
presidency is controversial. Arguments rooted in a sceptical approach particularly 
                                                 
6  Andreas Warntjen, “Steering the Union. The Impact of the EU Presidency on 
Legislative Activity in the Council,” Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (5, 2007): 1135-
1157; Jelmer Schalk, René Torenvlied, Jeroen Weesie and Frans Stokman, “The Power of the 
Presidency in EU Council Decision-making,” European Union Politics 8 (2, 2007): 229-250; 
Robert Thomson, “The Council Presidency in the European Union: Responsibility with Power,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 46 (3, 2008): 593–617. 
7  Petya Alexandrova and Arco Timmermans. “National interest versus the common 
good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting.“ European Journal of Political 
Research 52 (3, 2013): 316-338. 
8  Crum, Can the EU Presidency make its mark on interstate bargains, 1208-1226. 
9  Vít Beneš and Jan Karlas, “The Czech Presidency,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 48 (s1, 2010): 69-80; Petr Kaniok and Hubert Smekal, “The Czech Presidency of the 
EU Council: No Triumph, no Tragedy,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 9 (2, 2009): 59-
79. 
10  Petr Drulák and Zlatko Šabič (Ed.), The Czech and Slovenian EU Presidencies in a 
Comparative Perspectives (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2010). 
11  Cecile Leconte, “Eurosceptics in the Rotating Presidency's Chair: Too Much Ado 
About Nothing?” Journal of European Integration 34 (2, 2012): 133-149. 
12  Ole Elgström, “Introduction.” in European Union Council Presidencies: A 
comparative perspective, edited Ole Elgström (London: Routledge, 2003), 6; Fiona Hayes-
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evident in the 1970s and 1980s13 cast doubt on the presidency and contest its power 
in the programme dimension. Five arguments dispute the ability of a country acting 
as EU chair to influence the EU agenda. 
 
The first of these claims EU primary law does not explicitly delegate any formal 
power to the presidency that gives it the right to initiate legislation or to structure 
the agenda in keeping with its wishes.14 The presidency holds the chairmanship only 
on a primus inter pares basis and in this sense its role is not unique.15 The second 
argument has to do with the presidency’s own time constraints and internal 
configurations. It lacks full freedom to define its priorities because these must take 
into account the ‘presidency trio’ that includes itself and the previous and upcoming 
presidencies.16 In addition, the presidency must cooperate with other EU 
institutions in a large number of political projects whose timeframe exceeds the 
presidency’s six-month term of office.17 The third argument touches on the 
limitations implied by unexpected events that significantly interfere with the 
initiation function. These might include internal political developments in the 
country concerned, unanticipated events within the EU, and events that take place 
within the broader international political context. It is foreign events that seem to 
have been key in this dimension, as well as the degree to which the country holding 
the presidency actually represents only the EU Council; historically, countries have 
not always done so. The fourth argument notes that any requirement that states that 
the presidency should author priorities is in conflict with the mandate that it play a 
neutral role. The ideal definition assumes the presidency will act as an impartial 
moderator primarily engaged in building compromise. This assumption is actually 
made explicit in the Presidency Handbook, a guide for presidencies issued by the 
Council General Secretariat. Forces of socialisation also pressure countries in the 
                                                                                                                 
Renshaw and Helen Wallace. The Council of Ministers (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
141; Martin Westlake and David Galloway, The Council of the European Union (London: John 
Harper Publishing, 2004), 334. 
13  Tallberg,The agenda shaping powers of the Council Presidency, 2-3. 
14  Warntjen, Steering the Union, 1139. 
15  Tallberg, “The agenda shaping powers of the Council Presidency, 19. 
16  The trio presidency as a tool to strengthen continuity among presidencies was 
already anticipated by the Constitutional Treaty. The trio presumed EU Member States would 
be divided into groups containing three presidencies and producing a common agenda for 18 
months. Even though the Treaty was rejected, Member States incorporated this element 
under Council decision 2005/902 EC in 2005 into political practice. The first presidency trio 
took office in 2007. Concerning their performance and funcionality, see  Mads Dagnis Jensen 
and Peter Nedergaard, “Uno, Duo, Trio? Varieties of Trio Presidencies in the Council of 
Ministers.” Journal of Common Market Studies 52 (5, 2014): 1035-1052; Agnes Batory and 
Uwe Puetter, “Consistency and diversity? The EU's rotating trio Council Presidency after the 
Lisbon Treaty.” Journal of European Public Policy 20 (1, 2013): 95-112.    
17  Bunse, Small States and EU Governance, 44. 
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presidency role to execute their functions neutrally and suppress efforts to promote 
issues based upon their national interests. Fear of ostracism is a motivator.18 Finally, 
many scholars point to the paradox that the presidency, rather than being as 
influential as one might think, actually represents the least appropriate moment for 
a country to champion its own interests. The above noted emphasis on neutrality 
means it is being closely watched by other Member States.19 
 
The view of the presidency as primarily an ‘honest broker’ is opposed by another 
conceptualisation based upon a broad interpretation of agenda shaping. According 
to Tallberg, the agenda of the presidency may be influenced by a wide range of 
tools. These may give preference to or deflect attention away from particular topics. 
Tallberg’s model of agenda creation calls for identifying and determining the 
agenda, structuring the agenda and, finally, refining it. 
 
The initial manner by which an agenda may come to be set involves a realisation 
that the EU political process has neglected to acknowledge the gravity of a 
particular problem. The presidency may then act in one of several ways. First, it may 
include the issue in its programme for the presidency or include it in the agenda of 
informal meetings. Or it may lay out concrete proposals for action. Depending upon 
the nature and character of the problem, the presidency may at its own initiative 
offer a proposed resolution, a tactic often taken under the (former) first pillar, 
entailing dependence upon EC cooperation. Finally, the agenda may be set by 
creating new institutional mechanisms. This has been a frequent practice 
particularly in recent decades, when there have been more than 20 senatorial 
Council configurations.20 
 
The real power of the presidency, however, lies not in raising fresh topics so much as 
it does in structuring the agenda already on the Council’s table. The presidency may 
choose to deemphasise some topics while it prioritises others. In this way, it 
indirectly enforces its own interests. Any number of controversial topics may arise 
during the course of a six-month presidency. Deemphasising issues that are low on 
the country’s list of priorities may be a simple solution.21  
 
This emphasising or deemphasising of the existing agenda may be influenced by 
three basic dimensions. The first is the regional. It has closely overlapped in the past 
with the presidency’s function as a representative of the EC/EU. But regional 
                                                 
18  Ole Elgström, “'The honest broker'? The Council Presidency as a mediator.” in 
European Union Council Presidencies: A comparative perspective, edited Ole Elgström 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 40. 
19  Bunse, Small States and EU Governance, 43. 
20  Tallberg,The agenda shaping powers of the Council Presidency, 8. 
21  Ibid., 8-9. 
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concerns may also make a mark on common specific policies. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) may serve as an example. The German Presidency of 
2007 focused on the post-Soviet states, after which the incoming Portuguese 
Presidency shifted its attention to southern Europe. 
 
The second key dimension is the socio-economic profiling of the presidency. 
Presidencies differ both in terms of which individual EU policies they emphasise and 
which they develop. Countries whose political systems are invested in 
environmental protection traditionally emphasise making substantial progress in 
this area. Similarly, countries with robust social systems highlight EU social policy. 
The current political situation of the country assuming the presidency also plays a 
large role: conservative and liberal cabinets stress liberalisation and the common 
market. Socialist governments emphasise sustainable development or greater levels 
of employee protections. 
 
The third dimension centres on the relationship of the country in the presidency 
towards EU constitutionalism, particularly as regards institutional reform and future 
EU enlargement. In terms of the latter, there is a sharp line between traditional 
supporters of deeper integration and those who are more cautious. As an example, 
both Sweden and Belgium faced the same task of preparing for the 
Intergovernmental Conference of 2004. In 2001, sovereignty-conscious Sweden lay 
low and ignored the matter; federalist Belgium, following on Sweden in the 
presidency, made the future of the EU its leading theme and launched the debate 
on it. 
 
An effective tool for structuring the agenda is procedural control. Tallberg22 
delineates three possibilities. The first has to do with the frequency with which 
particular types of ministerial meetings are held on both the formal and informal 
levels. What is important in this context is the type of policy on which ministerial 
meetings focus — the presidency may express its preferences by favouring specific 
areas. The second possibility then relates to the programme structure of specific 
meetings, and the third, the use of standard legislative procedure (co-decision). 
 
Agenda exclusion is not often accorded the full status that agenda setting and 
agenda structuring are as ways of working with the agenda. Tallberg nevertheless 
sees it as a tool of equivalent status for influencing the EU agenda.23 Agenda 
exclusion may be effected by remaining silent, excluding a topic from the agenda, 
or by drafting proposals on which compromise is impossible. Tallberg points to the 
behaviour of the Swedish Presidency in 2001 on mad cow disease, which the Swedes 
ignored and failed to include in the programme of the European Council for March 
                                                 
22  Tallberg,The agenda shaping powers of the Council Presidency, 27-28. 
23  Tallberg,The agenda shaping powers of the Council Presidency, 28. 
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despite pressure from the Netherlands and Great Britain. He also makes reference 
to Germany’s unwillingness during its 1999 presidency to work with the EC proposal 
on strengthening employees’ consultation rights as an example of a topic excluded 
from the agenda.24 
 
Research on the general preferences of the Member States and their theoretical 
implications are not the subject of this article, but it should be demonstrated that 
Tallberg’s model may be placed in this context. Tallberg’s model is descriptive in 
nature and Table 1, summarising the model’s components, demonstrates its lack of 
balance. Its components are clearly not elaborated in detail. The most developed 
tool is agenda structuring, for which Tallberg treats both the determinants and the 
resources of potential power for the presidency. But agenda setting and agenda 
exclusion are mentioned only in passing and only their operationalisation is touched 
upon. Especially the absence of determinants in both agenda structuring and 
agenda exclusion is surprising: it is logical to assume that the presidency’s interest 
should be motivated by the same determinants for each of these three tools. It is 
difficult to imagine a country would have varying motivations for the different 
agenda shaping tools. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Tallberg's model 
Agenda 
shaping tool 
Means of tool realisation Determinants Resources of 
presidency power 
Agenda 
setting 
Raising the awareness of hitherto 
neglected problems (inclusion 
into programme or set as a theme 
for informal meetings) 
Developing concrete proposal for 
action 
Developing new institutional 
mechanism 
  
Agenda 
structuring 
Emphasising topic 
Deemphasising topic 
Regional 
Socio-
economic 
Constitutional 
Procedural control 
a.Ministerial 
meetings 
b.Structuring of 
actual meeting 
agenda 
c.Co-decision 
procedure 
Agenda 
exclusion 
Remaining silent on a subject 
Excluding an item from the 
decision agenda 
Presenting a proposal not 
amenable to compromise 
  
                                                 
24  Tallberg, The agenda shaping powers of the Council Presidency, 12-13. 
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3. The Czech Presidency: Characteristics 
 
The Czech Republic joined the EU on 1 May 2004 as part of the greatest 
enlargement of the EC/EU in its history. A dozen countries gained member status. 
The Czech Republic was the second of the new member countries to exercise the 
office of the presidency, taking over its role from France. What follows focuses on 
the ideological profiles of the political parties that formed the Cabinet during the 
Czech Presidency, as well as on government statements and an analysis of the 
foreign policy of the Czech Republic. The goal is to characterise the socio-
economic, constitutional and regional position of the Czech Republic as it took over 
the presidency. 
 
The government that was in power during the presidency had been created only 
with difficulty in early January 2007, a full six months after the elections of June 
2006. Those elections had produced a stalemate between the left-wing and right-
wing parties. The coalition was formed on the second attempt and, during the 
presidency, consisted of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Christian Democratic 
union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU–CSL), and the Green Party (SZ). 
 
The strongest party in government was ODS. It held nine cabinet positions in all, 
including that of Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek. Ideologically, the party, which 
had won the last election before the presidency, may be described as conservative – 
liberal.25 On issues of European integration, it is considered Eurosceptic.26 
 
In numerical terms, the second strongest player in the government was KDU–CSL 
with five ministerial positions. KDU–CSL is a centrist party politically, described as 
part of the Christian-Democratic party family. It has a generally favourable view of 
European integration, which it supports in both its economic and political 
dimensions. 
 
A particular anomaly in Mirek Topolanek’s cabinet was the presence of the Green 
Party. The party had four ministerial posts and its own self-perception deviated from 
the norm for Greens in most EU countries. Most such parties locate themselves to 
the left in the party landscape, but the Czech Greens saw themselves as 
centre/centre-right, at least on economic issues. Like the Christian Democrats, the 
                                                 
25  Vlastimil Havlík, “A breaking-up of a pro-European consensus: Attitudes of Czech 
political parties towards the European integration (1998–2010).” Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 44 (2, 2011), 134. 
26  Tim Haughton, “For Business, For Pleasure or For Necessity: The Czech Republic’s 
Choices for Europe“. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(8, 2009): 1371-1392; Sean Hanley, The New 
Right in the New Europe: Czech Transformation and Right-Wing Politics, 1989-2006 
(Abingdon – New York: Routledge, 2008). 
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Green Party may also be classified as pro-European, supporting further enlargement 
of European integration in both its political and economic dimensions.27 
 
The basic programme document of Topolanek’s government wants the Government 
Policy Statement, adopted in January 2007. Socio-economically, Topolanek’s 
cabinet was in favour of liberalisation, something is declared in the preamble to its 
platform statement. This part of the platform contains fundamental proposed 
government policies, such as creating an effective, limited state government; 
reducing debt; battling corruption; and reforming the pension system. This 
liberalisation either this is apparent throughout the Statement, but particularly in 
Section II. The reform of public budgets, taxes, and the taxation system is explicitly 
linked to reduced mandatory state budget expenditures which, in the Czech 
Republic, consist primarily of social policy spending. Equally important was a 
commitment to reduce the overall tax burden and a preference for supporting 
private enterprise at the expense of socially-oriented policies, for which 
government spending was cut.28 
 
At the foreign policy level, the statement called for strengthening transatlantic ties 
between the EU and the US. Topolanek’s cabinet considered this a key issue. The 
ties between the Czech Republic and the United States (and NATO membership) 
were placed on an equal footing with European integration. The Cabinet did not 
place its primary focus on Czech political events and developments within the EU. 
Rather, the EU presidency was spoken of directly as an important tool for increasing 
the prestige of the Czech Republic on the world stage. The government based its 
preparation for an exercise of the powers of the presidency on a ‘realistic estimate 
of what is possible for the country”. This was reflected in the particular route taken 
by the Cabinet in favour of restrictive reforms to the common agricultural policy and 
the EU budget.29 
 
The Czech Republic had no valid concept of foreign policy before assuming the 
presidency. The last document to express the country’s foreign policy and security 
interests in the medium-term was the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Czech 
Republic for 2003-2006. Its primary focus, however, was on the Czech Republic’s 
accession to the EU, meaning it was already out of date at the time of the 
presidency.30 The foreign policy preferences of the Topolanek government must 
                                                 
27  Havlík, A breaking-up of a pro-European consensus,141.  
28  Cabinet Office, Program Statement of Government of the Czech Republic 2007, 
available at http://www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=20780, 2-3. 
29  Cabinet Office, Program Statement, 15-16. 
30  A new foreign policy concept was adopted in July 2011. The cabinet managed to 
approve it on the second attempt, as the first version of the concept was voted down for 
being too much in favour of European integration.   
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thus be derived from the regular reports on foreign-policy issued annually by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The report for 2007 highlighted the critical position 
taken by the Czech Republic towards the EU constitutional process and stressed the 
positive impact this had had on the formation of the Lisbon Treaty. Czech foreign 
policy also favoured a continued EU enlargement process that would result in the 
fastest possible accession of Croatia and reiterated the importance of transatlantic 
relations.31 These same positions were evident in the report for 2008. 
 
Table 2: Declared and expected positions of the presidency Government 
Determinant Position of the presidency 
Government 
Expected influence on the 
presidency Program 
Socio-
economic 
Liberalisation, 
deregulation 
Emphasis on economic 
development 
Support for the private 
sphere 
Implementation and expansion of 
free market principles 
Preference for economic issues at 
the expense of social issues 
Liberal, pro-market approach to 
economic crisis 
Regional Equal focus on the EU and 
the U.S. 
Strengthening transatlantic ties 
Maintaining institutional status 
quo in CFSP 
Constitution
al 
Reserved approach to 
further deepening of 
European integration 
Absence of constitutional issues in 
the program 
Maintaining the status quo on the 
quality of European integration 
Support for EU enlargement 
 
The declared positions of the government in power during the Czech Presidency 
reveal all factors were considerably influenced by ODS party ideology. Neither 
minor coalition partner was able to enforce its interest, something particularly true 
of the Greens. The disproportion between ODS and the smaller parties is 
particularly evident in the socio-economic determinant and in relation to the future 
of the EU, where the approaches taken by ODS on the one hand, and the Christian 
Democrats and Greens, on the other, most differ. A pro-market, liberal approach 
prevailed at both levels, and a position was taken toward the EU which was 
lukewarm at best. The social-market economy orientation and pro-European 
positions of the minor coalition partners went unheard. 
 
                                                 
31  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report on the foreign policy of the Czech Republic for 
2007, available at  
www.mzv.cz/public/eb/43/a3/72910_14945_Zprava2007_cesky_verze_k_22_8_2008.pdf, 6-
12. 
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4. Programme analysis of the Czech Presidency 
 
The Czech Presidency will be analysed in two phases. First, the presidency’s use of 
the agenda shaping tools detailed by Tallberg will be explored. Then, in the second 
phase of the analysis, an in-depth look will be taken at agenda structuring, for which 
Tallberg’s model is an excellent tool. The analysis will employ the model to examine 
the concrete ways in which the agenda is structured in terms of which topics are 
deemphasized or emphasized, which determinants are present (the expected 
content as summarized in the previous chapter on the real behaviour of the Czech 
Presidency), and which resources of power are utilized. Along the way, the analysis 
will take into account the programme of the presidency, and the program, agenda 
and configuration of formal/informal ministerial meetings.32 
 
When it comes to agenda shaping tools, the Czech Presidency was quite active in 
agenda setting. The first good example is the Eastern Partnership, originally a Czech 
enterprise, even if the formal initiative for its establishment came from Poland and 
Sweden.33 Czech diplomacy, however, had already identified it as an important 
priority in 2007-2008, working systematically on its development.34 The program of 
the presidency mentioned the Eastern Partnership as a key priority for Europe 
(Cabinet Office 2009, vii), reinforcing its importance with a call for a summit 
between the EU and the countries in the Eastern Partnership. As France had done in 
establishing the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008,35 and Finland in proposing 
the Northern Dimension36 during the country’s first EU presidency, the Czech 
Republic readied the Eastern Partnership before assuming the presidency. Unlike 
those other countries, however, Czech diplomats were careful to emphasize the 
                                                 
32  Concerning the sources of presidency power, the article omits the third– use of the 
co-decison procedure – as Tallberg does not describe its content and there is a lack of 
reliable, valid data. 
33  David Král, “The Czech Republic and the Eastern Partnership – from a by-product to 
a beloved child?” in: The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and V4 Agenda"edited by Izabela Albrycht (Krakow/Brussels: The Kosciuzsko Institute, 
2010), 9. 
34  David Král, Vladimír Bartovic and Věra Řiháčková, The 2009 Czech EU Presidency - 
Contested leadership at a time of crisis. SIEPS Occasional Paper 2009:2, available at 
http://www.sieps.se/en/publikationer/the-2009-czech-eu-presidency-20092op, 51-52; 
Alexander Duleba, András Rácz, Věra Řiháčková and Rafał Sadowski, “Visegrad 4 the Eastern 
Partnership: Towards the Vilnius Summit”, SFPA Policy Paper 2013, available at 
http://www.sfpa.sk/dokumenty/publikacie/377, 15-16. 
35  Renaud Dehousse and Anand Menon, “The French Presidency,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 47 (s1, 2009), 99–111. 
36  Teija Tiilikainen, “The Finnish Presidency of 1999”, in European Union Council 
Presidencies: A comparative perspective, edited Ole Elgström (London: Routledge, 2003), 
109-111. 
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communitarian dimension of partnership and cooperated with those other Member 
States involved, and particularly with the EC. 
 
A similar example is shown at the level of secondary legislation in the commitment 
of the presidency to work on implementing the Services Directive. Another example 
may be found in the area of competitiveness. The presidency intended to work on 
the upcoming revision of the late payments directive, designed to ensure that small 
and medium enterprises (SME) receive payment for commercial transactions on 
time (Cabinet Office 2009a, 3-6). But unlike the French Presidency which had gone 
before, which was very active in calling ad hoc summits, the Czech Republic rarely 
created new institutional practices as a tool for introducing new issues into the EU 
agenda. Two exceptions were the Eastern Partnership summit and one informal 
ministerial meeting on regional development held as a Competitiveness Council 
(COMP) meeting in Marianske Lazne. 
 
Like most presidencies, that of the Czech government was visibly engaged in 
agenda structuring. In this, the presidency followed the socio-economic, 
constitutional, and regional preferences expressed in the government statement. 
The liberal profile of Topolanek’s cabinet, linked to the socio-economic 
determinant, was distinct in the socio-economic dimension. The economy, the 
presidency’s initial top priority, is a good illustration. The leitmotif in this area may 
be described as one of liberalization, anti-protectionism, and challenging barriers. 
The program made reference to temporary measures proposed by the European 
plan for economic and social renewal37 at the same time as it appealed to the 
principles of the Stability and Growth Pact and argued for the internal and external 
liberalization of the economic environment. In another priority area — that of 
energy policy — the Czech Presidency again made itself known as an advocate of 
liberalization. Its program stressed completing the internal market and emphasized 
the importance of energy security.38 And finally, the ‘Third E’39 — the European 
Union in the world — was also framed in the liberalization ethos. Aside from 
strengthening euroatlantic ties, the Czech Republic emphasized policy towards the 
Western Balkan countries, and called for dismantling external barriers, particularly 
in the area of trade policy.40 
 
                                                 
37  This plan was introduced and approved during the French Presidency in December 
2008. The Czech government saw it as an expression of protectionism.  
38  Cabinet Office, Work Program of the Czech Presidency in the EU Council: Europe 
without barriers, available at http://www.eu2009.cz/assets/news-and-documents/news/cz-
pres_program_cs.pdf, vi. 
39  Three top priorities of the Presidency (economy, energy and the EU in the world) 
were often put together as the ‘Three Es’. 
40  Cabinet Office. 2009a. Work Program, vii. 
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The regional preferences of the Czech government were most clearly visible in its 
support for enlarging the EU to take in the Western Balkans, a traditional priority 
area for Czech foreign policy. These preferences were also visible in its focusing of 
the external relations agenda on Eastern Europe, specifically on relations between 
the EU and Russia, and the emphasis the presidency laid on strengthening 
transatlantic ties. When it comes to the constitutional determinant, no mention was 
made of the Czech position on the Lisbon Treaty, an obvious consequence of the 
negative attitude held by ODS on the review of primary legislation, and the failure 
of the presidency government to adopt a clear stance. Significantly, at the time the 
program was formulated, the Czech Republic remained one of the few countries 
that had not yet ratified the Lisbon Treaty. On the point of EU constitutionalism, 
then, the presidency mentioned only resolution of the Irish guarantees. 
 
As regards agenda exclusion, there is no convincing evidence the Czech Presidency 
made use of this tool. The country was not silent vis-à-vis any part of the agenda. It 
tackled many issues — economic crisis, EU constitutional questions — in a different 
manner than had previous presidencies or most EU Member States. But this 
difference does not add up to an exclusion agenda. The program for the presidency 
proposed no unacceptable compromises and never pointed to any issue it wished to 
see eliminated from the Council agenda. 
 
Tallberg’s assumptions seem to have been confirmed in this first level of analysis 
focused on the presence of agenda shaping tools. Most convincing in the Czech 
case seems to be the use of agenda structuring. At the current stage of European 
integration, taking in, as it does, virtually all policies and regions, proposing fresh 
topics is difficult, even under the agenda setting procedure defined by Tallberg. As 
regards agenda exclusion, Tallberg41 points out that one of the few reasonable 
criteria for identifying it is that other states who wish to see an agenda item 
included react to its absence. But no such reaction occurred under the Czech 
Presidency, at least not as part of the process of agenda setting as defined by 
Tallberg. 
 
Turning now to the second level of analysis, Tallberg regards agenda structuring as 
the most effective, most commonly employed tool. The priorities contained in the 
working program (appearing after the general section of the presidency program) 
confirm the influence of all three determinants. Liberalization, which may be seen as 
the Czech ‘operationalization’ of the socio-economic determinant, was not present 
merely in economic policy; it also provided the impetus behind the presidency’s 
grasp of social policy. The presidency clearly preferred strengthened 
competitiveness to active social policy mechanisms as a tool for preserving the 
European social model. Aside from its rhetorical references to the importance of the 
                                                 
41  Tallberg,The agenda shaping powers of the Council Presidency, 29. 
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Lisbon strategy, the presidency mostly targeted the internal market and the need to 
remove barriers to the free movement of labour. Concrete measures included 
support for implementing the Services Directive. Additional points of focus were 
competition, better regulation, research and development, and SMEs.42 
 
Economic policies as a whole were framed by the economic and financial crisis. The 
programme focused on the recovery of the financial markets and their 
development, on macroeconomic structural policies, international cooperation, and 
on the battle to stop tax evasion and modernise tax rules. The presidency’s intent 
was to adopt or revise legislation in the above noted areas and to continue 
discussions aimed at strengthening the stability and development of the single 
European financial market. Plans also called for discussions on the quality of public 
finances.43 Liberalization of the common trade policy was also sought, with the 
presidency explicitly rejecting protectionism and calling for the removal of 
barriers.44 Some issues were emphasized; others were deemphasized. The latter was 
evident in the presidency’s reluctance to address the economic crisis on the same 
activist, protectionist basis as had France in 2008. But the Czech liking of 
liberalization and deregulation placed the country in the minority — most EU 
Member States called for major state intervention and were in favour of greater 
regulation.45 
 
The second of the ‘Three Es’, energy, also felt the Czech government’s advocacy of 
liberalisation as a key socioeconomic principle. Liberalisation, or deregulation, is a 
distinct element in the presidency’s plan to conclude discussions on the Third 
Liberalisation Package and focus on completing the requisite transmission levels 
and transmission capacity in member countries, as well as on starting talks on 
introducing a uniform tariff for international electricity transmission.46 In other 
words, the presidency’s chief interest lay in the internal EU market for electricity 
and gas. The environmental area, among others, was deemphasised in the 
programme vis-a-vis the economy and energy. It came up only in the context of 
negotiating a global agreement to cut emissions.47 
 
The programme was quite detailed in the areas of transportation and 
telecommunications and, to some extent, in matters covered by the former third 
pillar as well. In transportation, key legislative items included several which 
                                                 
42  Cabinet Office. 2009a. Work Program, 3-6. 
43  Cabinet Office. 2009a. Work Program, 2-3. 
44  Cabinet Office. 2009a. Work Program, 23-34. 
45  The most important advocate of this approach was France, the Czech Republic’s 
partner in the Presidency Trio. See Beneš and Karlas, The Czech Presidency, 74-75.    
46  Cabinet Office. 2009a. Work Program, 7-8. 
47  Cabinet Office. 2009a. Work Program, 10. 
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attempted to complete or strengthen the internal market: a proposal to amend the 
directive on fees levied on heavy goods vehicles, negotiations on the directive 
covering the introduction of intelligent transport systems, and aviation legislation. 
In the telecommunications area, stress was laid upon completing the 
telecommunications package and revising the regulation of roaming prices. Under 
the third pillar, the Schengen system was chosen as a crucial item. The program 
assumed a significant move forward in the development of the second generation of 
the Schengen Information System (SIS II) and work on the Visa Information 
System.48 The emphasis given to these issues also demonstrates the pro-
liberalisation approach taken by the Czech government, given that improving these 
tools would allow the free movement of persons in the EU to be broadened and 
simplified. 
 
Other EU policies and activities were deemphasised in both scope and depth 
compared to those noted. As an example, in the area of agriculture and fisheries, 
the presidency intended to continue discussions on reforming the CAP — and the 
words ‘debate’ and ‘discussion’ perfectly capture the way it viewed the CAP. This 
discussion-oriented approach, however, was underlined by the liberalisation ethos 
that the CAP should spend more efficiently, and that conditions for farmers should 
be fair, while the regulatory and administrative framework of the CAP should be 
simplified.49 
 
In terms of the regionally determined perspective on structuring the agenda, one 
interesting disparity occurs between the opening part of the programme and the 
sector priorities that follow. Its first segment starts by labelling the transatlantic 
relationship as a number one priority. It then moves to the relationship with Russia 
and finishes by speaking about the Eastern Partnership agenda. The second segment 
does the reverse; it first brings up the Eastern Partnership agenda, then moves to 
EU-Russia relations, and finally to the transatlantic relationship. All three of these 
priorities are in keeping with the foreign policy profile of the Topolanek 
government in terms of content and in the regional sense. Other areas of EU foreign 
relations activity are given brief mention. These include Mediterranean 
cooperation, given less emphasis by the Czechs than it had received during the 
preceding French Presidency, European Security and defence policy, and 
development assistance, both of which were also downplayed. 
 
EU constitutional topics took a back seat for the Czech Presidency, something 
entirely expected given the hesitant, Eurosceptic stance of the government. The 
program glossed over the constitutional situation in the EU in a fragmentary way 
and seemed inclined to accept the Irish ‘No’ on the Lisbon Treaty. Without going 
                                                 
48  Ibid., 8-10, 16. 
49  Ibid., 16-17. 
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into specifics, the presidency pledged to find solutions that took into account the 
concerns of the Irish people as expressed in the referendum.50 The Czechs 
attempted to deemphasise the agenda, a logical behaviour in view of the fact the 
country had not yet ratified the Treaty. The Czech government had also been asked 
by Ireland prior to assuming the presidency to keep a low profile on the issue. When 
it came to EU enlargement, the program was more enthusiastic. Support was given 
to the integration of the Western Balkans and interest was shown in making 
maximum progress on the accession negotiations with Croatia.51 Broad support for 
EU enlargement is not strictly regionally determined in the Czech case; it also 
indicates the presidency’s lack of interest in deepening European integration. ODS, 
particularly, has been the widest supporter of EU enlargement at the expense of 
further qualitative development. As far as emphasising and deemphasising 
particular topics, it is noteworthy that the presidency paid substantially more 
attention to enlarging the EU than it did to EU constitutionalism or institutional 
affairs, not only qualitatively, but also in terms of quantity. 
 
Another tool the presidency may use to demonstrate and promote its preferences 
consists in formal and informal ministerial meetings. Table 3 summarises the formal, 
informal and extraordinary meetings of the Council. A quick glance shows that the 
‘Three Es’ formed the most frequent topic of these meetings. The first ‘E’, the 
economy, was a topic in six ECOFIN meetings and four meetings of the COMP 
Council. Energy, the second ‘E’, was featured in seven meetings of the TTE 
Formation Council, and the third ‘E’, Europe in the World, was the topic of ten 
Configuration GAERC meetings. These Council meetings also covered topics not 
directly concerned with the content of the Three Es, such as transport configuration 
of TTE Council, but it remains apparent that the presidency favoured its prioritised 
agenda (and an economic agenda in general) in the Council configurations, at the 
expense of matters like environmental protection, education, and justice and home 
affairs. 
 
Ministerial meetings involving formal negotiations (both planned and emergency) 
may be analysed separately from informal ministerial meetings. The first type is 
organised under the Council Rules of Procedure, based upon a programme known 
well in advance, while the second, the informal meetings, are much more open in 
character and the presidency may use them as a discussion platform for issues it 
wishes to highlight. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50  Cabinet Office. 2009a. Work Program, 1. 
51  Cabinet Office. 2009a. Work Program, 1. 
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Table 3: Summary of formal, informal and extraordinary meetings of the EU Council 
during the Czech Presidency 
Council Formation Formal Informal Extraordinary 
General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) 
6 4 0 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 3 1 0 
Employment, Social Policy, Health and 
Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) 
1 2 1 
Education, Youth and Culture (EYC) 2 1 0 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN) 
5 1 0 
Transport, Telecommunications and 
Energy (TTE) 
5 1 1 
Agriculture and Fisheries (AGFISH) 5 1 0 
Environment (ENVIRO) 2 1 0 
Competition (COMP) 2 2 0 
Total 31 14 2 
Source: Author52. 
 
Table 4 offers an overview of the discussion topics on the agendas of informal 
ministerial meetings. It reveals the vast majority of issues the Czech Presidency 
offered to debate fit in with its socio-economic, regional and constitutional 
preferences. The link between determinants and discussion points is evident not 
only in the case of the Three Es and the Council formations in which they arose, but 
also in connection with most noneconomic informal ministerial meetings. The 
discussion agenda for January’s informal EPSCO meeting, for example, was in 
keeping with the liberalisation-influenced view of the socio-economic determinant, 
both in the area of labour mobility and revision of the working time directive. The 
March EYC directive likewise discussed education as a tool for solving the economic 
crisis and stressed partnership between industry and education. A spirit of 
liberalisation and an economics focus were apparent at the informal AGFISH 
meeting held in late May and early June. The focus was on cuts in CAP expenditures 
and the elimination of advantages for shown to some farmers in the direct payment 
system. 
 
                                                 
52  The author, on the basis of Cabinet Office, Summary of the effect of central 
coordination team during the Czech Presidency, available at 
http://www.eu2009.cz/scripts/file.php?id=61219&down=yes. 
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Table 4: Discussion topics of informal ministerial meetings 
Council 
configuration 
Date Agenda 
GAERC 8th January General presidency priorities; energy security; 
transatlantic relations; institutional issues 
JHA 15th -16th 
January 
Modern technology and security; technology, 
migration and asylum; international protection 
of children; Schengen information system ii, 
mutual recognition in criminal matters; 
cooperation in probate and family law; eJustice 
EPSCO 22nd -24th 
January 
Mobility of workers; revision of the directive on 
working time 
GAERC 29th -30th 
January 
Sustainable resources at the local level; 
democratic governance; impact of the financial 
crisis on developing countries 
EPSCO 4th -5th 
February 
Family and child care 
GAERC 12th -13th 
March 
EU military operations; EU military development; 
cooperation between EU-NATO, EU-OSN, EU-
African Union 
EYC 22nd -23rd 
March 
Education as a tool for solving the economic and 
financial crisis, partnership between education 
and the labour market/industry 
GAERC 27th  -28th 
March 
Middle East; ESDP Civilian Mission; Belarus, 
Western Balkans   
ECOFIN 3rd -4th 
April 
Stability and growth pact (excessive budget 
deficit), situation of financial markets; IMF; 
economic benefits of EU enlargements; financial 
markets 
ENVIRO 14th -15th 
April 
Adaptation to climate change; financing climate 
change; strategy for climate change 
negotiations 
COMP 22nd -24th 
April 
Principles and objectives of the future cohesion 
policy; territorial cohesion 
TTE 28th -30th 
April 
Intelligent Transport Systems; Swine flu  
COMP 3rd – 5th 
April 
Future of the internal market; reducing 
administrative burdens; Knowledge Society 
AGFISH 31st May – 
2nd June 
Direct payments, CAP reform 
Source: The author, based on press releases from informal ministerial meetings 
available on the Presidency Calendar 
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The regional determinant of the Czech government is apparent in the discussion 
topics of informal meetings (especially in the GAERC formation) and in the lack of 
interest shown in constitutional and institutional matters. Its only mention came 
during the first informal GAERC and can hardly be regarded as evidence of interest 
by the Czech Presidency. 
 
Table 5: Optimisation of Tallberg's model 
Agenda 
shaping 
tool 
Means of tool realisation  Determinants Resources of 
power 
Agenda 
setting 
Raising the awareness of 
hitherto neglected 
problems (inclusion into 
the programme or set as a 
theme for informal 
meetings)  
Developing concrete 
proposals for action 
Developing new 
institutional mechanisms 
Regional 
Socio-
economic 
Constitutional 
Procedural 
control 
a.Ministerial 
meetings 
b.Structuring of 
actual meeting 
agenda 
Agenda 
structuring 
Emphasising topics 
Deemphasising topics 
Regional 
Socio-
economic 
Constitutional 
Procedural 
control 
a.Ministerial 
meetings 
b.Structuring of 
actual meeting 
agenda 
c.Co-decision 
procedure 
Agenda 
exclusion 
Remaining silent on a 
subject 
Excluding an item from the 
decision agenda 
Presenting an impossible 
compromise proposal 
Regional 
Socio-
economic 
Constitutional 
Procedural 
control 
a.Ministerial 
meetings 
b.Structuring of 
actual meeting 
agenda 
Co-decision 
procedure 
 
More than thirty formal ministerial meetings were held during the Czech 
Presidency.  Such a number means that no comprehensive table can be drawn up to 
summarise their agendas, as could be done for informal meetings. Analysing the 
items included in the programs confirms the trend revealed by the analysis of 
CEU Political Science Journal 9(3-4) 
229 
discussion topics in informal ministerial meetings. In formal negotiations, as well, 
the presidency favoured those items connected to its socio-economic, regional and 
constitutional biases. Particularly in the second half of its mandate, the topics of 
informal meetings were tied to an anticipated legislative process — legislative 
items discussed at formal meetings had already been broached at informal 
meetings. 
 
It is not surprising that the most convincing determinant at this level of analysis 
turns out to be the socio-economic determinant. Formal Council meetings focus on 
the legislative process, where socio-economic preferences can best be tracked. But 
the regional determinant may also be taken into account. At all formal GAERC 
meetings, the presidency reiterated the themes the Government Statement would 
lead one to expect: transatlantic relations, the Eastern Partnership, the Western 
Balkans, and so on. As in the case of informal meetings, the constitutional dimension 
receded well into the background – no formal GAERC meeting program made 
explicit mention of EU constitutionalism (or any related agenda, such as the Lisbon 
Treaty). 
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
 
This article set itself three main goals. The first was to test the general model of 
agenda shaping advocated by Jonas Tallberg by analysing the agenda for a 
particular presidency with reference to a compact set of data consisting of EU 
legislation. The second was to potentially optimise Tallberg’s model, and the third, 
to analyse whether the model, initially developed for the EU–15, is also applicable 
to a new Member State. 
 
As regards the first and third of these objectives, analysis of the programme agenda 
of the Czech Presidency showed Tallberg’s model is indeed valid when brought to 
bear in a detailed analysis of the presidency’s agenda concerning everyday EU 
policies. This conclusion applies both to the initial level of analysis — the review of 
tools employed for agenda shaping — and to the second level, involving agenda 
structuring. Confirming the validity of Tallberg’s model is the first bit of added value 
brought by this article. This was undertaken in a way which contrasts with Tallberg’s 
own approach of illustrating his model using selected ad hoc examples. This article 
systematically explored whether the assumptions identified and illustrated by 
Tallberg also matter in everyday and routine secondary EU legislation. The fact that 
a single presidency was analysed obviously restricts the generalisability of the 
findings; it may nevertheless be concluded that Tallberg’s model is valid for 
secondary EU legislation and is applicable to the new member countries. The Czech 
Presidency simply made use of the same tools as the old Member States and 
followed the same determinants. 
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As regards the three determinants that influence agenda structuring, it seems, at 
least in the case of the Czech Presidency, that the strongest is the socio-economic. 
The liberalisation approach favoured by ODS was the most striking motive in all 
areas of the presidency and determined its content. It was also clearly present in the 
agenda of the informal meetings and in the programs of formal ministerial 
negotiations. The ideological profile of Topolanek’s government was most clearly 
evident when it came to social and economic issues. But it also had palpable 
influence on EU foreign policy issues and the approach taken to the EU’s 
constitutional future. In the constitutional/institutional area, the presidency 
remained passive and employed agenda shaping tools for non-action. 
 
The second objective of the article was to discuss Tallberg’s model itself, as 
illustrated in Table 1. Several comments may be made in this regard and the article’s 
findings matched with the model. The first comment is already been suggested 
when reviewing Tallberg’s model. At least in the Czech case, it seems to be valid that 
most components of agenda structuring are also relevant to agenda setting. The 
same determinants that motivated the Czech government when it originally set the 
new agenda were still present when the structured agenda was actually placed on 
the table, and equally redolent of the liberal ODS ideology. This is only logical: the 
presidency is, after all, of a single piece, with unified motives and subservient to a 
unified logic, no matter whether that concern agenda setting or agenda structuring. 
It has at its disposal the same resources for setting the agenda as for structuring 
policies and legislation. The only exception is the co-decision procedure: the 
presidency cannot propose legislation on its own. 
 
It may also be assumed that the identical pattern of behaviour will obtain (i.e., the 
influence of determinants and resources of power) in agenda exclusion. It is 
reasonable to anticipate that determinants will exert the same influence as in 
agenda structuring. It is difficult to imagine that any presidency would be driven to 
exclude agenda on the basis of a different set of determinants than motivated it to 
set the agenda or structure it. The resources of power the presidency has at hand 
should be subject to the same influences as structuring, since agenda exclusion is 
carried out using the same procedural variants as are employed to structuring the 
agenda (including the potential use of standard legislative procedure). 
 
The result of the proposed optimisation of Tallberg's model is a confirmation of the 
permeability of agenda shaping tools, as has already been noted in the overview of 
Tallberg's initial model. Since finding a brand new topic or policy in the current 
stage of European integration is hardly conceivable, it is often difficult to set a clear 
boundary between agenda structuring and agenda setting. Likewise, it is difficult to 
clearly identify differences between agenda structuring by its deemphasising and 
agenda exclusion as a whole — the boundary between deemphasising a topic and 
remaining silent on it appears fluid and fragile.  
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Despite some doubts, Tallberg's model may be taken as inspiration for further 
research into the Council Presidency and its role as agenda shaper. Knowing a 
government’s general leanings on the socio-economic, regional, and constitutional 
dimensions could forecast with good precision the approach it will take to the 
presidency agenda. Interesting in this connection is the impact of the Lisbon Treaty, 
which removed the second pillar and the external relations agenda from the 
traditional competencies of the presidency. The question that arises here is whether 
this will lead to a weakening of the regional determinant. Another potential 
interesting avenue would be to place the programme behaviour of the presidency 
into the context of research into the general preferences of EU Member States, 
since the presidency, as agenda shaper, is restrained by a number of formal and 
informal rules that other Member States are not. A promising, inspiring direction for 
future research would seem to lie in adopting a comparative perspective that 
includes a greater number of case studies and tests whether Tallberg’s assumptions 
hold across different presidencies. The present article has deliberately adopted a 
different prospective. For thoroughly evaluating Tallberg’s model, a single case 
study seemed to be a sufficient first step, but it is clear that a comparative approach 
should now follow. 
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Abstract 
After the breakdown of communism in Central and Eastern Europe one of the 
transition tasks was the adjustment of judiciaries to new democratic conditions. The 
aim of this comparative case-study is to explain different paths taken by the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia in establishing the institutions of judiciary independence and 
to discuss the relationship between these developments and the actual 
performance of judiciaries. To this end it investigates the existence of socialist 
legacies in judges’ behavior and seeks to provide an overview of legislative changes 
regarding appointment, removal, career progress and disciplining of judges. The 
results indicate that Slovakia created the Judicial Council in order to prove itself as a 
trustworthy candidate for the integration in the European Union after its semi 
democratic experience in the 1990s, while in the Czech Republic the development 
has been more gradual with the central role played by the Ministry of Justice. 
 
Key words: rule of law, judiciary development, communist legacies, European Union 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
One of the challenges faced in the early 1990s by transitional elites in Central and 
Eastern Europe was the necessity to adjust judiciaries to new democratic conditions. 
Partly discredited judiciaries that complied with undemocratic regimes had to be 
altered in order to function properly in new political systems. Yet, even after more 
than 20 years of experience with democracy in the region, the judiciaries are still 
perceived as problematic with regard to ongoing consolidation. Several scholars 
addressed the issue of judiciary reforms and judiciary performance in emerging 
democracies.2 The focus has been usually placed on the most visible, somewhat 
                                                 
1  This article is based on the MA thesis submitted at Central European University in 
2013. Publication of this work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development 
Agency under the contract No. APVV-0413-11 
2  See: David Kosar, "Judicial Accountability in the Post(Transitional) Context: A story 
of Czech Republic and Slovakia," in Transitional Justice, Rule of Law and Institutional Design, 
ed. Adam Czarnota and Stephen S. Parmentier (Antwerp: Intersentia Publishers, 2010). Maria 
Popova,  Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Brent T. White, "Putting Aside the Rule of Law 
Myth: Corruption and the Case for Juries in Emerging Democracies." Cornell International 
Law Journal (2010): 307-363. Alan Uzelac. "Survival of the Third Tradition?"Supreme Court 
Law Review 49 (2010): 377-396. 
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deviant cases such as Ukraine, Russia or Bulgaria, while countries that are 
considered to perform well in terms of consolidation are neglected, although they 
face noteworthy problems with their judiciaries as well. 
 
This research looks into development of judiciary institutions in two ‘third wave’ 
democracies – Czech Republic and Slovakia – in order to examine how these 
countries dealt with the issue of communist legacies present in their judicial 
systems; how they coped with the requirement of independent judiciary, often 
emphasized by international institutions; and what role these international actors, 
mainly the EU and countries’ ambitions to be integrated into its structures, played in 
these processes. The research describes and explains different paths taken by the 
compared countries in establishing of independent judiciaries and discusses the 
relationship between these paths and observed outcomes. 
 
Cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia are almost a perfect example for a 
comparative case-study utilizing most-similar systems design. They share communist 
past and institutional design at the dawn of democracy, hence the effect of legacies 
can be controlled and it can be reasonably assumed their starting points were to a 
large extent similar. In addition, there is a documented difference in the 
performances of judiciary systems that will be elaborated further in the research. 
While Czech Republic is by the World Justice Project considered to be one of the 
strongest performers in the region,3 the Slovak judiciary seems to be “in disarray and 
turmoil” and “there is hardly any country in the EU where public confidence in the 
judiciary is as low as in Slovakia“.4 
 
The study examines the relationship between EU conditionality focusing on 
judiciary matters and the state of judiciaries after the breakdown of communist 
regimes. The main argument is that communist judiciaries were not prepared to 
properly function in new democratic regimes and therefore if countries have not 
dealt with their communist past sufficiently the legacies could have been 
transferred into new conditions. Then if the judiciary was given considerable powers 
to administer its own matters, there was is a risk it can negatively influence not only 
performance of courts with regard to the decision making but also lead to problems 
with independence of judges and how is their independence perceived. 
 
The argument proposed in this research proceeds as follows. In sections 2 and 3 the 
role of judicial independence as an essential condition for democratic consolidation 
is established and is further developed with regard to the European Union and the 
ways in which the EU promoted this value. Section 4 discusses the inherent conflict 
                                                 
3  The World Justice Project."Rule of Law Index." 2011. 
4  Lukasz Bojarski and Werner Stemker Koster, The Slovak Judiciary: its current state 
and challenges. (Bratislava: The Open Society Foundation: Slovakia, 2012), 117. 
Samuel Spac: Judiciary development after the breakdown of communism  
236 
between requirement of judicial independence and the post-communist context. 
This is subsequently supported by the analysis of semi-structured interviews with 
four Czech and Slovak judges and/or legal scholars in Section 5 with the focus on 
communist legacies in two dimensions - judicial decision-making and judicial self-
administration. All of the selected respondents either were or still are judges, three 
of them approached the issue of post-communist judiciary as scholars, and all of 
them could have been considered prominent representatives of judiciary or 
academia in their respective countries. Legal textual analysis in Section 6 focuses on 
the development of legislation adapting administration of judiciaries since 
communist regime and examines parliamentary documents and discussions 
regarding the proposals for the creation of specific bodies - Councils - responsible 
for judiciary self-administration while explaining different paths taken by both 
countries with emphasis on the role of the EU. 
 
2. Judicial Independence: a sine qua non for democratic consolidation 
 
For a democracy to be considered it is often assumed that the rule of law has to exist 
there, indeed among other conditions.5. There is a variety of approaches to its 
definition,6 however it is generally perceived as an ideal that guarantees certainty 
between the people and ensures that the change happens in a stringent way, thus 
minimizing danger of one’s unrestricted power. The definitions vary from simplest 
ideas, such as that the rule of law means rule of law, not men, through any state of 
law as opposed to anarchy, to approaches based on values and institutional 
approaches defining institutions necessary for the achievement of the ideal, such as 
courts, bars or parliaments. Institutional definitions highlight the importance of 
judiciary independence, secured by the existence of tenure ensuring freedom from 
interference from other branches of power.7 In Walker’s definition however we can 
find something that goes beyond institutions as he brings in an attitudinal factor 
when he claims that law is highly dependent on people’s attitudes and for the 
successful application of the Rule of Law there needs to be a commonly shared 
“attitude of legality”. 
 
                                                 
5  E.g.: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-communist Europe (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1996). Guillermo O'Donnell. "Why the Rule of Law Matters." 
Journal of Democracy 15  (2004): 32-46. 
6  There is also a difference between Anglo-Saxon „Rule of Law“ on one hand, and the 
German „Rechtstaat“ on the other. For the purpose of this paper I will not differentiate 
between them and will use the term „rule of law“. I realize that „Rechtstaat“ is perhaps closer 
to Czech and Slovak understanding of the concept, as countries use this expression – „pravni 
stat“ or „pravny stat“ respectively. 
7  Joseph Raz. "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue."The Law Quarterly Review 93, (1977): 
195-211. Geoffrey de Q. Walker, The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy. 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1988). 
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The institutional approach – and the belief institutions ensure the establishment of a 
well-functioning democracy – has been criticized in the past. On the one hand, 
Carothers admits the importance of the rule of law as it has been used as an ideal 
that solves problems of non-democratic or less-democratic countries, however, on 
the other hand author argues that besides institutional reforms, an enlightened 
leadership and changes in values and attitudes of those in power will be 
required8.Others argue it is easier to define the values the rule of law shall serve 
than design particular institutions that will promote it,9 as it may be close to 
impossible are they not rooted in a proper cultural context.10 Despite the criticism 
and emphasis put on such conditions where the members of judiciary branch are 
able to identify a and interpret law and its fundamental assumptions properly, 
international documents regularly perceive institutions of judiciary independence 
as an essential pre-requisite of the rule of law11 and can be understood as a crucial 
element for the consolidation of democracy.  
 
The fact that requirement of judicial independence is included in a variety of 
international documents may have motivated newly democratized countries to 
search for arrangements that would ensure it. But what does judicial independence 
actually mean? The ultimate goal of the concept is to ensure that cases are decided 
on its merits and are not dependent on any other factor. As Popova convincingly 
puts it in her study, judicial independence “exists if no actor can consistently secure 
judgments that are in line with his or her preferences”.12 Despite quite 
straightforward definition we can distinguish between a variety of 
conceptualizations – behavioral, decisional, institutional and perhaps administrative 
independence.13 
 
                                                 
8  See: Thomas Carothers, "The End of Transition Paradigm."Journal of Democracy 
(2002): 5-21. Thomas Carothers, „The Rule of Law Revival.“Foreign Policy Affairs 77 (1998): 
95-106. 
9  Martin Krygier, "Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism." In Rethinking the 
Rule of Law after Communism, ed. Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier and Wojciech Sadurski 
(Budapest: CEU Press, 2005), 266-278. 
10  Walker, The Rule of Law. 
11  Such a claim can be found in the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the 
independence, efficiency and the role of judges; the Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct; European Charter on the statute of judges. 
12  Popova, Politicized Justice, 18. 
13  Erik S. Herron and Kirk A. Randazzo. "The Relationship Between Independence an 
Judicial review in Post-Communist Courts." The Journal of Politics 65 (2003): 422-438; 
O'Donnell, "Why the Rule of Law Matters," 32-46. Popova, Politicized Justice, 18. Hanssen, 
Andrew F. "Is There Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?" The American 
Economic Review 94 (2004): 712-729. 
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This study focuses on the creation and development of institutions, as these are 
states’ means to deliver desired outcomes – in this case independent judges making 
independent decisions. An “institutionally independent judiciary” is one that is 
formally separated from other branches of power, diminishing possible risks of 
affecting its performance through political offices. In an ideal case, such a judiciary 
would decide about all of its personal, financial and administrative matters without 
political interference. This study focuses on the personal dimension of institutional 
independence, specifically on the matters of appointment, removal, disciplining and 
promotion of judges, and evaluates the extent to which judiciary decides about its 
matters independently and who it is accountable to. If the judges were selected, 
appointed and promoted to higher offices solely by political elites, it may be 
assumed that only “reliable” judges willing to decide according to the desires of 
elites will be selected. Dependence would be even stronger was there a possibility 
of judge facing ramifications for their actions that could be initiated by elected 
officials.14 
 
What needs to be stressed for the purpose of this paper, there can be dependent 
judges in the judiciaries independent from other branches of government. Judges 
can be dependent not only on external actors, such as governments, but they are 
susceptible to be dependent on the members of judiciary itself, hence can be 
dependent both externally and internally.15 We need to bear in mind this possibility 
when talking about judiciary independence – judges’ impartiality is always in risk, 
even when the judiciary is structurally insulated from other branches of power. As 
was shown in the past, institutional independence does not necessarily correlate 
with independent behavior of judges16 which can be interpreted as an argument not 
only against the usefulness of the concept, but even as a call for abandonment as 
institutional independence proves to be neither necessary nor sufficient for the rule 
of law or good governance.17 In institutionally independent judiciary still exists a 
variety of possible influences over judges; be it corporate interests,18 including 
                                                 
14  Herron and Randazzo. "The Relationship between Independence and Judicial 
review in Post-Communist Courts," 422-438. 
15  The distinction between internal and external source of dependency, as well as of 
individual and collective source of dependency was introduced by Peter H. Russell. See: Peter 
H. Russell, "Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence." In Judicial Independence in 
the Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from around the World, ed. Peter H. Russell and 
David M. O'Brien (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001), 1-24. 
16  Shannon Ishiyama Smithey and John Ishiyama, "Judicious Choices: designing courts 
in post-communist politics." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33 (2000): 163-82. 
17  Lewis A. Kornhauser, "Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?" In Judicial 
Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. Stephen B. Burbank and 
Barry Friedman (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), 45-55. 
18  O'Donnell, "Why the Rule of Law Matters," 44. 
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judiciary itself; “telephone justice”;19 or simply by politicians who have capacity, and 
are willing to, intervene.20 As Ledeneva eloquently puts it: “the pressure does not 
need to be pervasive, to be effective”.21 
 
This study focuses on the examination of institutional independence of judiciary and 
the creation of institutions of independent judiciary which seems to be not only 
insufficient but, may also cause outcomes contrary to those desired. That is due to 
the fact that even if the judiciary is effectively separated from other branches of 
power, there is no support for a claim it cannot become dependent on high judiciary 
personnel or any other group of people, directly or indirectly – be it political elites, 
financial groups or even organized crime groups. Moreover, such a judiciary would 
not be exposed to any possible control provided by citizens, becoming completely 
unaccountable, whereas any governmental attempt to intervene may be declared as 
anti-constitutional, illegitimate attempt to influence judiciary, or simply anti-
democratic. Based on that, it can be argued there is a reason to preserve elected, 
and accountable, officials to hold certain powers to influence judiciaries; otherwise 
a judiciary personnel may become a privileged group – a caste protected from the 
outside world hidden behind the veil of concepts like judiciary independence and 
the rule of law. 
 
3. The EU as a motion power towards independent judiciaries 
 
Even though there was a need for the creation of independent judiciaries in the 
Eastern and Central Europe after the breakdown of communist regimes, the 
decision remained in the hands of politicians. There are several reasons why 
politicians would actually restrict their powers to exercise control over the judiciary. 
Firstly, it may be due to their true pro-democratic persuasion and their commitment 
to the rule of law ideal; secondly, there are rational choice explanations treating 
behavior of political elites as conscious decisions serving for the maximization of 
benefits;22 and last but not least, an explanation central for this paper, emphasizing 
the role of international actors, even though judiciary has rarely been a main focus 
point of any democratizing efforts, but rather a by-product of greater plans 
fundamentally changing institutions in countries in transition and consolidation.23 
                                                 
19  Ledeneva, Alena. „Telephone Justice in Russia.“Post-Soviet Affairs 24 (2008): 324-
350. 
20  Popova, Politicized Justice. 
21  Ledeneva, „Telephone Justice in Russia,“ 347. 
22  See: Hanssen, "Is There Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?". 
Magalhaes, Pedro C. "The Politics of Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe." Comparative Politics 
32 (1999): 43-62. Popova, Politicized Justice. 
23  See: Ghergina, Sergiu. "The Helping Hand: The Role of he EU in the 
Democratization of Post-Communist Europe," Romanian Journal of Political Science 9 (2009): 
65-79. Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. "The GATT of Law and Democracy: (Mis)Trusting the 
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In the post-communist region the strongest international player has been the 
European Union and the push-and-pull effect related to the integrative process of 
the post-communist countries. It can be hypothesized that countries attempting to 
be accepted in the EU structures were willing to closely follow the requirements for 
integration, especially countries that got stuck in the “grey zone” between 
democracy and authoritarianism and therefore needed to try harder to prove 
themselves as trustworthy candidates in order to be accepted. Ever since 
Copenhagen Criteria, reforms of the judicial systems became a crucial task for CEE 
countries interested in the EU accession. The document states that candidate 
countries need to has achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for protection of minorities, the existence 
of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union”24 in order to be accepted.  
 
In general the EU promotes democracy and democratic reforms on two levels and in 
two forms. The first difference may be labeled as a difference between formal and 
substantive democracy; hence a difference between creation of institutions and 
procedures at the polity level, and principles and mechanisms that function in a 
polity that encourage societal control over policy processes.25 The second is usually 
referred to as push and pull effect of the EU integration. The former meaning 
conditionality principle requiring countries interested in the EU accession to meet 
all the political requirements proposed by the Union; while the latter refers to the 
positive effect integration has in domestic political arenas.26 
 
According to Merkel, these incentives helped Central and Eastern European 
countries to consolidate their democracies so quickly after the regime change;27 
despite many propositions to the contrary.28 Merkel’s optimism regarding the 
                                                                                                                 
Global Reform of Courts." In Globalization and Legal Cultures.Onati Summer Course 1997, 
ed. Johannes Feest, (Euskadi: International Institute for the Sociology of Law, 1997), 49-86. 
24  "European Council in Copenhagen.Conclusions of the Presidency.(21-22 June, SN 
180/1/93)."[emphasis added] 
25  E.g.: Tom Casier. "The EU's two-track approach to democracy promotion.the case of 
Ukraine." Democratization 18 (2011): 956-977. 
26  E.g.: Geoffrey Pridham. "European Union Accession Dynamics and Democratization 
in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Future Perspectives."Government and Opposition 41 
(2006): 373-400. 
27  Wolfgang Merkel, "Plausible theory, unexpected results: the rapid democratic 
consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe." International Politics and Society 2 (2008): 11-
29.  
28  E.g.: Jon Elster, "The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and 
Political Reform."In Constitutionalism and Democracy, ed. Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N 
Katz, Steven C. Wheatley and Melanie Beth Oliviero. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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successful consolidation may be a bit premature it certainly does not change the 
fact that the EU integration played a considerable role in the alteration of post-
communist polities. Casier rightly argues that more progress has been achieved in 
“formal democracy” arena because formal institutions and procedures are 
established easier, are more visible and perhaps easier to evaluate,29 whereas the 
progress in substantive democracy did not happen at the same pace. This may be 
due to the fact that countries often did not pay sufficient attention to the context 
and enacted anything the EU desired without proper critical reflection and 
adequate debates.30 
 
Based on that, it can be expected that the most visible democratic reforms, such as 
introduction of new institutions, will be found especially in countries actively 
seeking legitimacy and an endorsement from the EU. Required reforms in formal 
arena should have served to increase legitimacy of a regime in the eyes of the EU, 
and hence secure their survival. With regard to the cases examined in this research 
it can be hypothesized that Slovakia followed the integration requirements more 
closely, because of its semi-democratic past; while the Czech Republic moved 
towards the EU accession indubitably, hence could have been more cautious with 
reforms and proceed rather gradually while paying more attention to the specific 
context in which reforms should have taken place. 
 
With regard to judiciary reforms, the EU has never really defined the content of 
independent judiciary, however there exist several other documents that have 
provided guidelines for candidate countries interested in altering their judiciaries. 
Casier states “the EU strategy of democracy promotion is mainly a reinforcement 
strategy. The EU does not create its own standards of democratization, but uses its 
bargaining power to back up the existing European organizations”.31 Documents 
that may have served as guidelines or, perhaps, an inspiration for countries’ elites 
may be divided in two groups: the first including documents that just appeal to the 
essentiality of the judicial independence, but define it vaguely, if at all;32 the other 
                                                                                                                 
1993): 267-274. Claus Offe. "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing 
the Triple transformation in East Central Europe," Social Research 58 (1991): 865-892. 
29  Casier, "The EU's two-track approach". 
30  Wojciech Sadurski, Adam Czarnota, and Martin Krygier. Spreading Democracy and 
the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy and 
Constitutionalism in Post Communist Legal Orders, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). 
31  Casier, "The EU's two-track approach", 960. 
32  Among other documents to this group belong: the 1950 European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Art.6), the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art.14), the UN Basic Principles on the Independence 
of the judiciary adopted in 1985, or the 2000 EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union that became binding in 2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon came into power  
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with documents that actually provide certain requirements and recommendations 
for what is judicial independence and how to achieve it.33 
 
All of these documents stress the importance of a body which personnel would be 
independent from other branches of power in order to establish independent 
judiciaries. Most elaborate guidelines were adopted by the European Association of 
judges which actually directly refers to “profound changes that have taken place in 
Eastern Europe”. The Charter aims to contribute to the efforts to improve legal 
institutions as an essential element of the rule of law by ensuring competence, 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. With regard to judiciary 
independence the most prominent part is the Article 1.3. that posits: 
 
In respect of every decision affecting the selection, recruitment, appointment, career 
progress or termination of office of a judge, the statute envisages the intervention of 
an authority independent of the executive and legislative powers within which at 
least one half of those who sit are judges elected by their peers following methods 
guaranteeing the widest representation of the judiciary.34 
 
Hence the Charter calls for a creation of a body that would administer personnel 
matters of the judiciary, and in addition requires that in such a body judges will not 
be a minority. However, it needs to be emphasized as we will come back to this 
point later, it does not demand the domination of members from the judiciary 
either, so gives legislators a considerable freedom. 
 
The other three documents all place focus on the selection of judges which shall 
happen independently from other branches of power. European Court of Human 
Rights in its decision stated: “[i]n order to establish whether a body can be 
considered as “independent”, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of 
appointment of its members and to their term of office, to the existence of 
guarantees against outside pressures and to the question whether the body presents 
an appearance of independence”.35 Remaining documents also include decisions 
made about careers of judges and related disciplinary measures under the authority 
of judiciary itself; in the Universal Charter of the Judge also a requirement of self-
administration is postulated. All in all, despite the fact the EU has never issued any 
                                                 
33  Rather specific definitions can be found in the Recommendation on the 
Independence, Efficiency and the Role of Judges adopted by the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe in 1994; The European Charter on the Statute of Judges approved by 
the European Association of Judges in 1998; and the Universal Charter of the Judge adopted 
in 1999 by the International Association of Judges. In addition, quite a specific definition can 
be also found in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, e.g. case 
Langborger v. Sweden 
34  European Association of Judges."The European Charter on the Statute of Judges." 
1988. 
35  Langborger v. Sweden. (European Court of Human Rights, June 22, 1989), par. 32. 
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guidelines on how to establish independent judiciary, it often uses its bargaining 
power to reinforce other organizations in the realm of democratization. And if any 
such bodies attempted to provide recommendations on judiciary reforms, it usually 
concentrated on the creation of such body that would decide about judiciary 
matters, while including substantial judicial representation. 
 
4. Independence in the Post-Communist context: Hazardous transplantations 
 
The context in which democratic reforms took place was rather a treacherous one as 
the inherited judiciaries were hardly prepared for a paradigmatic shift that 
necessary for proper functioning. In communist regimes judicial branches were 
deeply politicized as they de facto served as extensions of their respective 
governments36 and therefore were poorly suitable for new democratic conditions. In 
addition, there were no examples in the world available for post-communist 
political elites on how to deal with such a problem, as legal cultures in the region 
were specific, different from other “third wave” democracies; be it Latin American 
democracies or democracies of Southern Europe. 
 
John H. Merryman recognizes three different legal traditions: civil law, common law 
and socialist law.37 Opponents agreed there is a certain content to the term 
‘socialist law’, however it does not differ significantly from civil law tradition, and 
hence does not create separate family of law. However, according to Merryman 
‘legal tradition’ is not a set of rules, but rather a “set of deeply rooted historically 
conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society 
and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system”.38 
Some authors argued along the same lines as they perceived law and legal systems 
under socialism as consisting of several features – routines, practices, values and 
attitudes that can exist independently from the ideological labels given by the 
ruling elites39 and cannot be expected to simply evaporate with the regime change. 
In this article these routines and practices will be referred to as legacies of 
communist regimes with accordance to Grzymala-Busse’s definition of legacies as 
“patterns of behavior, cognition, and organization that have clearly identifiable 
                                                 
36  Rene David and John E.C. Brierley. "Socialist Law."In Major Legal Systems in the 
World Today, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1985). 
37  Merryman, John Henry. The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction of the Legal 
Systems of Western Europe and Latin America. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
Socialist tradition is also recognized by other authors, e.g.: Hazard, John. Communists and 
their Law: A Search for the Common Core of the Legal Systems of the Marxian Socialist 
States. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). 
38  Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, 2. 
39  Alan Uzelac. "Survival of the Third Tradition?"Supreme Court Law Review 49 
(2010): 377-396. 
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roots in the communist regime, and that persist despite a change in the conditions 
that initially gave rise to them”.40 
 
Keeping possible communist legacies in mind there were reasons to be cautious 
about the establishment of institutions of judiciary independence in post-
communist countries. Among the most prominent explanations why these legacies 
could have persisted is the nature of judicial careers in the countries with hybrid 
tradition of socialist and civil law culture. Judicial positions in these countries are 
open to students right after graduation, unlike in the common law countries where 
judgeship is “kind of crowning achievement relatively late in life”.41 Moreover, 
entering judiciary young causes that judges work under a supervision by senior 
judges or court presidents which may lead to survival of the opinions and practices 
typical for older judges.42 There was a variety of solutions on how to deal with 
legacies, however they were not as easily achievable everywhere. While in the East 
Germany it was possible to make vigorous changes in judiciary as well as at 
universities;43 other countries did not have sufficient resources of legal professionals 
available to fill in all vacant positions, for them it was rather a necessity than a 
conscious choice not to deal with the problem at all. Larkins offers a moderate 
possibility when he argues that the problem should be treated on a judge-by-judge 
basis, removing only those members of judicial power who actively demonstrated 
their agreement with old methods of governance or were responsible for some 
controversial decisions.44 
 
Legacies could have prevailed and appeared in two dimensions: in the decision-
making of judges, and in the capability to administrate judiciary matters. With 
regard to decision-making we can mainly talk about two possible problems caused 
by legacies. First of all, as Uzelac argues, because judges were subject to possible 
ramifications in case they issued undesired decisions the “safest way to go was to 
make no decision at all”.45 This could lead judges to refrain to sly actions and cause 
an inability of judges to deal with complex cases where a variety of considerations 
needs to be taken into account. On the other hand, Annus and Tavits did not find 
evidence for any significantly different behavior of judges with working experience 
                                                 
40  Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of 
Communist Parties in East Central Europe., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
41  Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition,  34. 
42  Michal Bobek. "The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental Transitions of 
the Central European Judiciaries."  European Public Law 14  (2008). 
43  See: Owen Fiss. „The Limits of Judicial Independence.“U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev., 
58 (1993). Inga Markovits, „Children of a Lesser God: GDR Lawyers in Post-Socialist 
Germany.“Michigan Law Review 94 (1996): 2270-2308. 
44  Christopher M. Larkins. "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical 
and Conceptual Analysis." The American Journal of Comparative Law 44 (1996): 605-626. 
45  Uzelac, "Survival of the Third Tradition?", 383. 
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in the previous regime.46The other problem is related to the bureaucratic nature of 
judicial positions in communist era. Judges often had to use their skills not to search 
for justice, but rather to find a proper regulation to justify the desired, and perhaps 
already known, outcome. Sajó and Losonci claim: “Judges and courts acted as 
bureaucrats, and fulfilled the expectations that they would promote centrally 
determined public interests”47 and the judges’ persistent self-perception of civil 
servants is why a necessary shift to “mental independence” would not necessarily 
happen when the structural independence is secured.48 
 
At the same time, bureaucratic nature of judges is problematic even with regard to 
self-administration dimension of possible communist legacies persistent in 
judiciaries. Their remuneration and evaluation were based on political loyalty, 
compliance with some higher authority, rather than on skills and moral 
preconditions.49 To establish judicial self-government in such conditions “will be 
aiding the position of people who seem to be unresponsive to ideas of fairness, are 
unfamiliar with judicial independence, and resist responsibilities for creative 
procedures”.50Uzelac postulates that such reforms create a closed circle of 
individuals with shared interests, often family interconnected, and causes 
perpetuation of old attitudes and practices, as only those compatible with old 
attitudes and practices will be appointed.51 For that reason we may refer to 
institutional changes in post-communist judiciaries as to hazardous “legal 
transplantations”. Such metaphor is very useful for its simplicity in describing the 
relationship between the new legal setting and the host body – domestic legal 
framework and legal culture. If these two are not in sync they may appear 
incompatible, leading to transplantation’s failure.52 Such effects have been well 
documented in the past, especially with focus on Judicial Councils, hence a bodies 
                                                 
46  Taavi Annus and Margit Tavits. "Judicial Behavior After a Change of Regime: The 
Effects of a Judge and Defendant Characteristics." Law and Society Review 38 (2004): 711-
736. 
47  Andras Sajo and Vera Losonci. "Rule by Law in East Central Europe: Is the Emperor's 
New Suit a Straightjacket?" In Constitutionalism and Democracy.Transitions in the 
Contemporary World, ed. D. Greenberg, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 324. 
48  Bobek, "The Fortress of Judicial Independence". 
49  Sajo and Losonci, "Rule by Law in East Central Europe," 324. 
50  Ibid. 322 
51  Uzelac, "Survival of the Third Tradition?", 383. 
52  See: David Nelken, "Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation." In Adapting Legal 
Cultures, ed. David Nelken and Johannes Feest (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 7-54. Roger 
Cotterrell, "Is There a Logic of Legal Transplants?" In Adapting Legal Cultures, ed. David 
Nelken and Johannes Feest (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 70-92. 
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of judicial independence and self-administration that were created all over the 
post-communist Europe in the last 20 years.53 
 
5. Judicial performance in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: the effect of legacies 
 
Both the Czech and the Slovak judiciaries enjoy very little trust among the citizens.54 
However, while the Czech Republic is considered to be one of the strongest 
performers in the region by the World Justice Project;55 the Slovak judiciary seems 
to be “in disarray and turmoil”.56 In addition, in the Global Competitiveness Report 
both countries ranked badly in Efficiency of the Legal Framework in settling 
disputes, and challenging regulations, as both can be found among 30 worst 
performers out of 144 countries.57 In this section the article provides an analysis of 
interviews with four Czech and Slovak judges and/or legal scholars58 and discusses 
the effect of socialist legacies on the observed performance of both judiciaries both 
in the dimension of decision-making as well as self-administration. 
 
With regard to the dimension of decision-making, what appears to be the problem 
in both countries is the length of the proceedings, although as Kuhn pointed out, it 
is getting better in the Czech Republic.59 The respondents provided a variety of 
                                                 
53  See: Kosar, "Judicial Accountability in the (Post)Transitional Context." Bruno 
Schonfelder. "Judicial Independence in Bulgaria: A Tale of Splendour and Misery." Europe-
Asia Studies 57 (Jan. 2005): 61-92. Francois Frison-Roche and Sodev Spas-Dimitrov, „The 
issues involved in the reform of the Bulgarian judicial system.“International review of 
Administrative Sciences, 71 (2005): 593-606. Zdenek Kuhn. "Judicial Independence In 
Central-Eastern Europe: The Experience of the 1990s and 2000s." The Lawyer Quarterly  1 
(2011): 31-42. 
54  The survey conducted by the Institute for Public Affairs in June and July 2012 
showed that only 28% of public trusts the judiciary; whereas only about 25% of Czechs trust 
their judiciary as documented by the SANEP agency in the survey conducted in February 
2013.  
55  Rule of Law Index. The World Justice Project, 2011, 31. 
56  Bojarski and Stemker Koster, The Slovak Judiciary: its current state and challenges., 
117. 
57  Klaus Schwab, Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Borge Brende. The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2012-2013: Full Data Edition, published by the World Economic Forum. (Geneva: 
World Economic Forum, 2013) 
58  The respondents were: Eliska Wagnerova, current Senator, former President of the 
Supreme Court and the judge of the Czech Constitutional Court; Zdenek Kuhn, legal scholar, 
and a judge of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court; Ludovit Bradac, the judge and 
former President of the Regional court in BanskaBystrica, and honorable president of the 
Slovak Association of Judges; and Jan Svak, former judge, legal scholar and the rector of 
Paneuropean University in Bratislava. 
59  This trend is also documented in the Council of Europe Commission for the 
Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice’s report where the Czech Republic appears to be the 
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reasons why this is the case: including bad legislation, causing some courts are 
overloaded; the problem of public prosecutors who are contributing to the delays 
by their own ineffectiveness; or unnecessarily long decisions and reasonings by the 
judges, as well as advocates, which were mentioned by both Slovak interviewees, 
and which lengthen the proceedings. Of the socialist legacies that prolong the 
proceedings, all of the respondents agreed that avoiding the responsibility for final 
decisions is very common among the judges, manifested through excessive 
formalism or positivism. As Kuhn put it: “[legal formalism] has its origin in 
communism, (…), judges attempted not to be entangled with the values of the 
communist regime; and because they could not decide on the merits, they had to 
shift to the form”; and the very same applies to the positivism. As Wagnerova 
argued it has been present in the Czech Republic, especially in the higher echelons 
of the hierarchy where judges at courts of appeal have been deciding badly when 
using a „formalist pettifoggery“. Another factors contributing to the delays are the 
overuse of appeals, and the fact that higher judges regularly avoid making decisions 
in order to avoid responsibility. However, one respondent perceived it as a simple 
“laziness” on the part of judges due to the fact that judicial positions were non-
lucrative, with minimal autonomy and have not attracted the best legal 
professionals. 
 
Problems in the dimension of self-administration were more vocal in Slovakia. The 
Czech trouble is rather opposite to the self-administration, as was pointed out by 
Kuhn.60 Slovak judiciary has been perceived as politicized and polarized; has been 
abused for arbitrary disciplinary proceedings against the opponents of the former 
president of the Supreme Court Stefan Harabin; struck a sensitive chord with the 
public when approximately 700 judges filed a lawsuit against the state on the basis 
of wage discrimination;61 and is considered as absolutely closed to any outside 
influence creating a state eloquently labeled as an “autism of the Slovak judiciary”.62 
Many of these problems have their roots in socialism. According to Alexander Bröstl, 
the former judge of the Slovak Constitutional Court and ex-member of the Judicial 
Council: “nowadays, at the courts, the generation of about 50-years old dominates. 
                                                                                                                 
second best performer in the EU in the time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial 
cases, whereas Slovakia is found among the worst countries. See Fig. 9.12., at 184. 
60  According to him, the ministry has too broad powers over the judiciary and in the 
case when the minister is “assertive or aggressive” can influence quite a lot, which is currently 
not the case. 
61  For more information see: Bojarski and Stemker Koster, The Slovak judiciary: its 
current state and challenges, 2011. 
62  Radoslav Prochazka, "Autizmus slovenskej justicie" (Autism of the Slovak judiciary) 
In Vyzvy slovenskeho sudnictva a moznosti zlepsenia existujuceho stavu (Challenges of the 
Slovak judiciary and possibilites of improvement of the current state). Transparency 
International Slovensko. (Bratislava: Transparency International Slovensko, 2010): 14-19. 
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Their mentality, stereotypes, as well as education did not change”.63 He also 
emphasizes that the required paradigmatic shift, to the idea that state should 
protect its citizens and does not serve itself, has not happened yet. According to 
Bradac this is traceable to the role that law had in socialism, and the fact it was 
interpreted by the political elites that subsequently enforced their interpretation 
upon the judges. In a democracy such a pattern of behavior implies that judges may 
be manipulated by powerful actors, eventually from within the judiciary.  
 
Three out of four interviewees shared the opinion that since the regime change 
corporatist tendencies has prevailed in judiciaries as judges quickly realized that 
democracy means money and started to jointly ask for the improvement of their 
financial situation. In Slovakia the Association of Judges of Slovakia played a crucial 
role in this question in 1990s. According to Bradac, former president of the 
Association, a corporatist branch within the organization started to dominate 
approximately in the mid-2000s which caused Association to lose its democratic 
ethos and contributed to the “revitalization of the old culture”. Czech corporatism 
differs, as Wagnerova perceives it rather as “fake collegiality” demonstrated for 
instance at the time of lustrations when judges wanted to avoid a possible purge. 
Notwithstanding, judicial corporatism is not directly a socialist legacy, but is rather a 
consequence of the little prestige the judiciary positions enjoyed in socialism and at 
the beginning of democratic regimes. 
 
Such corporatist attitudes ‘helped’ in the departure of the judiciary from the society 
and contributed to its encapsulation. Another factor that played a role here 
developed as a consequence of the career-model of the judiciary, where the fresh 
graduates come right to the courts, and once they become judges they are judges 
for life; especially with regard to formerly strong powers of courts’ presidents 
concerned with the selection of judges and rights to grant bonuses and other 
material benefits. Such procedures allowed the judges to provide for their children, 
possible law graduates, as they were able to help them ensure comparably 
comfortable life. As Kuhn pointed out, these are the conditions favorable for the rise 
of informal structures, but claims this was not the case during the communism as a 
judicial career lacked prestige and financial benefits.  
 
To clarify the connection between these patterns of behavior and the observed 
problems of the judiciary it is necessary to realize that the judges were used to 
exercise somebody else’s will, what Bradac labeled as “crooked personalities” of the 
judges after the breakdown of the old regime. This mass was therefore in its 
substance manipulable, and if someone was able to promise them personal benefits 
– be it higher salaries or jobs for their children – the system was able to produce an 
                                                 
63  Martin Hanus. ".tyzden." Dominuju ludia so zlou mentalitou (People with bad 
menatality dominate): Interview with Alexander Brostl. October 21, 2012. 
http://www.tyzden.sk 
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informal network of personal loyalties that punishes outliers, such as critics or those 
who try to change the existing practices. According to the interviews, the judiciary 
in both countries had tendencies for the creation of informal networks, which, if 
given power, may become dangerous for the rest of the polity, as would any power 
that would lack effective accountability mechanisms. 
 
In order to control for the effect of these legacies in judicial behavior it is necessary 
to briefly discuss the change caused by the lustration laws on the judiciary 
personnel. The issue has been researched in the region insufficiently, hence lacks 
comparable and reliable data. According to Wagnerova’s research in the first three 
years after the breakdown of regime approximately one third of Czech judges left 
the judiciary. In the interview she elaborated on the research and estimated it could 
have been around 40% in 2000 and about 50% in 2013.64 According to Svak and 
Bradac, the lustrations had only minimal impact on the judiciary in Slovakia. Bradac 
claimed that at the time of the approval of the law he had expected a radical 
change on the courts, but nothing remarkable happened. For that reason he 
assumes that there were rather informal tools of the influence over the judges. 
There is a disagreement between the two Slovak respondents, whereas Jan Svak 
claims that the change could had been as large as in the Czech counterpart, about 
40% in the year 2000; LudovitBradac thinks that it was rather smaller but did not 
specify his estimate. 
 
Interestingly, Kuhn warns that these numbers are not that important; partly because 
the practices could have been transferred to younger judges, and also for a reason 
that “the picture that someone who graduated from the Faculty of Law in 1988 is 
significantly the different from someone who graduated in 1992 is naïve. After all, 
they were taught by the very same people.” Based on this it can be argued that to 
whatever extent the change of the regime changed the composition of the 
judiciary, the patterns of behavior persisted in the democracy, preserved also by the 
fact that most of the senior judges, and judges from the higher echelons were the 
judges from the communist era. Therefore, it can be argued that if political elites 
had aimed their efforts on the change in the highest echelons of judiciaries they 
may had fasten the necessary mental change. If this was true, than the Czech 
judiciary would have been more successful in achieving this mental shift as, for 
example, EliskaWagnerova was appointed to the position of the president of the 
Supreme Court quite quickly after her return from emigration. 
 
 
 
                                                 
64  The effect of lustration laws is difficult to assess as many judges left the judiciary for 
more lucrative legal professions. According to Kuhn only marginal part of the judiciary 
personnel collaborated with the secret police, hence the effect of lustration was minimal. 
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6. Why different paths? The success and the failure of the Council model 
 
In two parts of former Czechoslovakia there can be observed two different paths in 
establishing institutions of the judiciary independence. The countries shared 
institutional design at the dawn of democracy in 1989 when basically all the powers 
with regard to the judiciary rested in the hands of political elites. Since then the 
countries’ paths took different directions; on one hand, the Czech Republic moves 
steadily and gradually towards higher independence with fewer significant changes 
and with the central role of Ministry of Justice; on the other, we can see Slovak 
turbulent development with decrease in the independence in the early years, 
through radical change of establishing the Judicial Council responsible for all 
personnel decisions, to empowering ministry again, as can be seen in Table  
 
Table 1: An overview of central actors in selected matters – Czechoslovakia 
 Appointment Removal Disciplining Promotion 
Czechoslovakia 
1989 
Political elites – 
ministers of justice 
Restricted tenure 
+ political elites 
Court presidents 
Political elites – 
parliaments on all 
levels 
1993 
Ministers of justice 
+ court presidents 
Restricted scope 
-  political elites 
Court presidents 
Political elites – 
ministers 
Czech Republic 
1998 
Minister + court 
presidents 
Minister Courts 
Political elites – 
minister 
2004 
Minister + court 
presidents / 
councils of judges 
Minister Courts 
Political elites – 
minister 
2013 
Minister + court 
presidents / 
councils of judges 
Minister 
Supreme 
Administrative 
Court – president 
of the court 
Political elites – 
minister 
Slovak Republic 
1998 Political elites 
Restricted tenure 
(!!!)– parliament 
Courts 
Political elites –
minister 
2004 Judicial Council Judicial Council Judicial Council 
Judicial Council / 
minister 
2013 
Judicial Council + 
political elites 
Judicial Council 
Judicial Council + 
political elites 
Judicial Council 
Source: Based on the data obtained from the qualitative analysis of Czechoslovak legislature 
and its future successors. For more extensive discussion please see: Spac, Samuel. "Judiciary 
development after the breakdown of communism in the Czech Republic and Slovakia" (MA 
Thesis). Budapest: CEU, Budapest College, 2013. 
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1.Slovakia established a greater institutional independence than the Czech 
counterpart and did so in the period that preceded its EU accession. In addition, it is 
also important to evaluate these changes with regard to guidelines for establishing 
judiciary independence discussed earlier in the paper that were reinforced by the 
EU in the integration period. All of the four examined powers were in the hands of 
the Council consisting of a majority of judges, hence in accordance with the 
guidelines provided by the European Association of Judges, the most specific of 
documents providing any recommendations. Contrariwise, in the Czech Republic 
only one of the four powers – disciplinary hearings – was handled solely within 
judiciary itself, whereas political elites remained their powers in appointment, 
removal and promotion of judges.  
 
Unlike Slovakia, the Czech Republic have not transferred most of the powers from 
Ministry to any specific body consisting mostly of the members of the judiciary. 
However, there was an attempt to do so, but the initiative in 2000 was not 
successful. The differences between the two countries are significant even when we 
look only at the proposals, as it seems both treated the context differently. If we 
accept that the socialist legacies in judicial behavior may have persisted even after 
more than 20 years since the breakdown of communism, it is important to 
guarantee that judges will not have a clear majority in the council, and will be 
counterbalanced by the members from other legal professions. In this aspect the 
two proposed model differ considerably. The Czech model – the Supreme Council 
of the Judiciary – ensured the council consists of as many judges as of members from 
other legal occupations – sixteen altogether, and in addition created favorable 
conditions for a variance among these as advocates, prosecutors and law faculties 
are eligible to nominate members of the council. Contrarily, the Slovak model does 
not secure a balance between judicial and non-judicial members, in that 9 out of 18 
seats in the council are reserved for judges, but there are no restrictions on other 
branches of power that would force them to nominate people outside the judiciary. 
As was argued by Jan Svak, a former member of the Judicial Council in Slovakia, 
during his term (2002-2007) a vast majority of politically nominated members of the 
council came from other legal professions which ensured a wider discussions and 
the possibility of acknowledgement of the existence of communist legacies and 
their subsequent counterbalancing. This changed in 2007 when, in conjunction with 
the political will of Fico’s government and president Gasparovic, a judges-
dominated Council was created, which led to prevalence of corporatist behavior, 
and consequently judiciary became encapsulated, attempting to protect its own 
benefits while fighting openness and eventual criticism leading it to a minimal 
public trust accompanied by very poor results in objective measures. 
 
The very last question remains to be answered: why did Slovak reform successfully 
pass the parliament and the Czech not and what were the differences between the 
two debates? The following hypothesis will be evaluated here: Slovak legislators 
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used the power of Europeanization to a much larger extent than their Czech 
counterparts, due to Slovak exclusion from democratic community in 1990s. The 
chapter provides in-depth qualitative analysis of parliamentary negotiations 
regarding the creation of the Council.65 Also, reasons for proposing such legislation 
will be discussed with focus on the debate about the composition of the council and 
the perception of different political groups.66 
 
At first the focus will be placed on the Czech unsuccessful attempt for the reform as 
it happened earlier than the Slovak one, which will be analyzed subsequently. The 
emphasis will be on the arguments used in order to persuade the rest of MPs in 
favor of the reform – in explanatory reports, as well as in discussions; and how did 
argue those opposed to the reforms. Evaluation of findings will take into 
consideration the role of the EU and the concepts of rule of law and judicial 
independence found in argumentation in the debate. 
 
A failure of the Czech reform 
 
The Czech reform consisted of three different proposals – one constitutional and to 
regular amendments – submitted by the Minister of Justice OtakarMotejl.67 Due to 
procedural reasons the constitutional amendment was discussed earlier than the 
rest of the legislation on the issue, and because of its failure the rest failed too. 
Although all of the proposals were discussed at the House of Deputies, the most 
attention is dedicated to the constitutional amendment – the following discussion 
became, to a large extent, repetitive. There were two main topics vocal in the 
parliament – the question of necessity of establishing such a body in order to 
                                                 
65  The unsuccessful reform introducing The Supreme Council of the Judiciary in the 
Czech Republic; and the Slovak Constitutional Act 90/2001 that besides other crucial 
changes introduced the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic. 
66  At the time the governing party in the Czech Republic was Czech Social 
Democratic Party (CSSD) that ruled with the support of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) as a 
minority government in the period of the “opposition agreement”. The rest of the opposition 
consisted of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), Christian and Democratic 
Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-CSL), and Freedom Union – Democratic Union 
(US-DU). In Slovakia a government with constitutional majority held the power, led by Slovak 
Democratic Coalition (SDK), and including Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), Party of the 
Hungarian Coalition (SMK), and Party of Civic Understanding (SOP).66 The opposition 
consisted of Vladimir Meciar’s Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak 
National Party (SNS). 
67  The Czech parliamentary material no. 539/2000: The governmental proposal of the 
act on the courts of Feb 2, 2000; The Czech parliamentary material no. 540/2000: The 
governmental proposal of the act on the judges and associates of Feb 2, 2000; and The Czech 
parliamentary material no. 541/2000: The governmental proposal of the act that amends the 
Constitution of the Czech Republic of Feb 2, 2000.  
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comply with the requirements of the EU; and the debate about the conflict between 
independence and responsibility of judges. 
 
As early as in explanatory report68 it is stated that the reform is necessary to create 
such a system of courts administration that would be conform with the documents 
issued by the Council of Europe, that were discussed earlier in the paper. The 
proposed arrangement gave the council mainly powers regarding personal matters 
of the judiciary which should have guaranteed independent functioning of the 
judicial branch in the same way it was proposed in the aforementioned documents 
and many of the democratic European countries. In the second reading on the 
parliamentary floor Motejl emphasized the importance of the reform when said: 
“(…) if we want to succeed (…) in the realm of the rule of law establishment (…) and 
at the same time in relatively critical and demanding evaluation in the European 
space (…)”, hence highlighting the perspective of the rule of law and European 
integration.69 A crucial counterstroke in the debate was delivered by the deputy 
VlastaParkanova (KDU-CSL), probably the main critic of the proposal in the 
parliament. She stressed that establishment of such a body  was not a requirement 
of the European Community and “[the Czech] accession into the European Union is 
certainly not conditioned by accepting this conception of the judiciary 
administration, as some advocates of this model like to pretend”.70 According to her 
it was not necessary to focus only on the model with central role of the council, as 
she interpreted international documents as allowing for rather a variety of 
approaches to the issue. 
 
Parkanova was heard also with regard to the second issue – the conflict between 
independence and responsibility, when she said: “It is important to note that the 
judiciary is always threatened by two extreme situations that need to be avoided. 
On the one hand it is politicization of the judiciary, and on the other it is elitism and 
corporatism”.71 According to her the proposal was very close the latter state of 
affairs and she opposed a shift of all the responsibility from politicians to judges 
themselves, as political elites are directly accountable to citizens and cannot hide 
from the responsibility. This conflict was also highlighted by the deputy Marek 
Benda (ODS) when he argued: “Independence, which is without any doubt good, 
becomes an absolute possibility of its representatives’ caprice if it does not go hand-
in-hand with responsibility”.72 The same point was also, rather surprisingly, raised by 
VojtechFilip, the KSCM deputy who proposed that the council “would create a 
                                                 
68  The Czech parliamentary material no. 541/2000: The governmental proposal of the 
act that amends the Constitution of the Czech Republic of Feb 2, 2000, 6. 
69  The transcript of 25th Parliamentary Session of the Czech Parliament, May 17 2000. 
70  The transcript of 22nd Parliamentary Session of the Czech Parliament, Mar 1 2000 . 
71  The transcript of 26th Parliamentary Session of the Czech Parliament, Jun 28 2000. 
72  The transcript of 22nd Parliamentary Session of the Czech Parliament, Mar 1 2000. 
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danger of elitist separation of the judiciary from a real public life”.73 Moreover, 
Parkanova argued that according to the experiences from the Europe, the reform as 
proposed did not guarantee any improvement and may cause different problems, 
such as those discussed or simply create a tension between the judiciary and the 
executive. 
 
Despite a lively debate the general atmosphere of it was rather non-conflicting with 
the consent, or at least willingness to discuss the establishment of a body of judicial 
independence. CSSD and its minister Motejl never actually addressed any of the 
concerns raised in the debate and never justified the proposed composition of the 
council due to the fact the reform was killed before it stand a fair chance in the 
parliament. All in all, the introduction of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary was 
not successful for a variety of reasons. The call for reform based on the reference to 
the EU accession was not convincing and the critics were able to refute it. Also, the 
proposed model have not dealt with the conflict between independence and 
responsibility properly and never got a chance to be discussed in more depth. 
Indeed, CSSD was in a difficult position as well – it had only a minority of seats in the 
House and because of procedural reasons it did not have a proper chance to 
persuade other political parties to support the reform. 
 
The Slovak success: introduction of the Judicial Council 
 
The introduction of the Council in Slovakia was a part of larger constitutional 
amendment proposed by four coalition deputies, one from each party: Peter Kresak 
(SOP), LadislavOrosz (SDL), Ivan Simko (SDK) and PavolHrusovsky (KDH). The 
debate was much more heated and polarized as the Czech one, however the analysis 
focuses only on the issue of EU integration and its relationship to the reform; and 
the debate about the composition of the Council and its pros and cons. In general 
the debate was lengthy and, indeed, very repetitive, but mentioning issues utterly 
unimportant for the reform; be it nationalistic or personal.74 
 
Besides other reasons the explanatory reports expresses “an honest interest to 
become a member of the family of European states”, while refers to a variety of 
international documents, such as European Charter on the statute of judges, UN 
                                                 
73  The transcript of 25th Parliamentary Session of the Czech Parliament, May 16 2000. 
74  In the debate one can find arguments dividing between those „who wanted 
independent Slovakia“ and those who did not, raised mainly by HZDS deputies. They were 
accusing the coalition of acting like saviors of Slovakia. For all the arguments that illustrate 
the tone of the discussion Roman Hofbauer’s (HZDS) statement suffices: „your proposal is 
missing one point – to change the name of the state to Presidential Constitutional-Court 
democradura of the Felvidek country.“ 45th Session, Feb 20 2011, Parliamentary material no. 
643. 
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Basic principles, or recommendations published by the Council of Europe.75 In the 
debate the importance of the reform was expressed mainly by the most important 
personnel of the coalition. JozefMigas (SDL), at that time the Speaker of the 
National Council, argued in favor of the amendment claiming it is necessary in order 
to meet the requirements for the early accession to the EU.76 The Prime Minister 
MikulasDzurinda takes the argument even further: 
 
There were opinions that the constitutional amendment is not necessary if we want to 
become members of the European Union. I want to declare that such statements are 
not true, they are false. If we want to successfully aspirate on the membership in the 
EU (…) we need this amendment. We need to strengthen the domestic background to 
approximate it to the highly-developed European democratic countries.77 
 
Somewhat contradicting speech was given by Peter Weiss (SDL) who argued in 
favor of the proposal, even without a wide consensus across the political spectrum. 
Nevertheless, he said: “I want to emphasize, the European Union and NATO are not 
forcing us to anything. It is our national interest, expressed in all the programs of all 
the government to the date, to be integrated. It is our concern, whether we meet 
the criteria for the accession into NATO and the EU".78 As can be seen, he 
specifically claims it is not the EU pushing Slovakia into doing anything; it is Slovakia 
attempting to prove itself as a trustworthy partner who calls for the reform. Similar 
sentiment is also reflected in a speech given by LadislavOrosz (SDL) when he said 
that “[i]f after tens of years some legal historians would come back to these 
documents, they will be able to objectively review what was at stake in the debate 
regarding the amendment of the Constitution in February 2001".79 Apparently 
Slovakia desperately wanted to be accepted in the EU alongside with other 
Visegrad Group countries, and was willing to go an extra mile in order to make it 
happen. 
 
Unlike the Czech debate about the composition of the Council, the Slovak one did 
not mention any of the possible concerns discussed in the paper earlier, related to 
the legacies of previous regime. In fact, the Slovak proposal was criticized for giving 
too many powers to the ministry, which was by the opposition interpreted as 
minister’s Carnogursky attempt to control the judiciary. The major criticism to the 
proposal was presented by Stefan Harabin, at that time the president of the 
Supreme Court appointed by HZDS. He proposed a composition where 10 out of 16 
                                                 
75 The Slovak parliamentary material no. 643/2000: The proposal of a group of deputies of 
the National Council of the Slovak republic of the constitutional act that amends the 
Constitution of the Slovak Republic. The explanatory report. 
76 The transcript of 45th Parliamentary Session of the Slovak Parliament, Feb 6 2001. 
77 The transcript of 45th Parliamentary Session of the Slovak Parliament, Feb 7 2001. 
78 The transcript of 45th Parliamentary Session of the Slovak Parliament, Feb 19 2001. 
79 Ibid. 
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members of the council would be judges and the rest by the parliament, as 
according to him the composition in the amendment is an “undying effort [of the 
government] to paralyze judiciary”.80 He also proposed his own solution to the 
problem of complete capture of the council by the judges – at least some part of the 
members nominated by the parliament would have to support any decision. 
Interestingly, he proposes that judiciary should be represented only by the judges 
who had been in the office for at least 10 years; which shows that his proposal did 
not reflect critically on the problem of socialist legacies.  
 
In the course of debate this proposal was brought back several times by a variety of 
HZDS deputies and Robert Fico, at that time an independent PM, elected on the list 
of SDL and the current (as of 2014) Prime Minister of Slovakia. Interestingly, HZDS 
deputies Gustav Krajci and Jan Gabriel accused the coalition of not-knowing the 
judiciary personnel as, according to them, judges wanted the Council to be 
designed as proposed by Harabin. Taking into consideration the fact that the 
Council was in fact designed together with the Association of Judges of Slovakia, 
shows not only a division within the judiciary that has been present ever since, but 
also shows that HZDS, Robert Fico and Harabin shared similar opinions about the 
self-administration of judiciary, were not concerned about the persistence of 
socialist legacies, and in fact, when were given a chance81 adjusted the composition 
of Council to their preferences. As a response, Orosz claimed that the Council 
establishes such a composition where a consensus between judicial nominees and 
members nominated by other branches will be necessary.82 
 
To sum up, the Slovak proposal for the introduction of the Judicial Council passed 
mainly because of the consensus among the coalition with a sufficient number of 
MPs to do such a reform. There seems to be an agreement between governing 
parties about the necessity of the reform in order to prove Slovakia as a trustworthy 
candidate for the EU accession, in order to overcome Meciar’s period that left 
Slovakia on the periphery of democratic world. Despite their seeming 
understanding of the problem of legacies, the Slovak elites never enacted a clause 
that would secure the politically nominated members of the Council will be from 
other legal professions, even though they intended it in the explanatory report and 
allowed subsequent governments to adjust the composition of the council in a 
manner not intended by the legislators. 
 
                                                 
80  The transcript of 32nd Parliamentary Session of the Slovak Parliament, Jun 14 2000. 
81  Between 2006 and 2009 Stefan Harabin became a Minister of Justice in Fico’s 
government as a nominee of HZDS. In that period 17 out of 18 members of the Council were 
judges themselves which, as was said earlier in this paper led to decrease in critical 
discussions in the Council.  
82  The transcript of 32nd Parliamentary Session of the Slovak Parliament, Jun 14 2000; 
and The transcript of 45th Parliamentary Session of the Slovak Parliament, Feb 20 2001. 
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7. Discussion 
 
This article showed that the necessity of establishing the rule of law, reinforced by 
Central and Eastern European countries’ desires to be accepted in the EU, created a 
tension between the goal of achieving judiciary independence and the post-
communist context they had to deal with. These judiciaries were severely affected 
by the legacies of previous regime and created unfavorable conditions for the 
creation of institutions of judiciary independence. Creation of judicial councils in 
such a culture may have resulted in encapsulation of the judiciary and its separation 
from the society, because of elitist and corporatist tendencies that were here 
inherently present. Despite of this, Slovakia came through a quite turbulent 
development to the crucial change in 2001 where it established such a council. On 
the other hand, the Czech Republic proceeded since the breakdown of communism 
rather gradually towards higher independence, yet the central role has been played 
by the ministry of justice. 
 
The Czechs attempted to introduce a council as well, but the proposal was not 
successful. In Slovak parliamentary debate the argument of EU accession was used 
much more than in the Czech counterpart and it was done more assiduously as well 
as more persuasive. In addition, the model proposed in Slovakia did not secure a 
balance between judiciary and non-judiciary members, which was included in the 
Czech proposal, which in time led to capture of the Judicial Council by judiciary 
members leading to decrease in accountability, encapsulation of the judicial branch 
and further separation from the public.  
 
In order to explain different paths taken by the two countries it is necessary to 
address at least two questions collected data could not provide an answer to. First of 
all; would the Czech reform be successful, had it been in the similar situation as 
Slovakia after Meciar’s government? It can be argued that yes, because there in fact 
existed quite a consensus about the introduction of the council. The reform failed 
because of the lack of flexibility on the part of government and because of of the 
lack of discussion regarding the composition of the council. If the reform was really 
crucial for the Czech elites, as it was in Slovakia, it can be assumed they would have 
submitted another proposal afterwards. The second question is: would such a reform 
be possible in Slovakia if the country was in a different position and did not need to 
prove itself as a trustworthy candidate? It is necessary to realize that the wide 
coalition – including Christian-democrats as well as social-democratic party – with 
constitutional majority, would not exist had there not been a strong demand for 
change after Meciar’s period. Such a coalition was rather a unique result of the 
‘democratizing elections’83 held in 1998. 
                                                 
83  Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in 
Postcommunist Countries, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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All in all, the research showed that a desire for the EU integration may create 
incentives that lead to the reforms which may prove themselves as dangerous in 
terms of consolidation of democracy. It also pointed to the fact that democratizing 
countries need to deal with their past properly in order to create a well-functioning 
judiciary, capable of functioning independent from other branches of power. In 
Slovakia, one may argue, these legacies were reinforced by the semi-authoritarian 
regime that followed the breakdown of communism. And last but not least, the 
research was able to propose several hypotheses that may be examined in the 
future, such as how the post-communist countries dealt with discredited judiciaries, 
what was the extent of changes in the judiciary personnel after the regime change 
and whether the change happened in lower or higher echelons of the judiciary. 
Subsequently these questions shall be discussed in a relationship with the observed 
performance of post-communist judiciaries in order to understand this wave of 
democratization, and its traps, better. 
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Robert Aldrich and Kirsten McKenzie (eds.), The Routledge History of Western 
Empires (London: Routledge, 2014)  
 
Alvin Camba 
Binghamton University 
 
In thirty two chapters, this book seeks to provide a comparative and thematic 
perspective of European Empires in the Americas, Asia, and Africa through an 
analysis of empire making, practices of people, culture, science, and responses by 
the colonizers and the colonized. The initial chapter by Aldritch and McKenzie acts 
as the overall unifying theme, positing cultural, economic, political, and ideological 
reasons for the study of empires via colonization of other continents. The main 
approach by Aldritch and McKenzie is the interconnected macro and micro 
practices of empire building, constituting a processual continuation of empire-
making throughout the entire imperial period through acts of culture, art, science, 
medicine, gender, and politics. The strength of the approach is it connects the 
agency of both the colonizers and the colonized in reconstituting and remaking the 
structural integrity of empires in both the imperial international system and the 
imperial domestic system. At times, those practices and acts enabled the agency of 
those excluded in mainstream narratives in constituting resistance in the political, 
economic, and cultural conditions. For example, diseases, non-European, women, 
and the indigenous people were given voice through highlighting their impact in 
increasing the difficulties for the colonizers to manage the empire. The diversity of 
the chapters, organized through empire building, cultures, people, science, and 
spaces, serves as the key strength of the book with countless conversations and 
debates found in the 32 chapters. For my part, the chapter on Anderson and 
Maxwell-Stewart on Convict Labour and the Western Empires appears to be the 
most interesting in showing how penitentiaries and inmates were not only issues of 
crime and punishment, but also cheap labor, empire building, and capital 
accumulation.  
 
As I would show in two levels, the book’s main strength of diversity is also its main 
weakness. First, on the conceptual definition of colonization, there seems little 
attempt to define the unifying concept. Colonization, as the key theme in the book, 
was defined as the territorial (formal) and economic (informal) colonization of Asia, 
Africa, and the Americas by during the 16th to the 20th century. Empire, in turn, as a 
term was defined through practices of empire-making. This means that the authors 
defined the concepts in their narratives through the practices, interaction, and 
processes of the Iberian, the British, the French, the Belgian, and other forms of 
European empires. This becomes a problem because, lacking any unifying 
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conceptual definition, it becomes difficult to categorize and define the actions of 
European political entities. For instance, what makes the colonization of Asia, the 
Americas, and Africa different from the conquest of nearby European political 
entities? Practices like the internal consolidation of the European realms of and on 
its own minorities were equally constitutive of the brutality and exploitation similar 
to the kind that ravaged the rest of the world.  There were numerous examples: the 
movement of the English on the Welsh, the Scottish, and the Irish, the Spanish 
monarchy’s treatment of the Basque, the dismemberment of Poland by various 
European powers, and the consistent expansion on Livonia, Central Germany, and 
Eastern Europe by Western European powers. Historically, these conquest of smaller 
political entities in Europe stabilized the intra-European political system that 
eventually enabled the colonization of other continents. The systematic 
feudalization of Eastern Europe and Southern Italian Latifundias created the 
conditions of grain and surplus transfer from the East to the West, leading to the 
systemic exploitation of Eastern European villages, and enabling the growth of more 
powerful Western European political structures. The growth of the political 
structures was a precondition of the colonization of the rest of the world. The 
implications are clear. The lack of conceptual clarity of the book means that the 
authors do not or cannot account for similar practices across time and space, 
leading to little theoretical conversations around the concepts of empire, 
hegemony, and the imperial system. This brings to light the limitations of the edited 
volume in trying to understand the link between colonization and the systematic 
nature of empires within a Pan-European system. 
 
Second, although the edited volumes aims to give a comprehensive—different 
topics on culture, science, economics, and society—account of the Western 
Empires, one of the book’s own aims, little has been done to speak of an integrative 
account of these empires within long-run and large-scale patterns of recurrence, its 
links to capital accumulation, and its evolution with the changing global political 
economy. Any sort of imperial turn from the level of the domestic, intra-state or 
inter-state European politics was omitted. Before the imperial venture of other 
continents, European political entities eventually organized into bigger, state-like 
entities with state-like machineries. The formation of the European empires 
however depended on subjugation of smaller, Feudal entities which emerged as 
part of the global warming period at the end of the Roman Empire (800-1300). The 
end of the global warming period with the harsh European winters withered the 
self-sufficiency of smaller feudal entities, leading to the formation of the bigger 
European political entities. An analysis of the relations of the political entities and 
their formation into bigger, more powerful and expansive empires were largely 
excluded in the book in favor of a focus on the colonization of the Americas, Asia, 
and Africa. As such, the authors cannot account for any sort of systematic process of 
rise, evolution, and fall of the empires in a longer historical time. There is a huge 
array of literature here since the 1970s. To give several examples, Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s The Modern World-Systems (1978), Stephen Bunker and Paul 
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Cinccantell’s Globalization and the Race for Resources (2005),   and    Giovanni 
Arringhi’s The Long 20th Century (1994) use longer historical timeframes of 500 
years, elucidating a variedly rich, yet complex historical structures, permeating from 
the beginning of colonization in the ‘long’ 16th century into the crises of US 
hegemony and legitimacy. The most central is Jason Moore’s work on Capitalism as 
World-Ecology (2013, 2012, 2011, 2010), which takes the question of nature, 
power, and struggle within a single dialectical unity of world historical relations, 
redefining colonization as an equally constitutive environmental process.  
 
Though it would be too much ask the volume to use the same approaches, but a 
conversations with these works and a dialogue with the processes would make the 
volume much more comprehensive than it already is. Given that historical literature 
has been criticized at times for ignoring these topics or taking them at piecemeal 
instances, it makes sense to respond to these concerns in light of furthering the 
conceptualization of empire and dialogue around ‘new imperialism’ and capitalism 
today. Altogether, these frustrations fail to dilute the book’s ultimate effect. This is a 
very well argued, valuable book, particularly in its comprehensive account of 
Western empires, as well as the richness of coverage it provides. It is a must read for 
anyone working on history and empires.  
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Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations. The State of the Art (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
 
Liana Ionita 
University of Bucharest 
 
This volume examines the constructive engagement between International Law (IL) 
and International Relations (IR) and the value-added of these two disciplines - 
separately developed until their recent rapprochement - to the emergence of the 
so-called ‘IL/IR scholarship and the understanding of international affairs in general.   
By providing empirical and conceptual analysis on different stands of IL and IR 
theories, the inner goal of this collection of valuable essays is to engender valid 
reasoning about the tensions generated by IL/IR scholarship in order to identify “the 
potential obstacles to interdisciplinary dialogue” (p.11). 
 
Starting from the controversial debates between IL and IR scholars, the authors in 
this volume are making a genuinely interdisciplinary inquiry into the possibility of 
unifying the approaches cultivated by both political scientists and international 
legal scholars. IL is “a sort of theoretical tabula rasa, waiting to be written on by IR 
scholars” (p.13). 
 
Looking at the structure and the content of the volume, the book is divided into five 
parts: the introductory part (part I) is followed by four parts coherently organized, so 
that one could observe the most important stages of the international legal process: 
theorizing IL (part II), the making of IL (part III), interpretation and application of IL 
(part IV) and enforcement, compliance and effectiveness (part V).  
 
In Part I the authors explain the central conceptual dichotomies of the 
interdisciplinary dialogue (IL and IR, law at a point in time and law over time, values 
and interests, law and politics) and identify the tensions that might arise out of the 
IL/IR scholarship, whose causes are arrogated to: (1) the theoretical differences, (2) 
the epistemological differences and (3) the competing conceptions of IL. One 
particular attention is given by Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, to the 
conceptualization of ‘international legalization’, defined as a distinct form of 
politics “shaped and constrained by law and legal institutions” (p.35).  
 
Part II focuses on understanding IL in the light of the main theoretical IR 
approaches: institutionalism, liberal theories, constructivism and realism. In each 
case, the authors reveal the key assumptions, along with the strengths and 
weaknesses of their perspective, in order to convince the audience that their theory 
has the most valuable contribution to the understanding of IL and its role in IR. For 
example, Andrew Moravcsik stresses on the superiority of the liberal approach in 
explaining the evolution of IL, by arguing that “international law will increasingly 
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come to depend on the answers to questions that liberal theories pose” (p.83). On 
the contrary, Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope claim the imperative role of social 
norms in global politics and consequently, the constructivist engagement with IL, 
setting up “a sociologically rich and historically grounded understanding of 
international law” (p.125). 
 
The essays from Part III of the volume concentrate on how to best create the 
institutional legal design in order to raise the effectiveness of IL and bring into 
discussion fruitful insights regarding different levels of international law-making 
(inter-state, trans-governmental and transnational) by NGOs (chapter 9), regulatory 
networks (chapter 10) and international organizations (chapter 11).   
 
The contributors to Part IV devote attention to the impact of the growing number of 
international courts and tribunals, regionally and thematically distributed, on the 
international judicial order. Karen J. Alter examines their main four (multiple) roles: 
enforcement, administrative review, constitutional review and dispute settlement 
procedures, which is also analyzed when speaking about international agreements, 
by Barbara Koremenos and Timm Betz. Another issue that might meet the public’s 
interest is how international judicial independence could advances the 
effectiveness of international courts (chapter 17). Erik Voeten argues that “the 
judicialization of politics is met by an increased politicization of the judiciary” 
(p.422). Part V examines the concepts of enforcement, effectiveness and 
compliance and provides a comprehensive qualitative and quantitative 
measurement of their relation with IL.  
 
Taken as a whole, the essays in this volume provide all together the enriching and 
innovative theoretical resources for a controversial contemporary discussion of the 
birth of IL/IR scholarship. The contributors - leading academics and scholars in the 
field of IL, IR and Political Science - explore the current stage of IL/IR research by 
proposing an interdisciplinary perspective, which permits them to cross traditional 
boundaries and analyze tensions between the two disciplines. A step in this 
direction is successfully made: the authors demonstrate that this new-born IL/IR 
scholarship transcend the disciplinary divides and traditions and label the points of 
tangency across disciplines. The result is a new unified sub-discipline, whose actors 
would be both international lawyers and IR scholars.  
 
A unique aspect of their inquiries is that, in order to investigate the state of art of 
IL/IR scholarship, the contributors review, firstly, the existing literature in the field 
from a critical point of view and then, by adopting different IR approaches, they 
succeed in explaining the making, interpretation and enforcement of IL. The essays 
outline a fruitful ground for future research questions: what is the impact of IL on 
global politics and international affairs and how could the later influence IL itself? 
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What makes the book even more valuable is that the authors combine different 
research methods and, besides the legal perspective, they use also the critical 
analysis of the different IR theories (Part II), the qualitative comparative analysis 
(Part III), the interpretation of different statistic data and graphics (Part IV - 
chapters 14 and 15) and the conceptual analysis (Part III). For example, one could 
notice the increasing attention given by the authors to the conceptual evolution of 
“flexibility mechanism” in the context of international agreements (chapter 7), 
“hard and soft law” (chapter 8), “institutional proliferation and the international 
legal order” (chapter 12) and “legitimacy” (chapter 13).  
 
Another asset of the book is that the essays provide excellent reviews of the IL/IR 
literature and contemporary writings, but in the same time, the authors develop a 
very original argumentation supporting their hypothesis.  For example, adopting a 
preference-based approach regarding the domestic voting and the lobbying, Joel P. 
Trachtman, outline a model of compliance with international legal rule, trying to 
answer the following question: “how domestic coalitions would be affected by and 
would affect international law”? (p.561).  
 
Moreover, the contributions create a bridge between theory and practice of IL/IR. 
The essays are rich in theoretical explanations, but also examples and analysis of 
specific topics, such as human rights and international trade (chapters 7 and 15).  
Besides the fact that the volume designs in an original way the avenues of inquiry 
between global politics and international law, a shortcoming of the book is that the 
perspectives embraced by the authors are mainly scientific American approaches to 
the IL/IR scholarship, developed within a very selective group of American scholars, 
as Slaughter explains himself in chapter 25 (p.612). Taken everything into 
consideration, this volume is an essential guide for understanding the role of 
international law in international relations, which makes it a very useful and 
indispensable reading for students in IL, IR or Political Science, but also for 
international lawyers and academic and professional audiences. 
 
 
Mariam Irene Tazi-Preve, “Motherhood in Patriarchy: Animosity Towards Mothers in 
Politics and Feminist Theory – Proposals for Change” (Opladen, Berlin and Toronto: 
Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2013) 
 
Leda Sutlović 
Center for Women’s Studies Zagreb 
 
Over the years the feminist approach to political science has significantly influenced 
and transformed gender blindness of the discipline by providing methodological 
and epistemological responses to its various perspectives and practices. The 
emphasis on the social conditionality of all knowledge has primarily taken place in 
the field of political theory with the deconstruction of the myth of universality and 
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abstraction of a political subject, as well as the one of artificiality of public-private 
divide. However, within the feminist (political) theory there are many internal 
debates, one of which representing a stand on the ways of achievement of equal 
civil status of the sexes, reflected in the division on the proponents of its realization 
within the paradigm of sameness, as opposed to the one of difference. The book 
Motherhood in Patriarchy poses itself within the latter field, taking the affirmative 
stand towards natural differences of sexes, also manifested in their opposite 
moralities. According to the proponents of this approach, being inherently pacifist 
the mothers’ ethics provides a solid basis for the establishment of the (new) social 
order. The main thesis of the book can be understood as a politico-theoretical 
advocacy for the restitution of the matriarchal society, subverted by the patriarchy, 
which has turned the ability to give birth into a deficiency. The patriarchy is defined 
as a transitory phase towards a society that will, with the help of reproduction 
technology replace mothers with an abstract father, represent a final triumph of a 
reason over body. Building the argumentation mainly on the binary oppositions, the 
author also adopts a multi-disciplinary approach defending the case through 
anthropological, philosophical, psychoanalytical and historical perspectives. The 
initial premise of the book questions the marginal position of motherhood and 
childrearing in contemporary societies. Furthermore, by “calling into question the 
theories and practices which formed the basis of our ideas of body, nature, mother, 
state and domination”, the book aims to provide an argument for the necessity of 
the return to matriarchy and its pacifist basis, suitable for the building of a just 
society. Finally, drawing on the concepts of ecofeminism, predominately on the 
connection between women and nature, the book also adopts the framework of 
matriarchal religion and poses itself within the field of matriarchal studies.  
 
The case for matriarchy is explicated through nine chapters, introducing the issue of 
patriarchal motherhood performed in the nuclear family, as opposed to the 
collective parenting conveyed within the women’s clan in matriarchy. The current 
state of patriarchal motherhood, whose main feature is isolation and overburdening 
of mothers, causes their depression while the main reason for it is complete 
detachment from nature, most vividly seen in the artificial approaches of medical 
science to childbirth. Furthermore, the author addresses the taboo of physicality in 
women’s movement present among the proponents of equality, primarily the liberal 
feminists, who have “rejected the nature in order to acquire equal rights through 
law”. This tradeoff has proved to be delusional and inefficient, placing motherhood 
on the margins and opening the possibility of equality only to childless women. The 
argument is further developed with the criticism of postmodern gender studies and 
gender theory that reflects gender “as if there are no mothers”. These theories have 
opened a possibility for a further development of reproductive technology towards 
the “final solution to the question of motherhood”, i.e. for subordination of mothers 
and their exclusion from the newly established political order. The overview of 
matriarchal societies through different times and civilizations, overthrown by 
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violence inherent to the patriarchal state represents a significant part of the book. 
Establishing the knowledge on the existence of matriarchal societies opens the 
possibility of its reestablishment. According to the author, the main goal of the 
modern state is the separation of mother and child, enabling the possibility of wars 
and expansion, providing the argument for inheritance of violence in the system. 
Regarding the economy, the matriarchal order represents a pre-class society which, 
being “beyond the reach of market economy demonstrates that rivalry with nature is 
not necessary”. Drawing on the second wave feminism matriarchal research, 
inherent to German and Austrian authors whose arguments establish the majority of 
theoretical framework of the book, the conclusion once again states the advantages 
of matriarchal social order. This is primarily the commitment to the principle of 
responsibility without domination that makes it an optimal model for social 
sustainability.  
 
The book Motherhood in Patriarchy offers a broad overview of the historical, 
psychological, anthropological and philosophical concepts following the socially 
important task of childrearing, but is doing so from a rather overcome perspective. 
Though the points on the need of stepping away from double-burden of women and 
work-life balance approach that places women as the center of the problem need to 
be revisited and deconstructed, the nature-affirmative approach might not provide 
the right solution. Revealing the instrumentalisation of women’s question for the 
purposes of dominant political and economic priorities, i.e. the comprehensive 
system criticism might be more adequate approach. Feminist political economy has 
addressed the question of motherhood by placing the social reproduction in the 
center of the analysis, as opposed to the approach of mainstream neoclassical 
economy. Though this broadly fits the main argument of the book, the 
achievements of feminist political economy have passed without references. 
Regarding gendered division of labour the author insists on binary oppositions, 
detracting the technology as a male sphere of activity and even stating that “birth 
control techniques have never been liberating for women but used as a means to 
discipline female creative nature”. To call the possibility of gaining control of ones 
own body unliberating is, if anything, strange. The outlined theses draw many 
questions, but the two specifically attract attention: in the proposed matriarchal 
order, what happens with women who do not want/cannot become mothers? If the 
(soft) power in the matriarchal society is established on the ability to give birth, 
these women are outcaste from the community. Continuing on the criticism of 
gender theory and the stance on fixed identities, in the proposed society what 
happens with the LGBT persons? These main disadvantages of motherhood utopia 
denounce the request for adequate valorization of the important social task of 
giving birth and upbringing of children, by using essentialisms and rejecting 
technology as the means to its goals. Based on the common natural ability to give 
birth, the monolithic understanding of women as a homogenous group overcomes 
all other differences, hence annulling the thesis on matriarchy as a just social order. 
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Though the book cover states otherwise, these unfortunately cannot be taken as the 
proposals for a change.  
 
 
Dorothee Bohle and Bela Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012) 
 
Akop Gabrielyan 
Central European University 
 
The book of Bohle and Greskovits aims to show how, when, and why the economic 
performance of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries differs from the 
rest of the world and within own range. In that respect, the statistical and 
explanatory argumentation emphasizes differences more than similarities of the 
region, thus rejecting the widespread perception of post-socialist state economies 
as homogenous. In the absence of monolithic unity, the different degrees of 
economic fragility and political stability gain relevance. At the same time, as the 
authors suggest, the post-socialist states share similar communist experience, 
historical legacies, and economic challenges of transition. Accordingly, the 
theoretical framework of the book is largely based on the scrutiny of capitalism 
development through the prism of major paradigms, e.g. Polanyi's 'The Great 
Transformation'.  
 
The book includes several groups of countries under analysis: the Baltics (Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania), the Visegrad Four(the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
and Poland), Southeastern European (Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia) – and 
Slovenia separately. Although almost all these countries pursue similar goals of 
neoliberalism, the varieties of their actual economic performance differ according 
to the main features of the group under scrutiny. Thus, the Baltic States represent 
the neoliberal model of capitalism, the Visegrad group can be introduced under 
embedded neoliberalism, whereas Slovenia exercises what is called neocorporatism. 
The authors do not provide a specific name to the group of the Southeastern states, 
but following the main logic of the book, one can place them with the Baltics in the 
category of  pure neoliberalism; although the Southeastern group was much less 
successful in that respect.  
 
The distinction of CEE countries shape the hexagonal "diamond" that includes 
several macroeconomic indicators: states' governmental policies; the levels of 
democracy; market efficiency; efficacy of macroeconomic coordination; abilities to 
create a welfare state, and representation of corporatism interest within each single 
case (pp.19-22). The creation of such a complex and sophisticated model allows to 
answer the general question of the book: is there one or many post-socialist 
capitalisms? The answer is unambiguous: the CEE states' fundamental differences in 
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macroeconomic policies within a single frame of market capitalism confirms 
Polanyi's approach and of all those who appeal to the varieties and diversity of 
capitalism. According to the authors the only country fulfilling nearly all the 
"requirements" to become a mature Western-type welfare state is Slovenia, while 
its neighbors (Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) are laggards. The authors argue that 
contrary to the initial expectations, there is no convergence and transformation of 
all Central Eastern European countries into a uniform Western-type capitalist 
economy. 
 
What is the story told by this analysis? First, it is correct to assert that the quantity of 
conducted reforms and their speed of implementation does not guarantee their 
quality. While some Baltic and Visegrad states competed in 1991-1992 with respect 
to swift marketization, Slovenia had already started in "pole position". The 
Slovenian success can be attributed also to the fact that the country "cumulated 
impact of reforms many of which had been initiated before and brought to 
competition after the end of socialism" (p. 27).One can conclude, that being among 
the front-runners by the beginning of transition, eventually did not guarantee being 
on the top of welfare state construction at the end because the actual price for 
rapid reformism can be unbearably more costly than the costs for gradual 
transformation. Second, the issues which have seemed to be settled down during 
the rapid transformation, can come to the surface later in a form of the recession 
and intrinsic conflicts, undermining overall state's capacity - which has been 
illustrated by the most recent financial crisis. This suggests that even when aiming to 
consider the CEE post-socialist space as a whole, there is a difference between at 
least two sets of countries: those who get closer to establishing effective market 
capitalism, enhancing own economic and political integration with the West (semi-
cores) and those trying to challenge the success of the former (semi-peripheries).  
 
Overall, although "Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery" was written two years 
ago, i.e. relatively recently, nonetheless some things have already changed since 
then significantly. In July 2013 Croatia officially joined the European Union (EU). 
While it may be too early to talk about particular effects from that decision, it is 
quite obvious that all of the post-socialist states considered joining the EU as the 
crucial goal of their foreign policy agenda. The second important change can be 
observed in Latvia, a recent joiner of the Eurozone. According to the current 
agenda, the last Baltic state's accession to the Eurozone is a matter of time1 and 
Lithuania will introduce the European single currency by the beginning of 2015. The 
deal with the European currency is more complex compared to the common 
willingness of the post-socialist states to join the EU. That is because several 
countries are not prepared to make this step, understanding that costs could be 
                                                 
1 "Who can join and when?". 2014. Online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm Last 
access: 7 April, 2014. 
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harmful for both joining and host sides. Obviously, Hungary, Romania, or the Czech 
Republic will try to avoid the Greek experience. Moreover, national economies in 
these countries are still functional and thus all pros and cons are to be taken into 
account today in order to escape "gathering stones" of hasty decisions tomorrow. In 
light of these arguments, the European integration appears to be ongoing despite 
its continuous challenges. Considering all the economic achievements, successes 
and failures of the post-socialist Europe, it is somewhat clear that some states like 
Slovenia represent rather semi-core, than semi-periphery. At the same time, as the 
authors themselves argue, "in terms of international economic integration, none of 
the East Central European states appear to us as fully peripheral"(p.47). 
 
The recent financial crisis made more vivid the differences of overall economic 
performance within the post-socialist world. It gave some food for thought about 
how macroeconomic models of the CEE states can be reshaped in a long-term 
perspective, accepting the possibility of their full revisal within the frame of 
democratic improvement and betterment. However, making a consonant to the 
authors' main conclusion, it is still not so much room for exclusively positive 
expectation from the coming decade. Obviously, new economic shocks can be 
unbearable for some of the EU states, and the right question to be asked by that 
time is how those future issues will be handled without undermining already weak 
capacities of these states.  
 
The book is highly recommendable for all those who want to deepen their 
understanding of how transformation to market-oriented capitalist economy works 
in general, and those who seek to enriching their knowledge in post-communist 
economic transition specifics in CEE particularly, considering the role and 
importance of state capacities. At the same time, due to already changed 
environment the book is appreciated to be scrutinized alongside with the latest 
political and economic changes of the region. 
 
 
Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built The Transformation of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Second Edition. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013)  
 
Akop Gabrielyan 
Central European University 
 
One of the initially crucial questions that has come to the agenda of political 
economy right after the collapse of the Soviet Union lied in the realm of defining 
and understanding transition as a specific process and period. The question itself 
originated a lot of discussion, as neither scholars-theoreticians, nor pure 
practitioners in the field of international politics and economy could find a common 
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agreement on defining precisely the very notion of transition, its timeframes and 
implications. In fact these discussions are still ongoing, as interpretations of the 
phenomena of post-communist transition largely vary from one case to the other, 
proving the absence of a single approach and view toward this issue in the European 
and overseas scientific community. In this respect, this work is chosen because it 
encompasses nearly all the author's views and opinion on economic and para-
economic aspects of transition. 
 
From the beginning of his work, Aslund argues that even if the exact moment and 
sudden collapse of communism had been unpredictable, yet to a certain degree 
people clearly understood that the system has been doomed to a failure. 
Simultaneously, the sudden collapse directly affected on the nature of transition in 
the post-communist space, which was unique in its essence.  
 
By the moment when planned economy proved its practical inability to exist any 
longer, dramatic transformation of economic interrelations among countries was 
characterized by a number of essential features. Those features were largely a 
consequence of a simple fact that the rest of the world had not had any alike 
empirical experience of that sort of transformation, i.e. immense shifting from 
planned economy to an entirely opposite economic formation in face of capitalism.  
 
First feature is unevenness, seen in the difference of interstates' ability of proper 
economic performance in terms of challenging the issues of transformation, and 
establishing open market system guided by democratic principles. Perhaps, the 
most vivid examples of unevenness of transition was the change of GDP 
levels(p.66),or the difference in privatization levels which also vastly varied(pp.190-
201).The unevenness of transition also bared several cases when countries like 
Belarus, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan failed to change their economic systems toward 
market-oriented economy and to establish democratic institutions in qualitative 
terms, remaining mostly unreformed(pp. 2-4).  
 
A second important feature is defining transition timeframes. As the author alleges, 
post-communist transition has been a protracted process and is not over yet 
because of three aspects: a)several states have not achieved so far the same level of 
economic performance as they had had before the transition; b)those initial 
economic and political objectives, that the majority of countries declared by the 
moment of departure from the communist rule, still remain unattainable; 
c)transition and recovery from the concomitant crisis and slump occurred in 
different countries with different time intervals: if the Baltic States and Central 
Europe already reached the positive level of economic performance by the 2000's, 
the post-Soviet countries, like Armenia, Georgia, or Azerbaijan, only started to show 
positive rates by that time(Ch.3).Thus, it would have been more correct to talk about 
different levels of success in transition, rather than about decisive overcoming of 
that phenomena. 
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The third crucial feature of transition is 'exogenous' factor of foreign support: 
unequal financial, institutional, advisory and other aid distribution across post-
communist states. Aslund's affirmation that "only the future EU accession countries 
received timely Western assistance"(p.8) proves disproportional and perhaps 
politicized approach of the advanced Western economies to provide equal support 
to all post-communist states, but rather firstly to those of geographical and political 
proximity to the West. 
 
The unevenness as the first and most broad feature of transition which amalgamates 
all other features and makes them to be considered through the own prism, leads 
the author to infer that all twenty one post-communist stories of transition can be 
formally divided into three main groups in respect to their economic and political 
performance: successful stories (mostly by then future EU member states,- CEE and 
the Baltic states),partially successful (the majority of the post-Soviet countries),and 
unsuccessful(those three mentioned states who failed democratic 
transition).Nonetheless, this simple differentiation should not misguide a reader: in 
my view, this severe division of countries should not be taken for granted, as there 
are still some room left for improvement, seen at corresponding  possibility of 
leaping from one group into the other exactly because, as the second feature states, 
post-communist transition is not over. 
 
However, because of sharp distinctions in the initial readiness to establish new 
political and economic order, different states have chosen different ways of 
reformation, presented in the two fundamental forms of transition: some have 
preferred fast acceptance of new policies, named by Aslund as radical reforms, 
whereas others have stood for relatively slower implementation of transformation 
policies, known as gradualism.  
 
The issue of the speed of transition has been practically one of the most important 
in the agenda of the newly emerged states. At the same time, while talking about 
radical reform and gradualism one should confess that though these approaches are 
contradictory in terms of defining the very process of economic change and 
reforms, albeit they are not irreconcilable in terms of shaping the ultimate goal of 
that process. Thus the proponents of radical reform and gradualism both largely 
agree that, eventually, the ultimate results of transition, disregard to the speed, 
should be aimed at establishing "a market economy leading to higher economic 
efficiency, economic growth, and an improved average standard of 
leaving"(p.37).Additionally, both approaches find common determinant in defining 
the importance of a state's role. A state should be capable to exercise hard budget 
constraint policies - an important requisite for successful transition. 
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Generally, Aslund clearly positions himself as a proponent of radical reformism, and 
believes that unlike gradualism in radical reform strategy a necessary accumulation 
of critical mass for growth and quantitative reorientation of economy toward 
market-oriented one is conducted in a quick and sharp way which allows to reduce 
time and money costs to achieve full liberalization. Aslund argues that gradualism 
itself was taken as a proper way of reforming mainly by those who sought to benefit 
by expanding time frames of transition. The more transition lasts, the better 
conditions could be shaped for rent-seeking. At the same time, one should bear in 
mind that the pitfalls of transition, like rent-seeking or spontaneous privatization 
(which is to be distinguished from radical reformism), have occurred in both types of 
countries: those who tooled them up with radical reform approach, and those who 
introduced gradualism, differing only by the level and deepness of their affect.  
 
Overall, this book is a perfect factual illustration of how the post-communist 
transformation occurred and why the issues of transformation are still relevant and 
salient, even if more than twenty years have passed since the collapse of planned 
economy and formal beginning of transition. The relevance of the work becomes 
undoubtable especially after the last financial crisis: the latter has proved the fact 
that the states are unable to tackle any global issue without joint efforts to do that 
and finding consent among each other. At the same time, Aslund's work still leaves 
some room for unanswered questions. 
 
 
Mark Pennington, Robust Political Economy: Classical Liberalism and the Future of 
Public Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 
 
Kawu Bala 
Bauchi State Judiciary, Nigeria. 
 
Mark Pennington’s Robust Political Economy: Classical Liberalism and the Future of 
Public Policy deals with the defence of classical liberalism within the perspective of 
politics and the economy. The author, being a professor of political economy, seeks 
to highlight the dilemma which is seen confronting liberalism on its face. To 
proponents, liberalism poses no principled concern in politico-economic point of 
view. Liberalism originated from basically the values of private property and 
profitable exchange of commodities and services; markets should be unrestricted 
and the actions of business partners should be regulated only by forces within, 
which serve to as well monitor the actions of producers in such a way that resources 
incline to drift directly so as to serve the interest of consumers. This is the raison 
d'être that ‘marked resistance’ to the ideology (p.1). In his book, Pennington sought 
to follow the likes of the greatest defenders of liberalism in the twentieth century 
such as F.A. Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. 
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Pennington’s book is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the core 
objections to classical liberalism in Europe, United States and other countries in Asia 
and Africa. The second part turns to give applied analysis of what the author 
gathered. In this first part, Pennington argues for ‘minimal’ intervention rather than 
absolute ‘welfare state’. To him the era of welfare system should be gone for good. 
So he challenges the arguments against classical liberalism (p.2). Yes, as the author 
shows, robust political economic demands that compassion (reads, welfare state) in 
the management of the economy should be relaxed if things are to work perfectly.  
 
Pennington’s emphasis is that ‘the results of classical liberalism order cannot be 
considered ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ because they are not based on obedience to a unitary 
system of commands’ (p.6). The author further emphasises that ‘classical liberalism 
recognises that states may have an important role to play within a liberal society’ 
(pp.6-7). This is ambiguous to say the least. It is worth accepting Pennington’s view 
for this part that classical liberalism is not a perfect order. Even with the liberalised 
economies springing up around us the question of social justice still becomes a 
mirage if at all it ever exists in the lexicon of the proponents of classical liberalism 
(p.9). A good example is the spontaneous emergence of the various “Occupy” 
movements in Europe and America which came no doubt as a result of discontent 
with the liberal order.  
   
Pennington discerningly scrutinizes many of the arguments against classical 
liberalism; the most prevailing is the issue of ‘social justice.’ Cases in point are the 
business and political benefits accruing to small group of people courtesy of 
classical liberalism (p.24). Predominantly this is the point when monopolistic 
tendency preys on people because of liberal institutions’ ‘morally corrosive effect on 
the social order’ (p.51). Society is not the benchmark for a shared vision for the 
goodness of all. What is known as ‘common good’ is hardly found in the people’s 
psyches under the much touted classical liberal order (p.52).  
 
Pennington’s comparative disagreement is very important to be cited again here. 
Democracy is confirmed to be the best system of governance. It is better than 
dictatorship and chaos. But the condition of the citizens of the liberal order calls for 
concern. Interestingly the author brings to fore some studies in Europe and the 
United States where he says that voters in these advanced liberal democracies ‘tend 
to be ignorant of even the most basic political information’ (p.66). Is this a mere 
coincidence? Well, Pennington should have said so in order to help readers unravel 
the role of the so-called mainstream media. There is also corruption and ‘social 
instability wrought by unregulated markets’ (p.82), including unhealthy adverts and 
competitions which devastate the rights to makes choices in the local markets 
(p.95). Consumers are left under the mercy of middlemen, retailers and worst of all, 
inhumane brand names. In essence the issue of ‘social justice’ is thrown to the dogs 
(p.145). 
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Pennington painstakingly defended the criticisms against classical liberalism. 
Examples abound, in the condemnation against competitive market where he 
argues in favour of its rationale. The author sees the function of the competitive 
market as a way of making it possible to allocate resources to people likely to ‘add 
value’ (p.152). Who are the people that are likely to add the much talked about 
value as Pennington propounds? Consumers are groaning as a result of exploitation; 
likewise workers who survive daily under pittance and inhumane conditions. 
Pennington’s assertion should be critiqued in that he says that ‘a more robust way of 
addressing these problems may be through voluntary collective action rather than 
enforced progress of tax-financed ‘welfare’ (p.155). This is the last that struck the 
camel’s back which is the non-existent of welfare which is being taking over by 
privatisation. 
 
Pennington once more observes that ‘reading groups, religious associations, sports 
teams, newspapers and Internet-based social networks might all compete in the 
provision of educational opportunities as might the potential for people to acquire 
skills via employment and vocational training’ (p.157). Nowhere has classical 
liberalism done a big blow than in the field of education. Pursue of knowledge is 
being mocked at. Schooling is arguably the last bastion of the welfare state and by 
virtue of the liberal theories it is unimportant to be given priority. For, relationship 
from top to bottom is ‘based on the pursuit of narrow self-interest’ (p.174). The 
various avenues for learning mentioned by Pennington play divergent roles but will 
never become the proper substitute as he predicted for the formal school system we 
know. 
 
Pennington’s book is well written for those interested to test the waters of classical 
liberalism. Reform is desirable due to time frame within which activities unfold. The 
problem, in my opinion, is when reform is subjected to liberal test. Curious as it 
seems even with Pennington’s findings in terms of the much advertised 
development programmes spearhead by classical liberalism, he ironically laments 
that ‘development programmes such as those of the World Bank are unlikely to be 
attuned to cultural and economic circumstances on the ground’ (p.208). One 
wonders what kind of “development” programmes should be accepted by global 
policy makers if not the one scripted by the World Bank?  
      
I enjoyed reading Pennington’s book for its extensive research and staunch 
protection offered to and codified in favour of liberalism. This, perhaps, is the 
biggest asset in Mark Pennington’s book. No need however to discredit further that 
social justice is not part of the robust political economy of liberalism. I am aware 
that social business enterprises are springing up even in Europe and the United 
States, a sort of reversal of political economic role in social coexistence. 
Understandably society is seeing the need to provide a breathing space to social 
justice. This methodology may work positively in the years to come. In conclusion I 
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do not believe with the author’s view that ‘from the current wreckage,’ the world 
would ‘see the rebirth of classical liberalism as a political force’ (p.267). For, the 
‘wreckage’ is directly coming to us, whether or not people agree, as a result of the 
policies brought about by the same chaotic classical liberal order.     
 
 
Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times. Joseph Chan. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) 
 
Emilian Kavalski  
Australian Catholic University 
 
The attempts (if not desire) to understand the motivations of Chinese policy-making 
and governance practices seem to be gaining increasing urgency in what is nearly 
universally acknowledged to be the “Asian century.” In particular, the attention to 
the emergent dynamics of international interactions has been facilitated by the 
break-up of the Cold War order, which has allowed a number of actors to extend 
their international roles and outreach. In this respect, thinking about the shifting 
contexts of global politics has often gravitated towards the realms of fiction and 
fantasy. This seems to be particularly the case when grappling with the nascent 
international agency of China—an actor, whose conceptualization in world politics 
often straddles the invention/reality divide.  
 
Beijing’s enhanced confidence and ability to fashion international relations seems to 
have provoked both interest and anxiety. In particular, (Western) observers have 
been debating whether the ongoing transformations in China are spelling a move 
towards a more open liberal democratic state or to the entrenchment of totalitarian 
practices. Joseph Chan’s investigation addresses the pervasive uncertainty 
underpinning these processes by undertaking a detailed analysis of the 
philosophical and intellectual traditions underpinning China’s policy practices. His 
suggestion is that while impacted by current contingencies, the future of China’s 
governance practices – both domestic and international – will be framed by 
attitudes based on interpretations of the past. As Chan indicates, looking back at 
past experience will necessarily provide indeterminate outcomes on the particulars 
of Chinese thinking about governance. 
 
The thrust of Chan’s argument is that Confucian practices and thought not only offer 
unparalleled insights into China’s rise to global prominence, but that they also 
provide a global model that can be emulated by “other societies whose cultures may 
benefit from contemplating, and perhaps applying in practice, the deepest 
principles of Confucian thought” (p. 204). In short, Chan’s analysis suggests that the 
democracy-totalitrianism bifurcation that seems to dominate so much of current 
debates on China’s future trajectories tends to occlude a far more nuanced 
BOOK REVIEWS 
280 
understanding of governance rooted in China’s own traditions. Thus, neither 
“democracy”, nor “totalitarianism” are relevant labels that capture the full spectrum 
and complexity of Beijing’s policy contexts and practices – in fact, Chan implies that 
they are inappropriate as shortcuts for explanation and understanding of China’s 
domestic policies and international outreach. In this setting, the contention of the 
book is that China promotes a distinct Chinese mode of meritocracy that promotes 
Confucian perfectionist approach to politics (on both the domestic and the world 
stage). As Chan demonstrates, the outlines of this model are fairly straightforward: it 
merely “assesses social and political institutions with reference to the Confucian 
conception of the good” (p. 18).  
 
The book articulates the framework of the model of Confucian perfectionism in two 
separate, but interrelated moves. Firstly, it considers the connections between 
political authority and political institutions in Chinese political traditions. What is 
particularly interesting here is that Chan offers probably the first-to-date definitions 
of a Confucian understanding of “the good life” – namely,  as “a broad conception 
that takes material well-being, moral self-cultivation and virtuous social 
relationships as constituents of ‘the good life’ for a normal human being, with the 
ideal of sagehood as the highest good” (p. 44). Secondly, the book undertakes a 
parallel assessment of the notions of human rights, civil liberties, and social justice. 
Such a comparative study brings together both Confucian and Western perspectives 
on political theory. The emphasis, however, is on the Chinese content of these 
concepts and the suggestion that a virtuous political process “requires citizens to be 
open-minded, to justify opinions with reasons that others can share, to attempt to 
limit the extent and depth of disagreement” (p. 201). Thus, as long as Confucian 
perfectionism imbibes actual policy practice, human rights – as understood by 
Western democratic theory – are not a requirement of governance. Yet, should 
government fail the political ideal of Confucianism than human rights have to be 
installed as an “instrumental fallback apparatus” (p. 113). 
 
In this respect, Chan’s framework is both rarely original and profoundly disruptive of 
established Western ways of doing and thinking about democratic politics. As the 
book demonstrates, the patterns of China’s policy making presents an intriguing 
intersection of the discursive memory of the past with the contexts of the present 
and the anticipated tasks of the future. Chan’s analysis provides a stimulating 
framework for the discussion of the prospective trajectories of Chinese governance. 
At the same time, his analysis offers a wealth of solid knowledge on the evolution, 
patterns, and practices of China’s policy thinking and practice. Thus, to the buffs of 
Chinese politics, Chan’s account offers a superbly researched assessment of the 
strategic culture underpinnings Beijing’s governance. Moreover, Chan’s study of the 
long shadow of Confucian political philosophy uncovers the ideational 
considerations framing Beijng’s current policy outlook. It is expected that the book 
will be welcomed by students and scholars alike – especially, those interested in 
Asian studies, political philosophy, democratic theory, comparative politics, and 
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international relations. At the same time, Chan’s careful examination of the impact 
of Confucian thinking on China’s current governance mechanisms makes available a 
rarely compelling perspective that is bound to attract policy makers and pundits 
interested in Chinese strategic thinking. 
 
 
Mats Benner (ed.), Before and Beyond the Global Economic Crisis: Economics, 
Politics and Settlement (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013)  
 
Monika Kokstaite 
IMT Lucca 
 
In Search for a Politics, Economy and Society After the Crisis 
 
The economic crisis has been and continues to be a hot topic within the field of 
social science. Recently published book Before and Beyond the Global Economic 
Crisis: Economics, Politics and Settlement, edited by Mats Benner, presents a rich 
volume of essays, concluding the project ‘After the Crisis - a research programme on 
the political economy of the future’, conducted at the Pufendorf Institute at Lund 
University from August 2009 till May 2011. This eclectic collection of various 
insights on economic crises, their historical roots, the factors that led to them, and, 
especially, a wide and deep discussion of institutional responses to crisis contribute 
to vast academic literature on the topic.  
 
As the editor of the book advocates, the key issues emerging from the crisis are 
analyzed across a range of fields, namely macroeconomics, politics, economic 
history, social policy, linguistics and global economic relations. The book aims to 
provide the ways out of the currents crisis and to analyze what lies beyond it. Given 
the interdisciplinary approach and the diversity of topics scrutinized, there can be 
several main groups of questions distinguished. The first group of essays – chapters 
1 to 4 – dwells on structural composition of the economy prior and after the crisis, 
revealing the evolving patters of growth and regulation beyond the crisis. Sections 5 
to 7 explore social and political consequences of economic crises, with particular 
emphasis on Swedish experience in the past. The remaining part of the book 
examines the forms of society, economy and polity after the crisis, with the last 
chapters focusing on the means to handle the current crisis and their relationship to 
economic growth including socio-economic development within new economic 
system. 
 
The book's strengths stem from interdisciplinary research and a diversity of 
questions analyzed in response to crisis. Chapter by chapter, the volume builds an 
extensive overview of economic development, theoretical discussions and 
comparative studies, including the cases from 20th century. It provides interesting 
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reasons and explanations of the recent crisis. Consequently, the long term impact of 
current economic crisis is portrayed through exploration and summary of other 
ways, patters and solutions developed after the other crises in the past, mainly from 
Sweden's experience. Several comparative studies, covering mostly Europe, allow to 
make even further reaching conclusions. Furthermore, the views and 
recommendations presented in most of the chapters are equally useful for scholars 
and policy-makers. Some of the texts literary provide road-maps for actions, policies 
or areas for future research in various disciplines. For example, Jonung indicates 
policy recommendations regarding macroprudential supervision, targeting the role 
of central banks and financial stability council quite to the point of the ongoing 
discussion in the European Union in the last years, whereas Boyer extensively 
elaborates on the future research agendas in post-crisis finance and 
macroeconomics. As a result, the book will be interesting not only for scientific 
community, including academics, students and researchers, but also policy-makers 
in related fields of policy, will find the volume useful for the information and 
reference. What is more, the reference to the past enlights crucial transformations, 
which can seem improbable at the moment. 
 
However, several remarks should be made regarding the weak sides of the book. As 
much as the book aims at covering all the most important issues in the fields of 
economics, political science and sociology, the coverage includes only micro-scale 
studies, with exception of theoretical and few comparative macro-scale works. 
Given the interdisciplinary approach the authors have utilized, as well as the cases 
selected, some researchers may find portions of the book, or chapters, to be 
somewhat superfluous, as they may find section devoted to other disciplines 
unnecessary for their purposes. Additionally, while there is some attention given to 
Europe and other countries in the world, like China, the main focal point are 
changes in Sweden. As such, academics interested in these transformations 
elsewhere may not find this book of particular importance. Readers investigating 
these specific topics and country may find a particular chapter to be useful, but this 
is not a book to be read from front to back cover, as the chapters seem quite 
disconnected and there is little overarching continuous theme between the essays 
and their contents, besides the general issue of crisis. Moreover, one will find 
strange the book's main target of analysis - Sweden. As much as Swedish case can be 
seen as followed and representative example of the issues in other countries, there 
are some observations to mention. The differences between countries can be 
extreme. Even in European Union, member states vary on the basis of domestic 
policies, regulatory structures, monetary and fiscal policies, not to mention 
institutional frameworks, electoral systems or social structure. This can lead to 
different experiences, leading to different solutions and lessons to learn in the 
future. On top of that, comparison between Sweden and other countries would have 
quite contributed to the volume, leaving readers more convinced about windows for 
opportunity, especially for policy change. Simultaneously, combination and 
integration of qualitative and quantitative methods would have helped to provide 
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broader picture of the situation. Finally, a reader might feel discontented with some 
mismatches, ambiguous reasoning and decisions of the authors, such as general 
comment that post communist countries were not successful in transition (chapter 
1); or a choice to analyze just two texts for each category from the same year, and 
then conclude about finding no variation in the texts and little effect of crisis on 
public rhetorics from basically just few sources (chapter 5). Likewise, chapter 9 
might leave a reader unsatisfied with only several pages of the analysis of the case 
of China, regarding responses to crisis, paying insignificant attention to housing 
affordability and migration problems. 
 
Overall, the volume remains an informative reference on economic crisis, 
identifying possible ways, patters and solutions for more sustainable economy, 
society and polity in the future. The texts present possible upgrades and new 
functioning of institutions, based on the analysis of existing frameworks and cases in 
the past. The crisis is not only a challenge, but also an opportunity to address long 
term problems by reconsidering established conventions. Interdisciplinary book's 
profile demands a versatile reader, concerned about different questions and 
advanced in various disciplines. As each chapter addresses the key issues of crisis 
from macroeconomics, politics, economic history, sovial policy, linguistics and 
economic relations, there is any broader connection or common trends between the 
texts of specific cases. Before and Beyond the Global Economic Crisis: Economics, 
Politics and Settlement paves the way for future research on crisis, pioneers by 
contributing to the question of the analysis by impressive interdisciplinary approach, 
and presents multiplicity and complexity of addressing post crisis environment 
nowadays. 
 
 
Mark A. Menaldo, Leadership and Transformative Ambition in International 
Relations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013) 
 
István Tarrósy 
University of Pécs 
 
Formulating and managing international relations is – for obvious reasons – closely 
tied with political leaders and their motivations. It is therefore relevant to look into 
what distinguishes the unique characters of the decisive actors, examining their 
“transformative ambitions”, which “often combine a desire for personal 
achievements with service to the common good” (p. 5). While realist leaders strive 
for their states’ and their own survival, and for them the security of their states is top 
priority on the political agenda, strategy is assumed to be the dominant feature in 
the ambition of both democratic and autocratic leaders according to the theory of 
strategic political survival. Mark A. Menaldo offers a systematically critical 
investigation of both, together with what personality scholars think about political 
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ambition, proposing: “individual ambition can have a public scope beyond private 
aggrandizement” (p. 9). Leadership and Transformative Ambition in International 
Relations is a well-researched account with clear arguments presenting an 
alternative approach to understand the nature and consequences of the ambitions 
of political leaders, thus, to contribute to the better understanding of foreign 
policies and international affairs in general. 
 
In seven chapters a very disciplined and clearly argumentative line of thoughts 
conducts the reader in the role statesmanship plays in foreign affairs. Many 
exemplary political leaders ranging from Otto von Bismarck to Woodrow Wilson, 
Charles de Gaulle and Pericles, and fundamental political thinkers such as Aristotle 
or Niccòlo Macchiavelli are shown as case studies in the analysis. As realists think, 
while strategic leaders want to grab and hold power – fostering their own interests –
, to get prepared for survival becomes their primary and foremost ambition. 
Illustrating this issue with the cases of some Latin-American dictators, such as 
Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay and Fidel Castro of Cuba, Menaldo highlights the 
role of unique personal characteristics to drive ambition and how politics is 
directed. From this point of view, Castro did differ from Stroessner as he did not 
only capture and possess all moral and political authority, but also “transform and 
reinvent Cuba” (p. 51) and introducing a new political culture with all its 
revolutionary and transformative – as he thought – values, norms, attitudes and 
beliefs. 
 
Although realism can offer an interpretative framework on, for example, power 
maximization and how this benefits leaders, it is “not interested in the traditional 
view of leadership […] [and] qualities such as courage, moderation, prudence, 
justice, and patriotism” (p. 54). Menaldo points out that neither realism, nor the 
strategic perspective theory deem the behavior of leaders as much responsible for 
the actual practice of statesmanship as the personality approach, which draws our 
attention to the character of the leader.  
 
Bismarck’s example first offers a thought about how “he perfectly exploited 
opportunities but could also show restraint” (p. 32) while – as a leader genius – 
applying realpolitik both in terms of his desire for Prussia’s international role and 
with the unification of Germany; but second, also to “his realism [… which] 
undermines some key realist premises,” as long as he happened to be “a political 
and moral relativist” (p. 33). Both domestic (internal) politics and external affairs are 
important terrains of the investigation of political ambition and leadership, in 
particular, if we accept Menaldo’s argument that leaders are first of all accountable 
to the people who voted for them, or support them to hold any high office. Another 
example in the book is Pericles, the prime leader of democratic Athens, who also 
proved how important it was to link domestic and foreign policies. He did not want 
only to foster democracy in Athens, but also to reorganize the Athenian Empire at its 
height to strengthen its position those days. 
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The issue of power that can highly motivate a number of individuals provides 
another intriguing perspective of the personality approach. Those people who are 
driven by grabbing and keeping power chase resilient solutions; they “have a 
problem adapting to political contexts that demand flexibility” (p. 57). The list may 
be long mentioning autocratic leaders such as Saddam Hussein or Robert Mugabe.  
 
Woodrow Wilson is a manifestation – to Menaldo – of a political personality whose 
goals “were as breathtakingly ambitious as they were unconventional,” (p. 63) trying 
to offer a new international order based on – among others – collective security and 
self-determination, as laid down in his speech delivered to the US Congress on 
January 8, 1918. His proactive engagement in international politics assumed not 
only political but also moral leadership, emphasizing the importance of the proper 
interpretation of interests, and therefore, the possibilities rhetoric offers, “that 
could capture the hearts and minds of the public” (p. 64). Today, this approach in 
international relations is better known as ‘soft power’, which has become an 
inevitable part of how states and other non-state actors can foster smarter policies 
of behavior in the global arena.  
 
Mark A. Menaldo offers a critique of James MacGregor Burns’ theory of 
transformational leadership (in chapter 4,), stating that Burns “abstracts too much 
and misses the realities of regime politics and concrete expressions of political 
ambition” (p. 81). Menaldo is successful in expanding the idea of transformational 
leadership by pointing out the significance of self-realization in understanding this 
complex notion. Virtue and honor, courage, political ambition and justice, but most 
important of all, “magnanimity [which] involves all the other virtues Aristotle 
examines in [his book] Ethics” (p. 100), and “entails great political ambition and also 
concerns honor, but not just any kind of honor. […] the desire to take part in great 
deeds” (p. 110). Who can be the successor – in practical terms – to carry on with the 
achievements? Pericles, for instance, is presented as one of the greatest 
transformative and most innovative leaders who relied too much on his own 
statesmanship, and although “had a unique ability to guide Athens’ imperial might 
and resolve tension between democracy and empire,” could not “pass the torch 
when he was gone” (p. 170).  
 
Leadership and Transformative Ambition in International Relations is a strong 
scholarly contribution to the study of international relations. It is based on a deep 
understanding of the phenomenon of ambition in politics, which can present more 
aspects for further investigation, in particular, the moral perceptions of leaders and 
their connection with the political regime. The author succeeds in his original goals 
to uncover the complexity of the role of statesmanship from an innovative angle 
departing from leaders’ political ambition. One of the strengths of the book is how 
neatly the different chapters are sewn into a coherent flow of discussion: each 
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chapter closes so swimmingly presenting the major problem the author will 
elaborate on in the next one. His sophisticated and highly plausible argumentation 
– although sometimes, especially in the first couple of pages seemingly more 
repetitive and didactic than needed –, together with the fine analytical portraits of 
exemplary leaders, as well as the selection of references (pp. 177-192), all result in a 
volume, which can be recommended to academics, students of IR, political science 
and history, but certainly to politicians and policy-makers as a handbook to use in 
their own learning processes.  
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